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Abstract
There are many challenges to make micropayment systems on the Internet work as
reliably, safely and efficiently as they need to. I have studied many of these problems,
and seen how different researchers have tried to solve the challenges. A summary of
many of these problems and suggested solutions are presented in this thesis.

A new micropayments system is presented, based on Merkle's authentication tree and
Wintemitz's one-time signatures. The scheme can add efficiency and flexibility to a
range of existing micropayment schemes based on hash chains. Unlike earlier system,
hash chains can be made relatively short, since the computational cost of
authenticating a new hash chain is made small.

An implementation of suggested micropayment system has been done; this is new. An
implementation of the Wintemitz signature scheme has also been made. This
signature scheme is mostly discussed only in theory in the literature, and only a few
implementations exist. Both the Wintemitz signature scheme and the new payment
system have been tested for time and space requirements and compared favourably to
well known signature systems like DSA and RSA. With optimal settings, a Wintemitz
signature can be done 14 times as fast as DSA (1024) and 28 times as fast as RSA
(1024).

Storage requirements are a problem for the Wintemitz signatures. A second
implementation was therefore made, focusing on this problem. The storage required
by the signer was thus reduced by a factor of about 28 by sacrificing some signature
speed.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The introduction of the web browsers in 1993 changed the Internet considerably. All
of a sudden everybody with a computer could navigate the World Wide Web, and it
was no longer an exclusive club for computer people. It didn't take long before
businesses started to use the Internet to promote themselves, and to sell goods and
services. This development has exploded in the last few years, and will keep on going
at an accelerated speed for years to come.

Being able to perform payments and trust them to be secure is a vital part of a
business infrastructure. A lot of research has been undertaken into making payments
secure on the Internet. Computationally demanding cryptography, and especially
public key cryptography are means by which security is achieved, but there are still a
lot of challenges ahead.

One particular category of electronic payments is called micropayments. These are
payments with a very small value, typically from less than a cent to a few dollars. A
large number of transactions are expected to be made since each payment is worth so
little. This means that a higher level of efficiency is required than for other (macro-)
payment systems. It is a major challenge to make the micropayment systems
computationally efficient enough while keeping the appropriate level of security. It
seems to be the view of the crypto-community that public-key signatures are too
computationally expensive, and other methods must be found instead. Several
schemes use one-way hash functions to obtain the desired speed and efficiency. Both
Rivest and Shamir [Ri,Sh'96], and Anderson, Manifavas and Sutheriand [An, Ma,
Su'97] use hashing to produce the actual tokens. Glassman, Manasse, Abadi, Gauthier
and Sobalvarro [Milli'95], use hashing to authenticate the payments by utilising
Message Authentication Codes (MACs).

1.1 Contributions made in this thesis
Many papers have been written on micropayments (most of them after 1996). I have
studied a variety of these and collected the different problems, concerns and
suggested solutions to given problems discussed in different systems. Naturally,
several researchers address the same issues, but they address them in different ways
with different perspectives. It can be difficult to get a full overview of what has and
what has not been done. A summary of how some of these papers intend to solve
various problems can therefore be very useful for people intending to study the field
of micropayments.

Possible improvements to micropayments based on hash chains are suggested. A
framework for a payment system is given, where the Wintemitz one-time signatures
are used. The system offers flexibility to existing payment systems.

I have made an implementation of the Wintemitz one-time signature as a part of the
suggested payment system. This signature scheme is often considered to be only of
theoretical value, but modifications have been done to make it's use feasible. With the
right conditions, a signature can be made about 28 times as fast as an RSA (1024)
signature [Ri, Sh, Ad78], and 14 times as fast as a DSA (1024) signature. DSA
(Digital Signature Algorithm) is a defined in the U.S. Federal Information Processing
Standard FIPS 186, named the Digital Signature Standard (DSS).

1.2 Outline of this thesis
Chapter 2 discusses the background material. A few of the cryptographic primitives
and functions used in this thesis are described. Background on conventional (macro-)
payment systems is also provided.

Chapter 3 is the summary of micropayment systems mentioned in Section 1.1. Some
of the major issues and their suggested solutions are described and discussed.

Chapter 4 is a description of the Merkle one-time signature, the Wintemitz one-time
signature and the Merkle authentication tree. These structures are used in the
suggested payment system.

Chapter 5 describes the suggested payment system mentioned in Section 1.1.
Modifications are done to the Merkle authentication tree and the Wintemitz signature
scheme. Properties that can be gained by using the suggested improvements are listed.

Chapter 6 describes the details of the implementation mentioned in Section 1.1. Data
for signature sizes and operation time are presented.

The material in Chapters 5 and 6 in new and it is intended to be written up for
publication.

Chapter 2
Background
2.1 Technical background
2.1.1 Cryptographic functions
One-way functions
A one-way function (Diffie and Hellman, [Di, He76]) is informally a function that is
easy to compute, but hard to invert. If F is a one-way function, then it is easy to
oom^uiQ y=F(x). However, given

and F, it is difficult to compute x.

One-way hash functions
One-way hash functions, OWHF are a special family of one-way functions. A hash
function produces a finite length digest of an arbitrarily long message, Merkle
[Me'89]. A OWHF is often called a weak one-way hash function in cryptographic
literature, Menezes, van Oorschot and Vanstone [Me, Oo, Va'97]. Hash flmctions are
often written with a script font, and ^T/'will be used throughout this thesis.

Collision resistance
Hash functions that are used in cryptography often needs to be collision resistant.
Collision resistance can be defined as ([Me, Oo, Va'97]):
"Collision resistance - it is computationally infeasible to find any two distinct inputs x
and x' which hash to the same output, i.e., such that H(x) = Hfx'):'
Collision-resistant hash functions (CRHF) are often called strong one-way hash
functions in cryptographic literature [Me, Oo, Va'97].

Digital signatures
Digital signatures (public key) was first suggested by Diffie and Helman, [Di, He76],
and later explored by Rivest, Shamir and Adleman in [Ri, Sh, Ad78]. Much research
has been done in this area. Look in the [Me, Oo, Va'97], for a good covering of the
topic.

A signature scheme consists of two algorithms: signing algorithm and verification
algorithm. Each participant has a secret and a public key. Using the signature
algorithm, user A can use its secret key to sign a message. Anyone can use A's public
key and the verification algorithm to verify that the signature was produced by A.
Without the knowledge of A's secret key it is infeasible to make a signature that
appears to be made by A.
2.1.2 Notation
Binarv concatenation
Binary concatenation is represented with 11. Given two bit strings A and B, the
resulting bit string C that is produced by appending BtoA is: C =A 11

A=JOJO 3=1100

C=A\\B=10101100

Public key functions
There are two or more players in a signature scheme. Let them be the signer^, and
the verifier B. They have a set of keys each containing a secret and a public key. The
secret key of A is named SKA, and the corresponding public key is PKA. A message M
signed by party A is written as
eyes only is written

IF A

sends

<M>SKA

<M>SKA,

and a message M' encrypted by B for A's

<M'>PKA.

to B, it is assumed that B also receives M, unless otherwise noted

(this is not true i f B sends

<M'>PKA

to

A).

It is common practice to sign a digest of a message rather then the whole message, to
save space. Let

HHQ2I

hash function. If the texts says that A sends

then it implies that^ actually sends

<H(M)>SKA.

<M>SKA

to

B,

2.2 Introduction to electronic payment systems
There has been a lot of research in the area of electronic payments during the last
twenty years or so. Some of the first research and discoveries in this field was done by
David Chaum [Ch'82].

Electronic payments can be defined in several ways. In general, an electronic payment
protocol aims at making it convenient, safe and cheap to make payments over a
network. Damgard , in [Da'88], use a very general, yet fitting definition:" Payment
systems and credential mechanisms are protocols that allow individuals to conduct a
wide range of financial and social activities while preventing even infinitely powerful
and cooperating organizations from monitoring these activities".
Other definitions have been and will be used by other people. In this thesis I will use a
very wide definition: any payment made over a computer network will fall into the
category of electronic payments. This definition includes all types of computer
networks, but the focus in this thesis will be on Internet payment systems (IPS) [Sh,
Sw'98].

Several electronic payment schemes have been made; some just as theoretical papers,
some with trail implementations, and some that are actually being used in the market
today. According to [Milli'95], some of these are: DigiCash, Open Market,
CyberCash, First Virtual, NetBill.

2.3 The entities in an electronic payment system
When we focus on the Internet in specific, we talk about an Internet payment system
(IPS). Several parties are involved in an IPS, and these will vary depending on the
scheme. A Delphi survey done by Shon and Swatman in [Sh, Sw'98] showed six
important players. These were financial institutions, IPS providers, merchants,
customers, regulators and network providers.

Different schemes focus on different parties, and most schemes do not consider all of
these. A trusted third party (TTP) is needed in addition to the six mentioned above, to
distribute verified public keys.

Financial institutions. Their main function is to handle the real money transactions. It
might be a bank that does money transfers between accounts, or a credit card
company that can bill a cardholder.

IPS providers. These are the manufacturer and provider of IPS services. They will
most likely work closely with one or more financial institutions, or they might
actually be the same entity.
Several IPS systems use on-line verification of payments. In these cases the IPS might
work as a clearing server that must approve each payment.

Vendors. These are the merchants that do business on the Internet. It might be a small
one-man business, or it might be a large electronic department store. The vendor
might sell services, electronic goods that can be transferred over the network, or
physical goods that must be sent by normal mail.

Customers. These are the general users of the IPS system that will use the scheme to
pay for merchandise. It might be an individual sitting at home at a PC, or it might be a
large cooperation. As long as the entity is paying someone it will be identified as a
user. Customer and user will be used as the same entities in this thesis.
Regulators. This refers to the legal authority. Their concerns might be the impact of
the IPS on the financial system, if it allows payments to be tracked, the protection of
users etc. They might establish an entity that will help settle disputes between parties
Network providers. These parties supply the actual network facilities, such as
telecommunication capabilities and other necessities to make the Internet work.
Trusted Third Partv (TTP). The TTP lets entities look up and verify other entities'
public keys.
Broker. Brokers were first introduced in MilliCent [Milli'95], and are mostly used
with micropayment systems. The broker is a link between users, financial institutions
and vendors. The broker will produce and/or sell valid money, and/or issue
certificates to authorise customers as rightful users of the system. Depending on the

scheme in question, the broker might do other tasks like account handling and
reimbursement.

2.3.1 A payments scenario
A small example of how a payment scheme is provided to give the reader an idea of
how it can work. The scenario given is not taken from a particular scheme. Details
about cryptographic techniques have been left out for the sake of simplicity and
generality.

Alice has a bank account with Bank One. She wants to withdraw $40 worth of
electronic money from that account, and contacts Bank One online. Bank One
provides her with the $40, and deducts that amount from her account. Each piece of
money has been signed with the bank's digital signature, using the bank's private key.
Alice can verify this signature by using the bank's public key. This key can be
provided and verified by a Trusted Third Party.

Later, Alice finds some music she wants to buy on the site of the music store Tunes.
She pays them the $5 required to buy the two songs she wants. Tunes controls the
structure of the money and Bank One's signature to make sure the money is authentic.
Then they give Alice the passwords to download the music she has bought.

At some point during the day, Tunes contacts Bank One to get redeemed for the
payment Alice made. (Any other payments made to Tunes by Bank One customers
are settled at the same time.) A record of the transaction between Alice and Tunes is
sent to Bank One, who controls the electronic money. Tunes get their $5, and Bank
One keeps a record of the payment for future reference.

2.4 Classifications of payment systems.
There are several ways to identify and classify payment systems. Ferrira and Dahab
[Fe, Da'98] have written a paper that focuses on this particular issue. Some of the
major classifications will be mentioned here.

2.4.1 On-line or off-line
Systems that are on-line differ fundamentally from those that are off-line. Normally, it
is the financial institution's on-line status we are referring to, but it could also be a
broker, or the IPS provider and its payment server (the entity in question will be
referred to as a payment authority in this section).

If the system is on-line, the vendor will contact a payment authority in real time while
a transaction is being done. The payment authority will check if the payment is valid,
if the user has tried to spend this money before, if the user has enough funds to make
the payment and so on. Only after the payment authority has accepted the payment
will the vendor go through with the transaction.
In an off-line scheme the contact between the vendor and the payment authority is
much less frequent. The vendor will normally contact the payment authority at regular
interval (e.g. once a day) to clear the payments he has received and to get reimbursed
for them.

An on-line scheme has the advantage of increased security, as the payment authority
approves every transaction before it is made. The drawback is that it increases
communication costs, system costs (systems must be available at all times) transaction
times etc. The off-line schemes do not need all this, but more complex (and more
expensive) computations will normally be involved to preserve the required level of
security.

2.4.2 Hardware or software based
Several systems have been proposed that take the advantage of using a piece of
specialized hardware. This might be a PCMCIA (Personal Computer Memory Card
International Association) card to a PC, a smart card or other devices. Dedicated
hardware is often referred to as an electronic wallet. The wallet might consist of
several parts, and one of these must be tamper resistant to safeguard against backward
engineering and other attacks.

An early electronic wallet was proposed by Even and Goldreich in [Ev, Go'83;.
Further work has been done in several papers by Chaum , Pedersen, Brands and
others. Some of the most current and detailed work can bee seen in the ESPRIT
project CAFE [CAFE]. Mondex (www.mondex.com) is an up and running service
that uses smart cards to store information, and special devices (including phones) to
make transfers between cards.

Hardware based systems have several advantages over software based ones. It is
assumed that the hardware in question is tamper resistant, and thus it is infeasible for
the user to change the data in it by physically opening the device. This makes it easier
to control things like double spending, as the device will prevent a user spending the
same money twice or tampering with the registers that hold the monetary values.
The main drawback with a hardware based system is increased costs. Every user and
point of sale (POS) must have one or more pieces of specialised hardware (both the
wallet and a device to read the data). Also, if the user does not have access to his
device, then he cannot perform and transaction.

2.4.3 Value of payments
The security of the payment system needs to be better when the vale of each payment
gets increases. Ferreira and Dahab, [Fe, Da'98], defines three broad size groups as
large, medium to small and micro. Large payments are those of several hundred
dollars, and such payments will be on-line for many years to come to make fraud very
difficult. Medium to small payments range from a few dollars up to a few hundred.
This is the type of payments that most of the research is being focused around.
Micropayments does not really have a defined lower threshold, but the upper limit is
normally set to a few dollars. More details of micropayments are given in Chapter 3.

2.4.4 Payment types
Two major groups of payments are token based and notational systems, [Fe, Da'98].
Token-based systems operate with specific pieces of digital information often referred
to as tokens or electronic coins. These will often have a set face value, and the user
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will have to pay the vendor with several coins to get the exact amount due. Tokenbased systems are often called cash like systems.

Most notational payment systems are either cheque based or account based. The user
will sign an electronic "cheque" or an account transfer authorisation with a digital
signature, and the vendor will show this to the right payment authority to get
redeemed.
We also make a distinction between pre-paid and credit based systems. This is tightly
linked with the above-mentioned grouping. A pre paid system will normally be token
based. A user buys tokens from a payment authority, and these tokens will be
presented to a vendor as payments. Most systems use tokens that can only be showed
once, but some schemes have proposed tokens that can be used multiple times [Fe'93].
A notational system with normally be credit or debit based.

2.5 Properties of an electronic payment system
Depending on the scheme and the authors behind it, different properties will be
considered important. It would be very difficult to make a payment scheme that
satisfies every possible need, so choices and priorities must be made. The most
common properties found in systems are listed below.
•

Anonymity. Several systems focus on the protection of the identity of the user.

The idea is that no entity A in the system should be able to track how another entity B
spends his or her money. Even a bank should not be able to make a connection
between a customer and the money that has been issued to that customer. A possible
exception from this might be regulators, to make it possible to track and stop online
criminal activity.
The earliest mechanism for providing anonymity was blind signatures, invented by
David Chaum [Ch'82]. These signatures allow a financial institution to sign electronic
money without being able to make a connection between the user and the serial
numbers on that money.
Ivan Damgard introduced a system using pseudonyms in [Da'88]. This allowed a
single user to identify him or her self as different entities to different organizations. A

TTP is needed to keep track of use different pseudonyms. A similar approach is used
in the NetBill protocol [Co, Ty, Si'95].

•

System security. Security is a very wide term, and could be sub divided into

several different properties like integrity and robustness [Fe, Da'98], privacy,
confidentiality and non-repudiation.
This is the most important property of any payment scheme.
System security makes it intractable for any entity to do anything that entity is not
authorized to do. No entity should be able to spend more funds than it is allowed to.
No entity should be able to unlawfully assume a different identity than its own. No
entity should be able to manipulate another entity's data. It should be possible to
detect, prevent and punish unauthorized use.
Encryption and signatures with public keys are two of the major tools for achieving
this. Symmetric encryption and one-way functions are also used.

•

Cost. The cost of doing a transaction should be low compared to the value of the

actual transaction. The system must be cheap for a customer to use, but it must also be
profitable for the IPS provider.

•

Prevent double spending. This goes hand in hand with system security, but it is so

important that it deserves special mentioning.
It is very easy to copy electronic data, and thus electronic money. This is a major
disadvantage electronic money has compared to normal cash, which is considered to
be intractable to copy.
Double spending is also tightly linked to anonymity. If the system has perfect
anonymity, it is difficult and/or expensive to prevent and detect double spending; and
double spending is easy to handle if there is no anonymity.
A system was introduced by Chaum, Fiat and Naor in [Ch, Fi, Na'88], which allow
double spenders to be caught. The user's identity is protected as long as no double
spending is done. But it is possible for the bank to find the user's identity if the user
spends the same electronic coin more then once.
Other ways to prevent double spending are used in different schemes.

•

Divisibility. It must be easy to pay a vendor the exact amount that he asks for.

This is not a problem in a notational system, but a token based system must have
mechanisms for dealing with this.

Chapter 3
Aspects of micropayments
3.1 Desired properties for mieropayment systems
The major differences between properties for macro- and mieropayment systems
evolve around the value of each individual payment. A lot of work has gone into
making the systems faster and more efficient, and thus computationally cheaper. A
long list of different properties required or desired can be composed, and it would be
favourable to have as many of them in both macro- and mieropayment systems.
However, some of them need special consideration to make mieropayment systems
work:

•

Minimization of computational requirements for the system. Since each payment

is so small, it should not require much use of expensive hardware to make it. This
goes for both the creation, verification and depositing of the electronic money. One of
the key methods used is to minimize the use of public key operations. Macropayment
schemes often use public key signatures to bind a payment to an entity, but this is
deemed too expensive for micropayments.
Common techniques are the use of efficient one-way hashing schemes and private key
cryptography.

•

Minimization of the communication costs. Communications between the parties

involved costs both time and money. See Section 3.4 on on-line vs. off-line payments
for details.

•

Certified delivery. This is a guarantee for both parties involved in a transaction to

ensure they both will get what they want. For the customer this means that he or she
will have to pay if and only if the goods are delivered. For vendors it means that the
customer will only get the goods if the payment is made. This is possible with
micropayments, since the goods often will be delivered over the same network as the
payments.

•

Micromerchants support. Micromerchant is a name used for entities selling only

small amounts of electronic goods. They will most likely be individuals without a
large support system, but who have goods that people are willing to pay for. Examples
might be freelance reporters or artists.

•

Handling streaming. Micropayments can be used to pay for media and other

services where a payment is good for a time period. This can for example be
telephone calls or pay per view movies. The payment system must handle streaming
of media and other time dependant service like these.

3.1.1 Other properties wanted in both macro- and micropayment schemes:
•

Offer strong security for all parties.

•

Minimize the need for special hardware.

•

Minimize fraud in the system. Special consideration should be given to double

spending.
•

All parties must be able to authenticate themselves as valid entities to other parties

they are dealing with.
•

Fairness.

•

Provide users with anonymity, privacy and untraceability.

•

Scalability. There should not be any bottlenecks in the system.

•

It should be easy to pay any arbitrary value in a transaction.

•

Transferability. It should be possible for several parties to make payments with

the same piece of electronic money before cashing it with a financial institution
•

Interoperability. The system should support multiple currencies. It should also be

possible to deposit a piece of electronic money with another financial institution than
the one that originally made or issued it.
•

Non-repudiation. An entity should not be able to go back on a deal that has been

agreed upon through the participation in a transaction.

3.2 Setting for micropayment schemes
The entities in a micropayment scheme are mostly the same as in a macropayment
system. However, there are a few differences, and some of the entities can perform
different tasks. The main difference probably is the broker.

3.2.1 The broker
The broker was introduced in the Millicent scheme presented in [Milli'95], and is used
in many other papers since. It acts as a link between the customers, vendors and
financial institutions, and can handle the customers' and vendors' accounts.

The broker will sell or issue electronic money to customers, and will redeem vendors
when they contact the broker to return the money. Another option is to let the broker
certify the customers to produce electronic money for themselves. This saves
communication cost between brokers and customers, and computation costs for the
broker. By letting customers create their own payments we move towards a more
distributed system, and the chances of bottlenecks become fewer.

If the broker creates the payments, then these will be sold in bulk to the customers.
The customer will pay the broker through a macropayment system or with a credit
card. If the customer pays the broker with an anonymous macropayment system, then
the micropayment system in question can qualify for anonymity.

If the customer creates the payments, then the system cannot be anonymous. The
customer will pay the vendor, and the vendor will accept the payments because the

customer has a certificate from a trusted broker. To receive redemption, the vendor
sends this broker the money received from the customer. The broker checks the
payments, and if they are valid the vendor is paid and the customer is billed for the
purchase.

A third option is that the vendors produce the payments. This can be done in certain
systems where the payments are vendor specific, and was proposed in the Millicent
system [Milli'95]. The brokers will buy the payments from the vendors in large bulk
to get a good price, and sell them is smaller quantities to customers for a higher price.
The benefit of this system is that the vendor does not need to contact the broker for
redemption. But the downside is that the vendors need large hardware capacity to
produce the payments. The communication during the bulk purchases will be
relatively intensive, but no extra communication is produced. The payments will have
to go from the vendor to the broker either way, be it before or after the customer has
spent them.

3.3 Anonymity
In electronic payment systems anonymity refer to the property of protecting the actual
identity of the entities in the system. The main focus is to protect the identity of the
customers.

There are several motivations to protect the customers' anonymity, but they all evolve
around the ability to hide the customers' spending patterns. If these are not hidden,
data can be collected and profiles can be made to match each individual user's habits
in the digital environment. This can easily lead to what is called intrusive profiling
[Br'99]. The most obvious aspect of intrusive profiling is directed advertising, where
the user is 'bombarded' with ads and offers that have been custom made to his or her
interests and shopping routines. But more serious consequences like discrimination
and political assault are also quite likely

But it is not enough to protect the identity of each individual. We also need to make it
difficult to see of two payments have been made by the same entity or not. This
property is called unlinkability, and is tightly bound to anonymity.

Strong anonymity can be a problem in macropayment systems due to the potential of
criminal use. Authorities are not interested in creating new payment systems that are
attractive to criminals. If the anonymity is too strong, it will be impossible to trace
illegal transactions to either of the parties involved. This can be used for blackmail,
money laundering and other unlawful actions.

Criminal usage is much less of a problem with micropayment systems, as the values
are so low. After all, it will be somewhat difficult making much money with illegal
use of payments worth only a few cents each. This would lead one to think that
micropayment systems could have stronger, and perhaps absolute, anonymity
implemented. However, there are technical problems doing this:

As was mentioned in Chapter 2, one of the main ways of achieving anonymity is
using one-show blind signatures, first introduced in [Ch, Fi, Na'88]: These are a
special type of public key signatures that lets the signer sign a blinded message. Thus,
a customer can get a signature of the bank on electronic money, and the bank will not
be able to link that money (through its serial number) to that particular customer. This
scheme can work well for macropayments, but becomes too expensive for
micropayments. In general, the number of public key operations should be minimized
in a micropayment system, and one public key signature on each payment seems to be
too computationally expensive.

3.3.1 Properties of anonymous schemes
If a payment scheme is anonymous, it is infeasible to make the connection between a
user and a payment that have been made. That is, it should not be possible to find out
who was the paying party in a given transaction.

A consequence of anonymity is that the payment system must be pre-paid. If it is not
pre paid, then the customer must be sent a bill after the electronic money has been
spent. To do this, the bank must be able to make a connection between money spent
and the user that spent them.

3.3.2 Batch signatures
An option to validate electronic payments is to use batch signatures. This way, one
public key signature can be used to authenticate several payments, and the
computational cost can be spread out amongst them.

This method is used with several proposed systems based on chain and tree structures.
The names of some of there schemes (and the papers they are described in) are
PayWord[Ri, Sh'96], NetCard [An, Ma, Su'97], Pedersen's proposal [Pe'96], ^iKP[Ha,
St, Wa'96] and PayTree [Ju, Yu'96]. A series of payments are made from a single tree
or chain, and the root of the tree or chain is authenticated through a signature. Each
payment can be linked back to the signed root, and thus be verified as authentic.

A problem with batch signatures is the innate linkability between each single
payment. An aspect of the anonymity property is that it should not be possible to
identify two payments as coming form the same entity. This property is naturally
violated if each payment is verified by linking it back to another payment. However,
this can be acceptable for some payments, and can thus be used in certain
micropayment systems. Examples are phone calls or pay per view movies, where
several payments are made to pay for the same product (e.g. a payment every minute
for the duration of the movie). We still want to protect the customer's anonymity, but
it is acceptable that the vendor knows that each payment comes form the same
customer.

Another problem with batch signatures is how to handle partially spent batches. Since
anonymous schemes must be pre-paid, the money in a signed batch has already been
debited from the customer's account. Then the question arises what to do about the
money that is left in a partially used batch. Theoretically the vendor can give back
change, but this will violate the customer's anonymity. Another way to handle this is
by the bank refunding the customer at a later time, but this involves a fairly long
delay.

3.3.3 Pseudonyms
A non-cryptographic technique used to protect the anonymity of the customers is to
let them use pseudonyms instead of their real identity. This can be done in different
ways, but it will normally involve some type of anonymity server.

A user can register with an organization, and this will issue a public/private key pair,
not giving away the anonymity of the user. When the user deals with a vendor,
remailers and other services can be used to deliver the electronic goods to the
customer without revealing the identity. A problem with this type of anonymity is that
the financial institutions in the system might be unwilling to let anonymous customers
establish accounts. This can also interfere with tax laws and other regulations.

The payment service provider might also offer pseudonyms. This way, the customers
can identify themselves with different names to different vendors, and their spending
patterns will thus be hard to map. Banks can offer similar services, and some of the
above-mentioned problems can be avoided.

Using pseudonyms, every payment can be traced back to an identity. The security lies
in the infeasibility of linking that identity to an actual customer. However, if this can
be done once, than all other payments done by that customer using that pseudonym
can also be traced. This is a general problem with systems using pseudonyms.
Allowing customers to use several pseudonyms helps, but the linkability between
payments is still a problem.

Another problem with pseudonyms is that the anonymity is protected by trust rather
than the computational infeasibility of revealing the customer's identity. This can
prove to be a problem, but it can also fit nicely into the existing trust model. For
example, we already assume there exists a trusted party to issue public/private key
pairs.

3.4 On-line and off-line systems
Some macropayment systems use on-line verification of payments to strengthen the
security of the transactions. This is a useful technique to prevent fraud like double

spending and counterfeit money, but comes at a cost; namely the communication
overhead required. The vendor will contact the bank to make sure a payment is
authentic and in order before the transaction with the customer is executed.
This type of on-line verification (also called on-line payment) is considered to be too
expensive for micropayment schemes. However, several micropayment systems
propose to use of communications with the bank on other occasions than for
withdrawal and deposit. This will be discussed Section 3.5 about probabilistic
payments.
There are several drawbacks with on-line verification, besides the fact that it produces
time-delays due to communications. The overall cost of the systems also increases, as
does the chance for bottlenecks to occur.
If a vendor is to contact a payment authority for every payment, then that authority
must be on-line at all times. The cost for being able to handle high traffic even at peak
times will be considerable for the payment authority and thus for the system as a
whole. This might be bearable for a macropayment system, but may be too expensive
for a micropayment scheme. However, there are the cases where a payment system is
hybrid, handling both macro- and micropayments. The cost of the on-line system will
be spread out over a larger user and payment group, and this might make the system
economically feasible.
Related to the financial cost of the on-line system is the number of available on-line
payment authority servers. These servers can easily form bottlenecks in the system,
making delays too long. A network of servers is needed to handle the load, pushing
the price up further.

3.5 Probabilistic payment systems
Some of the problems with micropayments have tried to be addressed by adding the
property of chance to the system.

3.5.1 On-line verification
As mentioned, on-line verification of payments is considered too expensive for
micropayment systems. But what happens if only a few of the payments are verified
on-line and the rest are verified in batches at a later time (i.e. off-line verification).
The main reason for using on-line verification is to prevent double spending by users,
and also to make sure a customer does not overspend.
A vendor can accept most payments off-line to save communication costs and time
delays. However a small number of the payments picked at random will be checked
on-line before the transaction is completed. This will allow a few illegal payments to
be stopped before they are made, but more importantly it will discourage customers
from making fraudulent payments. If a user knows there is a chance of being caught,
this might stop him or her from cheating.
The probability for doing an on-line check should be proportional with the value of
the payment made. The greater the value, the bigger the chance that the payment will
be checked. This ensures that cheating becomes increasingly harder and more risky as
the intended fraud gets bigger.
However, it is not only cheating and fraud that can be controlled with probabilistic
on-line verification. It is also possible to monitor and to a certain degree control the
customers credit limit.
When a customer makes a payment to a vendor, this payment is checked on-line no
matter what. The bank will then know that the given customer is active with the
vendor, and will keep an eye on the credit limit of the customer. Whenever the vendor
sends a new payment for verification, the customer's usage is updated at the bank. If
the customer spends more then his or her limit, or shows signs of doing so, the bank
can contact all vendors dealing with that customer to stop all transactions. This
effectively stops the customer fi-om overspending any further.
The cost of such a system grows with the values of the transactions done. If the
scheme is used with relatively high valued payment, then the cost will get closer to

that of an on-line payment system. If all or most transactions stay small, then the
system will be closer to the cost of an off-line payment system: The vendor in every
payment systems needs to contact the bank at least once to deposit the electronic
money received from customers. With probabilistic verification the vendor will have
to contact the bank at least once per customer it deals with in addition to the
communication needed for deposit.
3.5.2 Probability of payments
A technique for cutting down on both communication- and computational costs is to
not pay every vendor every time a service is bought. It sounds a bit odd, but we can
add a probabilistic chance to see if a vendor will be paid or not. It can be seen as using
a specialized type of lottery tickets rather than electronic money as payments.
The idea is that it costs less to pay a few vendors than paying many. The few vendors
that gets paid will be paid a lot more than what a normal micropayment is worth, and
the law of large numbers will make sure the values evens out.
Normally, if a given vendors deals with a thousand customers in a day, it will receive
several payments from each of them and several thousand payments must be
processed. With this type of probability added only a handful of customers will
actually make a payment to the vendor in question. Both the communication costs for
deposit, and the bank's computational costs for checking the payments can thus be
greatly reduced.
There are several ways of achieving this type of probabilistic payments. The customer
can issue a 'payment' where the chance for getting paid is described. This chance can
be based on a number of things, and the question if an actual payment will be made or
not can be resolved instantaneous or there might be a delay.
For delayed decisions on who will and who will not get paid, an external source can
be used. Examples mentioned can be numbers form the state lottery.

Protocols that settled the question of payment in real time can make use of the
knowledge of the pre-images of one-way hash functions. The customer will choose
random winning numbers, and commit to these with a 'payment'. The vendor will
generate random numbers, trying to match the numbers of the customer. If the vendor
guess right it gets paid, otherwise the vendor provides the service for free.

In an example described in [Ri'97], the vendor generates a random 30-digit decimal
number w, and send the customer the hash value 0-C(w) . The customer will send a
'payment' committing to ^ w j a n d a winning condition. The winning condition is that
the last three digits of w must match a random number generated by the customer. The
vendor can easily check if it wins, and will send w to the customer if it does win.

Several problems arise with these types of probabilistic payments. One is that users of
the system might not feel comfortable with the uncertainty of payment. The vendors
never know exactly when and how much they will get paid, and the customers does
not know exactly how much they spend. Even though this will even out, many people
might object to the idea.

Another problem mentioned is that a system like this can conflict with the regulations
for lotteries. Even this is not a lottery authorities might see it differently. Also, since
lottery laws vary in individual countries, a probabilistic payment system will have to
be evaluated but local authorities. There is a danger that an otherwise good payment
system will not be accepted in a series of countries, and this will weaken the overall
acceptability and usefulness of the payment system.

3.6 Money production
Both macro- and micropayment systems have different types of money. They can be
divided into two main groups, namely token based and notational.

In token-based systems the electronic money is represented by specific digital patterns
with predetermined values. Tokens are similar to conventional coins and notes, and
several tokens might have to be used to pay a particular amount. Token-based systems

are often called cash like, and the tokens are often referred to as coins.

Several parties in the system can do the actual production of electronic money. An
issuing authority like a bank or a broker will often do it, but the customers can also do
it. Either way the vendor receiving the money must be able to verify the authenticity
of the payments.

3.6.1 Hash chains
Repeated hashing of a number is a much-used technique to produce the payments.
Each link in the hash chain will be a separate payment often referred to as a tick, a
coupon or a payword.

Some of the payment systems (and the papers describing them) using hash chains are
PayWord (in [Ri, Sh'96]), NetCard (in [An, Ma, Su'97]), Pedersen's proposal (in
[Pe'96]) and i^iKP (in [Ha, St, Wa'96]).

A hash chain is formed by repeatedly applying a one-way hash function on a
randomly generated number. Each link w/ in the chain is the hash value of the next
link Wi+i.

To make a chain of length «+7, a random number

must be generated. This will be

the last link in the chain.

Let HhQ a strong one-way hash function. The hash chain can then be generated in the
following manner:

Wi= H(wi+i)

Wo is called the root of the chain.

A chain like this has the nice property that, if w/ is made public, only the person who
generated the chain will know the value of

Any other entity must break the one-

way function

be able to find

3.6.2 Hash collisions
Let HhQ a strong one-way hash function. It is easy to find = H(x), given x and K It
is considered infeasible to find x given y and ^ and it is also infeasible to find two
values xi and X2 so that H(xi)= H(x2) and xi X2. The first problem is called reversing
the hash function, while the later is called finding a collision. However, given enough
time and computing power both of these tasks can be done.
In Micromint, [Ri, Sh'96], a system was presented where a broker with specialized
hardware can produce special electronic coins that consist of a k-way hash collision.
That is, a series of numbers xi, X2, ...,Xk are found such that
!Hlx])= J{(x2)=
=
The verification of such a coin is easy for anyone to do
given the numbers and the hash function K but it is infeasible to produce counterfeit
coins.
3.6.3 Scrip
The Millicent protocol, [Milli'95], presents a token based system, introducing scrip.
Scrip represents an account that a customer has with a given vendor. This way, the
money is both vendor and customer specific. A piece of scrip contains several data
items, including the identity of the vendor and customer and the monetary value of the
scrip. A secret key is adde to the scrip and a hash value produced, giving a certificate
in the form of a MAC.

3.7 Fraud and loss of money

Some micropayment schemes are not as concerned about absolute security against
loss or fraud as other payment systems with higher values per payment [Milli'95], [Ri,
Sh'96], [Mu, Va, Li'97]. Micropayments can be seen as pocket change, and it is no big
deal if a few micropayments get lost now and then. Likewise, a few occurrences of
fraud are accepted, but it must be possible to detect and stop large-scale frauds.

It is simply too expensive to have the necessary mechanisms to make sure every
single micropayment is protected and accounted for at every step of the protocol It is
enough to make fraud hard and detectable, [St, Va'97].

3.7.1 Fraud detection/prevention
The main device for preventing loss in the system is by secure production of the
electronic money. Some of these are described in Section 3.6.

The NetBill system [Si, Ty95] uses digital signatures for the transaction, which of
course is a very effective weapon against fraud. However, as mentioned earlier,
digital signatures are considered to be too computationally expensive for
micropayments.

The market forces are considered to have a large influence in many papers. It is often
assumed that customers and the market in general will shun vendors that cheat,
forcing them out of business. Some of the papers discussing this are SVP in [St,
Va'97], MicroPayments based on iKP in [Ha, St, Wa'96], Micro-Payments via
Efficient Coin-Flipping in [Li, Os'97] and PayWord in [Ri, Sh'96].

If the payment scheme is not anonymous, then the chance of fraud goes down. A
person is less likely to cheat if his or her identity is known to the parties he or she is
cheating. The problem of fraud then becomes tightly linked to the authentication of
the entities in the system, and whether or not a person can manage to get a fake
identity and thus avoid paying their debts.

Overspending is an issue that may or may not be actual fraud, depending on the
system. In a credit based system, an over spender who pays his or her bills has only
committed a minor offence against the financial institution in question, and might
have to pay an additional fee. If the system is pre paid, overspending will most likely
be considered fraud, as the person is spending funds he or she should not have access
to.

Some of the most effective methods to prevent fraud and overspending are on-line
verification, one-show blind signatures and tamper resistant hardware devices.

3.8 Authentication
In a computer environment where all entities have public/private key pairs, we can
use the public key to identify individual, for example through X.509 certificates [Cho,
Na, Pu, Un'98].
Macropayment systems often rely on public key signatures to authenticate users, as
does some micropayment systems. However, several micropayment systems do not
use public key signatures at all, to save costs, and need other ways to identify users of
the system.

If public key signatures are used, then this will normally just be used for one payment,
or a commitment for the payments to come. Micropayment systems don't use a public
key signature on each individual payment, so all systems need other measures to
identify separate payments.

3.9 Protecting the customers rights
Customers want to be sure they get what they pay for, and vendors wants to be sure
they get paid. This property is easy to fulfil with conventional purchases, as the
customer and vendor are in the same room, exchanging goods for money.
It is difficult, and often impossible to get this property working in macropayment
systems, as goods often are physical. If they are, then the vendor will ship the ordered
goods after the payment is cleared, and the customer will have to wait and hope that
he or she receives the merchandise. Macropayment systems must have a mechanism
for receipts, since there are room for both fraud by the vendor and difficulties during
shipments. Receipts can be handled quite easily with a public key signature on a
message containing the purchase details.

Again we run into the problem with public key cryptography and micropayments. It
will be too expensive to issue a receipt for each micropayment if a public key

signature is needed on each receipt. Receipts are also hard to handle if we want to
preserve anonymity in a payment system. After all, the vendor will have to make the
receipt out to someone, and that is hard to do if the customer is anonymous. It can be
done through pseudonym schemes, but can easily be complicated.
Another problem with receipt is that they are only good for proving that a payment
was done for a given product or service. A customer that did not receive what he or
she paid for will have a hard time proving this to an arbiter or even the vendor to
whom the payment was made.
Quite often, it will not be practical to use receipts in a micropayment system. This is
especially true for streamed products like movies and phone calls. In such cases it will
be more practical to use one receipt for the whole product, not for each payment.

Most proposed micropayment system does not have mechanisms for receipts or
similar safe guards. They assume that vendors that do not deliver will be shunned and
go out of business. An option is to have the brokers or banks, or a central authority
handle complaint about bad deliveries. If a vendor gets enough complaints, it might
be forced out of business by revoking its certificates or through other means.

3.9.1 Certified delivery
A system for certified delivery was presented in the NetBill system, [Si, Ty'95]. This
ensures that the payment only goes through if the customer gets the information he or
she paid for. NetBill is an on-line system, and any payment system that wants to use
this type of certified delivery needs to be on-line as well.

With NetBill's certified delivery, the vendor encrypts the information goods before it
is sent to customer. The customer sends the payment to the vendor, and the vendor
sends both the decryption key and the payment to the NetBill server. If the payment is
approved, the NetBill server keeps a copy of the key, and instructs the vendor to give
the key to the customer. If a problem arises with the decryption, then the customer can
go directly to the NetBill server to get the key.

Chapter 4
One-time signature schemes with an infinite
authentication tree
Merkle [Me'87], [Me'89] proposed a scheme where one-time signatures are used in
conjunction with an authentication tree. The one-time signature is based on a system
proposed by Lamport and Diffie, and improved by Wintemitz and Merkle [Me'87],
[Me'89].

The following description is a summary taken mainly from [Me'87], and some from
[Me'89]. The reader is referred to [Me'87], [Me'89] and Menezes et al [Me, Oo,
Va'97] for more detailed descriptions. Ove Heigre has written about the Merkle-,
Wintemitz and other one-time signature schemes in his thesis, [He'OO;.

4.1 The Lamport-Diffie one-time signature
The Lamport-Diffie one-time signature uses one-way functions as the base for their
one-time signatures. The signature is first described in [Di, He76], and later
referenced to in [Me'87] as the "Lamport-Diffie one-time signature".

If a signer wants to sign a one-bit message m={0,l},

this can be done in the following

way: The signer selects two values xj andjc^, and computQS yj=!H(xi)

dxvdy2=0i(x2),

where ^ i s a one-way hash function, yi is made public. The message m is signed with
x; if m = 7, and with X2\im = 0. The verifier can easily check the signature by
computing 0-C(Xi) =yi.

If many Xi and yi are made, a longer message can be signed. To sign an n bit message,
2n XiS and 2n yts must be made. The 2n yis must be public, or the receiver must
previously have received them from the signer in an authenticated manner. The 2n XiS
are used to sign the message.

4.2 Merkle*s one-time signatures
Merkle improved the Lamport-Diffie scheme by cutting down the size of the
signature. Rather than creating 2n XiS (and 2n

only n+log2n needs to be made.

This almost halves the size of the signature.
Instead of making two x's and two

for each bit, only one is made per bit. Let the

message be M=mi m2 ...nin, mi={0,l}. If m/=7, thenXi is released, and if

then x/

is not released.

This would enable the receiver to cheat, by pretending not to receive certain x'5.
To avoid cheating, a check sum must be added to M, where the number of O's'mM is
noted. The message to sign i s M ' = M \ \ C , where 11 is concatenation and Cis the binary
representation of the number of O's in M.

Let's say M i s an 8 bit message. The length of the check sum C will be log28 = 3, so
the length of the message to be signed, M\ is 8+3=11.

To sign a message of length 11, Alice will need a vector X == x;, X2,
corresponding vector Y. 7 must be known to the verifier Bob.
Let M = "1001 1101The number of
"01 r\ andM' = "10011101 Oil".

xy; and the

is 3, which is " 11" in binary. Thus C =

Alice sends the message M' along with xj, X4, X5, xe, xg, xjo and xjj to Bob. Bob cannot
modify M - M | |C if he wants to have a valid signature on M'. He cannot change a 0 in
M into a 1, since he cannot create any XiS that he has not received from Alice. He can
change a 1 in M into a 0, but that is going to make the count C wrong. He would have
to change C too, but again he cannot produce the needed x/.

Example 4.2.1
Alice wants to send the 8 bit message M to Bob:
M= 1001 0101
The number of O's in M is 4, which is 100 in binary. This is the check sum for M.
C= 100
Append C to M to produce M'
M' = M\\C = 1001 0101 100
Alice must produce Xand 7, with length 11 (8 for M and 3 for Q .
X= X], X2, X]]
Y = yi,y2, ..-^yii
7 is made public, so Bob can verify that Ahce produced it.
The signature on M' is

Xj, X4, X6, Xs, Xg

Alice sends the message M' along with the signature to Bob. Bob cannot modify
M | C if he wants to have a valid signature on M'.
He cannot change a 0 in M into a 1, since he cannot create any XiS that he has not
received from Alice.
If he tried to modify M to 1001 1101, then he will needxj to produce a valid
signature.
Bob can change a 1 in M into a 0, but that is going to make the count in C wrong. He
would have to change C too, but again he cannot produce the needed xu
He can modify M to 1001 0001, since he can pretend he did not receive X6. However,
this would change C from 100 to 011. Bob would need to produce xio and Xn to make
a valid signature on M'.

4.3 Winternitz*s one-time signatures
Wintemitz proposed a variant to Merkle's signature that reduces the signature size, but
it requires more computations [Me'87].
The idea is to reduce the number of x and j values needed to sign a message. Rather
than mdkmgy=9{(x), Tfis applied repeatedly to Repeated applications of HWiW
have this notation: H(7{(7{(9{(x)))) is written as !H^(x), H(H(H(x))) is written as
etc., and thus :}f(x) is equal to x.
This way, a single ;c and;; value can be used to sign several bits. Let M=m/, be a 2
bit message and n=4 be the message space (4 possible messages with a 2 bit
message). The public y is equal to !H^(x); y= !H^(x). The signature on M is ^{^(x) and
TT'^^ix). The signature can be verified be applying repeated hash functions to reach;;.

The Wintemitz scheme can be used to sign longer messages as well. To do this, the
message is split into t sub elements of equal length k, and each of these elements will
be signed with an a: and pair.
M=mi\\m2\\...\\mt

A checksum C must be added to the message in a similar fashion as in Merkle's
scheme (Section 4.2). The checksum is the sum of each sub elements minus n.
C=

/=i

-m,) <12"

[Me, Oo, Va'97]

Example 4.3.1
Alice wants to sign an 8 bit message M.
M=mi 1712 ^ ¿ ^
mi

Om

(9 and 5 in decimal)

1712

Alice will use one jc and pair to sign four bits, making
k=4

and
C = (n-mi) + (n-m2) = (16-9) + (16-5) = 18
C = cic2 =

00^00j^
C]

C2

The message w to sign is then
w=M\\C

= mi\\m2\\

ci ||

mi m2 C; C2

The signature S consists of four hash values as follows

^ =

H-'^fxJ

= H'(xJ

H'(x,)

H'(x,)

H'(x,)

Given the public Y

Y = yxyiy^yA ^ ^"(xj

^""(x,) H "(X,)

^^(xj

Signature S can easily be verified by checking each Sj:

4.4 Merkle^s authentication tree
A problem with one-time signatures is that each signature requires a new entry in a
public record. This amounts to a large exchange of information that might be work if
only two parties are involved, but it becomes unwieldy as a general signature scheme.

Merkle proposed a scheme where one-time signatures form a tree structure. The root
of the tree is entered into a public record, held by a TTP. Each node in the tree is used
to sign a message, but also to verify the authenticity of its children.

When a one-time signature is used, it must be authenticated. This is done by
recursively showing the ancestors of the node to the verifier, all the way up to the
root.

Each signature still has a private array x, and a public array;; which is a function ofx.
A binary tree is used as an example for simplicity, but in theory any K-array tree can
be used.

Each node in the tree has three functions:
1) sign off the left child,
2) sign off the right child and
3) sign off a message.
Thus, each node contains three separate signatures.

Two three-dimensional arrays, x and>^, are needed to form the tree. The three fields in
each index of the arrays are:

x[<node number>,<left, right or message>,<index within the one-time signature>].

<node number> is simply the node's index within the tree structure. <left, right or
message> indicates if this signature is used to sign off the left child, the right child or
a message. <index within the one-time signature> is the index of the bit this particular
;c-values is going to sign.

Assumepx's are needed to make a child signature and qx's needed to make a
message signature. The private part of the signature in node i would then look like
this:

x[i, left, 1], x[i, left, 2], ...., x[i, left, p]
x[i, right,l], x[i, right, 2], ...., x[i, right, p]
x[i, message,!], x[i, message, 2], .,.., x[i, message, q]
Let x[i, message, *J be all

[4.1]

needed to sign a message (and the same for left and

right children) using the signature in node i. Let also xfi,

*J be all jc'i- for both left,

right and the message in node i.

The public part i has exactly the same structure.

The public part;; of the root must be authenticated by a TTP, much like a public
signature. To sign a message m, the signer uses the one-time signature described
above, with the secret parameters xfi, message, */. All public parameters _y/y,
message, *7 are given to the verifier. Then certain x's in x[i, message, */ are shown to
the verifier as well, who can now see that the signature is indeed made by the right
person.

The verifier must then make sure>'//, message,

are actually a valid set of

parameters. This can be done with the parameters y[j, left or right, *], where j is the
index of parent node to node i (j=li/2 J. Verification for

can be done

recursively up to the root, which in turn has been authenticated by a TTP. The signer
must keep sending the parent n o d e s l e f t or right, 0<=k<j\ and some other
information to the verifier until the root is reached. This is often referred to as the
authentication path.
If we use Merkle's signature scheme (see Section 4.2), QSLch y[r,s,tj {r,s and t are the
indexes as indicated in [4.1]) is computed from the corresponding x/'v,)^:
y[iJ,k]=H(x[ij,k])
Each node / has a unique identifying number called HASH(i), which is a collection of
all the public parameters for node i.
HASH(i) = Hmy[i, left, *]) 11 H(y[i, right, *]) 11 H(y[i, message, *]))

Chapter 5

New improvements for micropayment schemes
based on hash chains
5.1 Introduction to the scheme

A payment scheme based on hash chains is presented in this chapter. These are
suggestions for new extensions and improvements to existing micropayment systems
based on hash chains.
The payments are structured in a Merkle authentication tree, and any one-time
signature scheme can be used, although Merkle's and Wintemitz's schemes have been
the main focus during this research.
The new improvements offer more flexibihty and opens up for time saving for both
payment and verifications of already executed transactions. These properties are
discussed in Section 5.5.

5.2 Related work
5.2.1 Hash chains
Diffie and Helman used repeated one-way functions in a password authentication
scheme, [Di, He'76], and Wintemitz used repeated hash functions to design the onetime signature scheme described in Section 3.3. [Me'87].
Several micropayment schemes use hash chains to make payments. The idea is that a
chain is created be applying repeated hash functions, and the security is based on the
difficulty of reversing a cryptographic hash function. Some of the first to use hash
chains for payment systems were Rivest and Shamir in their PayWord system,
[Ri,Sh'96], Anderson, Manifavas and Sutherland in the NetCard scheme, [An, Ma,
Su'97], and Pedersen's proposal in [Pe'96].
A short description of PayWord is provided here to illustrate how a hash chain can be
used for micropayments.

5.2.2 A short summary of PayWord
Let J-ChQ a secure one-way hash function.
n is the length of the hash chain that will be made.
The user selects a random number
A chain of values is then produced in the following manner:

The user ends up with a chain
So> Sj,

Sn-h S„

where
So = H(Si),

Si = 3<(S2),

,Sn.l = H(Sr),

S„

Each link 5, in the chain is a payment token, so is considered the root of the chain, and
the user must authenticate the root so the vendor knows he will get paid for tokens
related to so- The user authenticates So by signing a certificate issued by a broker or

bank.

Each payment consists of the next token from the chain, and the token's index

thus

the payment is (5,, i). The vendor have received the previous token 5,./ before, and can
thus verify this payment by checking that Si.i = !H(si) (unless i=0, in which case it is
the root which is signed with a pubHc signature).

5.3 The new payment scheme
The system is built around an authentication tree with one-time signatures that is
reduced to a chain structure. Each node in the tree will contain signatures to
authenticate its child, and a hash chain will be attached to the node. The hash chain
will be authenticated through the one-time signatures.

5.3.1 Using a chain rather than a tree structure
An authentication tree can be arbitrarily large (or small), and only the root needs to be
created initially; any other node can be made later on. The user will create a new tree
for every vendor he does business with. Making a new tree is not more computation
ally expensive the making a node in an exciting tree. Thus making a new tree for each
vendor does not produce any extra work.

Normally a tree structure is used in order to need as few recursive calls as possible to
get up to the root to authenticate a signature. This makes each signature cheap, since
only log n signature authentications are needed, where n is the tree depth of the
signature to authenticate. But we can shorten the authentication path to only one step
here, since a new tree is made for each vendor. A child can be authenticated by its
parent, and the parent has already been authenticated by the vendor in question.

Therefore, a chain will be used rather than a tree. This saves space, since each node
only have to contain two signatures; one for the child and one for the message, rather
than one signature for each of its k children plus one for the message. An

authentication tree reduced to a chain will be referred to as a signature chain.

The message signature in a node i can be used to authenticate a hash chain and the
monetary value pf each link in that chain like this:

Hash chain authentication = <so,o, i, value>Message signaturei

Where so,o is the root of the hash chain, i is the node depth and value is the value of
each link in the chain.
5.3.2 Further size improvement on the signature nodes
A node in an authentication tree (or a signature chain) normally contains signatures to
authenticate its children or child, and also a signature to authenticate a message. With
this structure, the identification of node i is based on the public values of all the
signatures (that is, all the y matricis). With a signature chain, each node will need two
signatures, and the node identification HASH(i) is:

HASH(i) = !H'(!Hly[i, child, V) || H(y[i,

message^]))

The idea behind this is to make sure an attacker or fraudulent user cannot insert false
signature node, since each node is identified with public values that in turn is
authenticated with a signature of a parent.

However, rather than using a message signature to sign the root of a hash chain, we
can use the root to as an integral part of the node identification. This is done by
including the hash chain root in the identic fiction HASH(i). The value of each link in
the hash chain must also be included, since we no longer have a message signature to
authenticate the value.

Each node will always be associated with only one hash chain with one value, and this
connection does not need to be made until a payment from that hash chain is needed.
Therefore, we don not lose any flexibility by dropping the message signature from the
signature node. The new identification for a signature node will now be:

HASH(i) = H(H(y[i, child, *7; 11 Hash Chain Root \ \ Value per link)

All three components are public values just like in the original Merkle tree. None of
these values can be replaced by a fraudulent user, since the vendor will detect this
when computing HASH(i). The vendor cannot replace any of these values either, since
the bank will detect this. Therefore, we do not compromise security with this new
structure.

We have now gone from 2 to just 1 Wintemitz signatures per node, so the size of each
signature node is reduced to almost half (on top of the reduction achieved by going
from a tree to a chain structure as described in Section 5.3.1).

5.3.3 Assumptions
The scheme is credit based. A discussion about adding hardware to allow for a pre
paid version is provided later.
The bank is off-line.
Multiple currencies are supported.
Divisibility is not a problem since denominations are chosen on demand.
No anonymity is provided, unless some kind of anonymity server is used. Again,
hardware can help solve this.

Three parties are involved: user U, bank B and vendor V. The user has an account
with the bank. It might be useful to have a broker that acts as an intermediary between
users, vendors and banks, but it does not make a difference for the principle of the
scheme.

Í/establishes an account with B, and B issues U with a certificate. It might look
something like this:

Certu = <IDu, IDB, PKU, Epx, Stat, Info>SKB

[Ri, Sh'96]

The certificate might contain a number of things, but above are listed: user's and
bank's ID, users public key, expiration date, credit status or limitation, and other

information. The Info field might contain maximum spending limits per vendor per
day for the user. The certificate is signed by the banks secret key.

The certificate authorizes the user to produce micropayments. A vendor can verify a
certificate through the bank's signature, and can thus trust to be redeemed by the
bank. The certificate needs to be reissued with certain (fairly frequent) intervals.

The user contacts the vendor to make a purchase. The vendor sends purchase
information back, including pricing and currency. The user will send a commitment to
the vendor:

Commitment = <IDv, Certjj, Time, Curr, Root>SKu

The commitment contains:
Commitment

vendor's ID, the user's
certificate (including user ID),

Signature verifying
the root of thie
signature-chain

a timestamp, the currency for
the payments and the public
parts of the root of a signature
chain. Root refers to the
identification of the root of the
signature chain:

HASH(i) = H(J{(y[i, child, *])
So,Q 11 valueo)

The commitment is signed by
the user's secret key.

5.3.4 Payment
After the commitment has

Figure 5.1:
Each signature node has a hash chain attached to it.
The node is identified by its public values, the public
part of the child signature, y[i, child,
the root of the
hash chain, So.o, and monetary the value per link value{.

been given to the vendor, the
user is ready to start sending payments. The public

in node 0 in the signature chain

is sent to the vendor, along with the root of the hash chain attached to that signature
node.
The vendor can verify these vales computing HASH(O) can compare this to the value
Root in the Commitment.

A new signature node with a corresponding hash chain can easily be created if a hash
chain runs out, or the user needs to change denomination per payment.

The signature nodes are easy to make (and can be pre made, if this suits the particular
application). This allows the user to produce many hash chains of different
denominations and lengths as needed. Each link in a specific hash chain will have the
same value, but each chain can have different values per link. Thus the user can send
links from different hash chains depending on the payment that is to be made.

Each hash chain has the same index as the signature node it belongs to, and each link
in the hash chain will have a second index, internal to the hash chain.
Signature node / will be used to sign the root

0 of the hash chain

Su,

-p. i is the

depth of the node in the signature chain, and p is the length of the hash chain attached
to node /.

5.3.5 A payment example
User U contacts vendor Fto purchase information on web pages. The user needs to
produce a hash chain to make payments. This chain can be made in advance, before U
contacts V, since the hash chain is independent of the vendor and the token values in
question. Let the chain of length p be so,o, so,i,

, so^p. so,o is the root of the hash

chain and is authenticated through the commitment

F wants payment in US$, and each web page costs $0.05. U sends the public parts of
the signatures in the root node: y[0, child, *7, so,o and valueo=0.05. Uthen sends a
commitment:

Commitment = <IDv, Certu, Time, US$, HASH(0)>SKu

HASH(O) is the identifying number for the root of the signature chain. Fcan verify the
commitment with ITs signature SKu, and the bank's signature SKB on the certificate
Certu.
U can now do a series of payments worth five cents each. This is done by sending the
next hnk in the hash chain, together with that Unk's index to V.
Payment = (soJ, 0, j ) J ^
V can verify this payment by checking that soj = H( soj+i) , j<p.
If U then wants to buy a piece of information goods worth 2 cents, he can easily make
a new hash chain worth two cents per Hnk. A new node in the signature chain must be
made, and this node must be authenticated by its parent, namely node O.U SQnásy[l,
child, *] , and value\=0.02 to V. V can verify the authenticity of node 1 by
checking
child, *] up against HASH(l).
A hash chain must be made with a finite length. This is one of the common criticisms
used against hash chains: A user must make a chain of a chosen length, and if he does
not use the whole hash chain he will have done unnecessary computations. On the
other hand, if the hash chain proves to be too short, another hash chain must be made,
and another public signature used to sign a new commitment containing the new
chain. This problem will not occur with this scheme. Each hash chain can be made
relatively short. If a hash chain of a certain denomination is exhausted, the user can
just make a new hash chain signed by the next node in the signature chain.
5.3.6 Redemption
The vendor contacts the bank and sends the following data: The commitment, the
public part of each signature child, *J, all hash chain roots si,0 and every link
value valuci. The bank can verify the authenticity of each payment in the same way
the vendor did upon payment. The vendor will be redeemed if the bank finds the

payments to be authentic, and the user's account will be charged for the same amount.

5.3.6 A problem with size
A problem with this scheme is that the one-time signatures can be relatively large. As
will be shown in Section 6.6.2, the public;; of a typical Wintemitz signature will be
880 bytes long, as will the signature. This can prove a problem, as the vendors will
have to store a lot of information.
Adding a closing protocol
A step to end a series of payments can be added to reduce the size of the data stored
by the vendor.
Whenever a user is finished dealing with a vendor he will make a new commitment,
signing off the amount he as actually spent with the vendor. This commitment will be
very much like the starting commitment:
Commitment = <IDv, Certu, Time, Curr, Root, Value>SKu
The only difference is that a last data field, Value, has been added to the end of the
commitment. It will be impossible for the vendor to cash in both the opening- and the
ending commitment, since both of them contain the same Root.
If the user tries to cheat by making the value in the closing commitment smaller than
the amount he has spent, the vendor can choose to ignore the closing commitment and
show the individual payments to the bank. The same will be done if the user for some
reason does not send a closing commitment at all. If the vendor finds the closing
commitment to contain the right amount and to be authentic, he can delete the
opening commitment and all individual payments, using only the closing commitment
to be redeemed by the bank.

5.3.7 Further possible improvements
Security improvement.
Each one time signature can sign the number of links released in the hash chain
belonging to its parent node.

Bootstrapping
This payment system can be boot strapped to a full-blown macropayment system,
much like jiiKP, [Ha, St, Wa'96]. The commitment will then be replaced with a
regular payment in the macropayment system, except the value of the macropayment
will contain the root of the signature chain rather than just a monetary value.

Probabilistic poling
Probabilistic polling as in [Ja, Od'97] can be used to discourage overspending. This
way, the bank can keep better control of the users potential overspending.

5.4 Properties of the payment scheme
These are properties any hash chain based payment system canl gain by using the
scheme described in this chapter. The main improvement is flexibility in several
areas.

• The payment scheme trades time saving and flexibility in several areas for signature
sizes.

• It becomes easier and quicker to change denomination per payment. In most
payment systems based on hash chains, the user can simply skip several links to
make a larger payment. However, this technique cannot be used to make a smaller
payment. The system presented here makes it easy to change denomination due to
quick Wintemitz signatures.
This type of down grading of link values can be useful if the customer starts buying
information that costs less, for example cheaper articles, or the cost of a phone call
changes from peak to off-peak price.

• It is very easy to handle multiple currencies. Each commitment can have a different
currency, as is the case with most payment systems. Additionally, each separate
hash chain can actually have a new currency, although this might not have an
immediate real world use at the moment.

• The same signature chain can be used within the same electronic warehouse, where
there is a degree of trust amongst the vendors, much like described in Pay Tree, [Ju,
Yu'96]. A party trusted by all vendors (this might be any vendor in the warehouse)
verify the commitment, and a new hash chain is made for each vendor in the
warehouse. The vendors contact each other to verify separate nodes in the signature
chain.

• More flexibility is offered with regards to the length of the hash chains. A new
chain can be made more often, since the computational cost of making a new hash
chain is cheaper.

• The system is flexible with regards to the available hardware. Computations can be
done ahead of time, or during run time, depending on memory and processor power.
All the links in a hash chain can be stored, or each link can be computed from the
secret s„ each time a payment is made.
Signature nodes can be made and sorted for later, since no part of the one-time
signature is revealed before it is used, and a node in a signature chain is completely
independent of its parent until it is used.

5.5 Further work and open questions
5.5.1 Anonymity
Anonymity is a general problem in micropayment schemes, and the system described
above does not solve this problem. The two most obvious solutions to anonymity is
making the system on-line, of use special hardware, both of which are quite
expensive. The reader is referred to Chapter 3 for a more thorough discussion on
anonymity in micropayment schemes.

Providing anonymity with hardware
With the use of hardware, this system can provide anonymity with a few extensions,
much like described in Brands' paper on Electronic Cash, [Br'99]. First of all, each
user must have a piece of hardware that they use when they make payments.

The user will withdraw money from his bank account, and this cash value will be
stored in the tamper resistant piece of hardware. The payment system has thus
changed from being credit based to being pre paid.

The bank will issue blank cheques that are signed with one-show blind signatures.
Each cheque will contain the root of a signature chain, and a maximum spending limit
for that cheque. When a user contacts a vendor, he will send a cheque rather than a
commitment.

The rest of the payment protocol proceeds as described above, except that the
hardware device keeps track of the user's spending. This prevents the user from
spending more money than what was withdrawn from the account.
During redemption, the bank needs to verify its own signature on the cheques sent in
by the vendor.

5.5.2 Overspending
Users have the opportunity to overspend in this system. That is, they may spend more
money than their credit limit or account balance. However, they will find it difficult
escaping the bill since the bank knows the identity of the user. We can assume that the
situation will be similar to when people overspend their credit card limits today.

Unless the scheme makes use of special hardware, or the scheme is on-li-e, it is very
difficult (or impossible?) to prevent this kind of behaviour. Penalties can be used
against overspenders, but they cannot be stopped altogether. Again, this is a general
problem for software based and off-line schemes. Over- and double spending is
possible, but the person doing so will be caught, and most likely made to pay by a

bank or other financial institution.

5.5.3 Other signature schemes
There is no reason why this scheme can't be used with another one-time signature
scheme. The more efficient and secure the signature scheme is, the more efficient and
secure the payment scheme will be. This is particularly true with regards to the size of
the signature scheme.

5.5.4 Further areas for study
-Wenbo Mao describes a system using Schnorr signatures described in [Mao'96]. This
system lets the bank reveal the user's secret key SKu after double spending. This
might be a good way to improve security for the scheme described here.

-Transferability between users should be made possible. In theory, this can be done by
letting the payee act as a vendor and receive payments as per the normal protocol.
Alternatively, as long as the system is off-line and credit based it might be sufficient
with a digitally signed commitment. lOU.

Chapter 6
Implementation of the proposed improvements to hash
chain based payment systems
The implementation has been done in C++, using the Microsoft Visual Studio
development environment. Crypto++, a library provided by Wei Dai, [Dai'Ol], has
been included to provide the cryptographic functions.
The implementations could have been done in either C++ or Java. There are two main
reasons why C++ was chosen.
First, the cryptographic libraries available for Java are still a bit limited, even after the
US export laws on cryptography have changed. The standard JCA and JCE provided
by SUN seemed a bit limiting, even though the implementation does not use a lot of
cryptographic functions.
Second, C++ it is the preferred language of the author.
Notation in this chapter
Until now, symbols and letters have been written in italic; for example the x matrix of
a Wintemitz signature. It is common to use courier when writing source code, as it
makes it easier to read. All letters and symbols referring directly to a variable in the
code will now be written in courier as well; for example the private member x of class
Wintemitz. However, when referring to general concepts like "the public ;; values"
italic will still be used.

6.1 Outline of the programs
An implementation has been done to get hands on experience with the micropayment
system described in Chapter 5.

Three classes have been implemented. They are:
class Winternitz
class WinternitzShort
class Node
class Tree

class Winternitz

is an implementation of Wintermitz's improvement on Merkle's

signature scheme. It takes a SHA digest as an argument, and makes a Winternitz
signature on it.

class WinternitzShort

is a re-make of

class Winternitz

Optimised for

producing smaller signatures. The main change is the most of the private members are
re-computed every time they are needed rather than stored. Some of the functions
have been modified for this purpose, and there are several variations of some of the
functions in order to avoid unnecessary computations. Due to the class's similarity to
calss Winternitz,

the source code will not be discussed in detail below. See

Appendix C for the source.

class Node

is the implementation of the signature node described in Chapter

5.

main contents are the root of a hash chain, the face value of each link in the hash
chain, and a Winternitz signature to authenticate it's child node.

class Tree

is the Specialized version of the Merkle authentication tree, called a

signature chain in Chapter 5. It is a "tree" structure build up of instances of
Node, but

each node has only one child, making it into a chain.

class

Its

6.2 class Winternitz
The author has implemented the Winternitz signature scheme described in Chapter 4.
This scheme (as well as the original Merkle scheme) is often considered a theoretical
signature system, due to the size of the authentication path involved in verifying a
signature. However, with the custom application and modifications done in Chapter 5,
it can become useful in practice. This prospect needs to be explored, and this
implementation has become a significant part of this thesis.

The Winternitz improvement to the Merkle one-time signature scheme can reduce the
signature size with a factor of about 4 to 8 [Me'89]. It can be used to reduce the size
more, but this will make the scheme too computationally expensive.

This implementation makes it possible to choose if that factor should be 4 or 8 (see
next Section: 6.2.1). That way, signature size or computation speed can be chosen as
first priority, depending on the situation.

class winternitz

makes a Winternitz signature on a message of length 160 bits. It

is assumed that this is a SHA-1 digest of the message to be signed. What is described
in Section 4.3 as the message, is thus always expected to be a digest of the message.
The actual information to sign is of no interest to c l a s s w i n t e r n i t z , only a digest of
that information. In this chapter, "message" literally means "digest of the message".

6.2.1 Global values
These constants are defined at the beginning of wintemitz.h.

As mentioned above, the size saving factor of the Winternitz scheme can be chosen.
Setting the value of these two global constants before compilation does this:

c o n s t s h o r t u n s i g n e d int

elementLen=4;

c o n s t s h o r t u n s i g n e d int

elementPerByte=2;

describes how many bits will be signed by each jv value. This
corresponds to the value k in Section 4.3.
elementPerByte says how many sub elements there will be in each byte. The
signatures will be smaller and slower if elementLen is set to 8 and elementPerByte
to 1.
elementLen

const short unsigned int

digestLen=SHA::DIGESTSIZE;

is simply the length of the message to sign, which is the length of a
SHA-1 digest. At the time of implementation this is 160 bits.

digestLen

A checksum is appended to the message to sign, as described in Section 4.3. The
length of this checksum is described by
const short unsigned int checkLen=sizeof(short

t
The value of the check sum is set by C = ^^^^^ - w j <
/=i
t is the number of sub elements of the message.
^2elementLen

unsigned);

.

elementPerByte * digestLen

C gets the largest value if each mrO, so C gets a maximum value:
=
160 = 40960.
A variable of length 16 bits is needed to hold this number, so the checksum can be
represented by a short unsigned int.

6.2.2 Private members
The data type byte is used for several of the members. Byte is defined as unsigned
char in the crypto++ library.
byte **x

These are the secret values of the signature. They are generated at random.

byte **y

Generated from x by applying multiple hash functions. This matrix is public.
short unsigned int xyLen

The number of x's and y's that is needed for the signature. xyLen will normally be set
equal to (digestLen+checkLen) *elementPerByte. This will be 22 or 44, depending
on the value chosen for elementPerByte.
byte *subVal

These are the sub elements described in Section 4.3.
short unsigned int subLen

This is the number of sub elements in subvai. If subLen is set to a value, it will be
the same as xyLen.
byte *m

The message to be signed. Again, this is assumed to be a SHA-1 digest of length 160
bits.
short unsigned int mLen

The length of m. It is assumed to be 160 bits (since a SHA-1 digest is 160 bits).
short unsigned int n

This is the maximum value of a sub element. In Section 4.2 this is described as 2\
which is equal to
in this implementation.
byte **signature

This is the signature matrix described as S in Section 4.3.
6.2.3 Constructors
The default constructor calls initialise (), and makes the x and y matrices.

Winternitz();

W i n t e r n i t z ( b y t e m e s s D i g e s t [ ] , s h o r t u n s i g n e d int m e s s D i g e s t L e n ) ;

Makes a signature object, and creates a signature on the message messDigest.
messDigest is assumed to be a SHA-1 digest, and messDigestLen is thus assumed to
be 20, since a SHA-1 digest is 20 bytes.
w i n t e r n i t z ( b y t e m e s s D i g e s t [ ] , s h o r t u n s i g n e d int m e s s D i g e s t L e n , b y t e
**yTest);

This constructor does not make the x matrix, and the y matrix is sent to it as an
argument. The subval matrix is made, and a signature can later be sent to the
Winternitz object to see if it the signature corresponds with messDigest and yTest.

'-WinternitzQ;
Standard destructor that deletes the arrays made by calls to new.

6.2.4 Private functions
void initialize 0 ;

Creates the secret x matrix and the corresponding public y matrix. A few other data
members are also given proper values.
void winternitz::computeSubVal()

{
if(elementPerByte==l)
f o r ( s h o r t u n s i g n e d int i=0; i<mLen; i++)
subVal[i]=m[i];
else
f o r ( s h o r t u n s i g n e d int i=0; i<mLen; i++)
s p l i t B y t e (m [i] , ScSubVal [i*elementPerByte] ) ;

}
Makes the matrix subval. If each sub element is 1 byte long, then subVal will be
equal to the message m. Otherwise, each byte in m must be split into two bytes,
padding the high order bits with 0.
v o i d w i n t e r n i t z : : s p l i t B y t e (const b y t e v a i , b y t e * s p l i t A r r a y )

{

b y t e m a s k = 128;
f o r ( s h o r t u n s i g n e d int i = 0 ; i < e l e m e n t P e r B y t e ;

i++)

splitArray[i]=0 ;
f o r ( s h o r t u n s i g n e d int j=0; j < e l e m e n t L e n ; j++)
{

splitArray[i]<<=1;
if (val Sc m a s k ) / / P u s h 1 , e l s e p u s h 0
s p l i t A r r a y [ i ] = s p l i t A r r a y [i] |l;
mask>>=l;

} ^

}

}

This function takes a byte val, and splits it into several bytes that are put into the
array

splitArray.

The functionality is easiest explained with an example.

Let e l e m e n t P e r B y t e b e 2 a n d e l e m e n t L e n b e 4.
val=1001

0110

mask=10000000
splitArray[0]=00000000
splitArray[1]=00000000

The inner for-loop tests if a 1 or a 0 should be pushed into

splitArray

[o]. The four

rounds in this for loop will produce these value (after the if-statement, but before
raask>>=l):

mask
=1000
splitArray[0]=0000
mask
=0010
splitArray[0]=0000

0000
0001
0000
0100

The next four rounds will produce

mask
=0000 1000
splitArray[1] =0000 0000
mask
=0010 0100
splitArray[1]=0000 0011

(i
(iii

mask
=0100 0000
splitArray[0]=0000 0010
mask
=0001 0000
splitArray[0]=0000 1001

s p l i t A r r a y [i]

(v
(vii

(ii
(iv

in a similar fashion:

mask
=0100 0010
splitArray[1] =0000 0001
mask
=0001 0001
s p l i t A r r a y [1]=0000 0110

(vi
(viii

The byte val has thus been split in two, in the same way as described in Section 4.3.
This corresponds to the message Mbeing split into mj and m2 in example 4.3.1:

val=1001

0110

splitArray[0]=0000

1001

splitArray[1]=0000

0110

void winternitz: imakeCheckSumO

{

s h o r t u n s i g n e d c = 0 ; / / t h e integer v a l u e of the
short u n s i g n e d int i=0;//loop counter
int j = 0 ; / / l o o p counter
short unsigned cLen=checkLen;

checksum

byte * cVal = new byte[checkLen];//Binary representation of c
//Compute the check sum
for(i=0; i<subLen-(checkLen*elementPerByte);
c+=(n-subVal[i]);

i++)

for(i=0; i<cLen; i++)
cVal[i]=0;
cVal=(byte*)&c;

^

int tempVal=subLen-checkLen*elementPerByte;
short unsigned int k=cLen-l;//Last index of cVal
if(elementPerByte==l)//cVal can be copied straight into subVal
for(j=tempVal; j<subLen; j++)
subVal[j]=cVal[k--]/
else
for(j=tempVal; j<subLen; j+=2)
splitByte(cVal[k--], &subVal[j])/

This makes the checksum of the message m. The equation of the check sum is found in
Section 4.3, and the first for-loop does this calculation. The next for-loop just
initialises the elements in

The line

cvai=

(byte*)

cVal

&c;

to zero.

casts

c

to the byte array

the casting "reverses" the two bytes in

c

cvai. (At

first it can seem like

when they are put into

cVai,

so a small

example is in order).

A quick example:
c = 374 = 00000001

01110110

cVal[0] = 01110110
cVal[l] = 00000001

In the last if-statement the checksum

cVai

is appended to the array subVal. This is

done in a similar fashion to what is done in

computeSubvai.

then a simple copy can be used. Otherwise,

spiitByte

must be used.

As is shown in the example above, the copying from cVai to
from the highest index of

If element PerByte is 1,

subvai

must be done

cval.

If spiitByte is used, then the address to the right index in subVal is sent as the
destination of the split. Here is a small example where spiitByte is used to append the
checksum above into the last four elements in

subvai.

subVal[40]= 0000.0000
cVai[o] =

_subVal [41]=00.Qi]^0001
subVal [42] = 0000^0111

cVal[l] =(00^(000^

subVal[43]= 0000 0110
"Padding"

void Winternitz::produceX0
{
short unsigned i;
X = new byte * [xyLen];
for(i = 0 ; i < xyLen; i++)
x[i] = new byte[SHA::DIGESTSIZE];
AutoSeededRandomPool rng;
long seed=rng.GetLong();
RandomPool randPool;
randPool. Put ( (byte*) Scseed, sizeof (seed) ) ;
for(i=0; i<xyLen; i++)
randPool.GenerateBlock(x[i] , SHA: :DIGESTSIZE)/

}
The values in the x matrix are secret, and created at random. Creating a secret, secure
and random seed is a research area in itself, and not a focus of this thesis. A function
in the crypto++ library is used to create a seed, and the rest of the x matrix is
generated from this seed using a pseudorandom function. If we can assume the seed is
secure, then the rest of the matrix will be secure as well.

void Winternitz::produceY()
{
short unsigned i, j;
y = new byte *[xyLen];
ford = 0; i < xyLen; i++)
y[i] = new byte[SHA::DIGESTSIZE];
SHA hash;
for(i=0; i<xyLen; i++)
^

}

hash.CalculateDigest(y[i] , x[i], SHA: :DIGESTSIZE) ;
for(j=l; j<n; j++)
hash.CalculateDigest(y[i] , y[i], SHA::DIGESTSIZE);

As shown in Section A3:yk=^(xk). This means that each element in x must be
hashed n number of times to get the corresponding element in y. The SHA object
hash

is used for all the hashing operations. Inside the second for-loop, y [i] is set

equal to the digest of x [ i ] . This is the first hashing.
Then, in the inner for-loop, y [i] is set equal to the digest of itself This is done n -1
times, giving n hashes of x [ i ] to produce y [ i ].

void Winternitz::produceSignature()
{
short unsigned i, j, k;
signature = new byte * [subLen];
for(i = 0 ; i < subLen; i++)
signature[i] = new byte[SHA::DIGESTSIZE];
SHA hash;
for(i=0; i<subLen; i++)
{
if(subVal[i]>0)
{
hash.CalculateDigest(signature[i], x[i],
SHA::DIGESTSIZE);
for(j=l; j<subVal[i]; j++)
hash.CalculateDigest(signature[i],
signature[i], SHA::DIGESTSIZE);

}
else

}

}

for(k=0; k<SHA::DIGESTSIZE; k++)
signature [i] [k]=x[i] [k] ;

The signature is produced by hashing the x values a given number of times. The
number of hashes being done is set by the value in the corresponding value in subvai.
S H A O .CalculateDigest (signature [i] , x[i] ,
signature [i]

SHA: :DIGESTSIZE)

; makes

into a hash value of x [i], and then

SHAO.CalculateDigest(signature [i], signature[i],

SHA::DIGESTSIZE);

hashes signature [i] subVal [i] -1 times more.
If subval [i] is zero, then no hashing is done, and the x value can just be copied into
signature.

6.2.5 Public functions
bool getSignature(byte **sign, byte **yTemp);

If either of the two private members signature or y are not initialised, the function
returns false. Otherwise it returns true.
The argument sign is set equal to the private signature, and yTemp is set equal to
the private y.

int getxyLenO {return xyLen;}

Returns the length of the x and y matrices; the number of x's and y's needed in this
signature object.

bool getY(byte ** yTemp);

If the private member y is not initialised, the function returns false. Otherwise it
returns true.
The argument yTemp is set equal to the private y.

short verifySignature0;

This is a test function that lets a signature object test it's signature on its own message.
The function returns -1 if the private member signature is not initialised. It returns 0
if signature is not a valid Wintemitz signature on the private member m. Otherwise
it returns 1.
The code is very similar to verifySignature (byte **testSign), SO see the
description of this function for details.
short Winternitz::verifySignature(byte

{

**testSign)

if(! subVal)
return -1;
if (!y)
return -1;
byte tempCheck[SHA:rDIGESTSIZE] ;
unsigned short i, j, k, t;
SHA hash;
for(i=0; i<subLen; i++)
{
for(k=0; k<SHA:iDIGESTSIZE; k++)
tempCheck [k]=testSign[i] [k] ;
for(j=subVal[i]; j<n; j++)
hash.CalculateDigest(tempCheck, tempCheck,
SHA::DIGESTSIZE);

^

for(t=0; t<SHA::DIGESTSIZE; t++)
if(y[i][t]!=tempCheck[t])
return 0;

return 1;

This fiinction tests if testsign is a valid signature on the message in the signature
object. The fiinction returns -1 if any of the private members signature or y are not
initiaHsed. It returns 0 if testsign is not a vaHd Wintemitz signature on the private
member m. Otherwise it returns 1.

Normally, this fiinction will be called on an object that have been created with the
constructor that takes a y-matrix as an argument, since such an object does not have a
signature on it's own.
Each line in testsign is copied into tempCheck for verification up against the
corresponding line in y. Then, tempCheck is hashed a number of time equal nsubvai [i]. Each element in tempCheck should now be the same as the corresponding
value in y. This is controlled in the last for-loop and if-statement.

void update(byte messDigest[], short unsigned int messDigestLen);

Called on signature objects to update the message the object should make a signature
on. The object's x and y are not changed, so update should (out of security reasons)
only be called once on each object, and only on objects created with the default
constructor.

6.3 class Node
This class represents signature nodes in the signature chain described in Section 5.3.
The main content of each are: the root of a hash chain, a face value per link in that
chain, and a Wintemitz signature used to authenticate the child of the node.

class Node is intended to be used in conjunction with class Tree, class Tree

needs access to a few of class Node's private members, and is therefore a friend of
class Node.

6.3.1 Private members
int depth;

A node-object is assumed to be in a tree, and this is the node's depth in that tree,
float face;

This is the face value of each Hnk in the node's hash chain, face is used to make the
node's identification number id.
byte

chainRoot[SHA::DIGESTSIZE];

This is the root of the hash chain attached to the node. This value is considered to be
public, and is used to make the node's identification number id.
byte

chainEnd[SHA::DIGESTSIZE];

This is the secret base number for the hash chain attached to the node. It is generated
at random, and chainRoot can be derived from it.
int chainLen;

The length of the local hash chain.
byte

id[SHA::DIGESTSIZE];

This is the identification number of the node. It is made from the member variables
ChainRoot, face, and

the public y-matrix from the Wintemitz signature wchild.

int index;

Current index of the local hash chain,
w i n t e m i t z wChild;

Signature object for the node's child. This is used to make to node's identification
number id.
Node * child;

Pointer to the node's child node.

6.3.2 Constructors
Node::Node(int d, float f , int n. Node* c)

This constructor is the only one implemented, and will often take only the first three
arguments. As can be seen in node. h, the argument c has a default value of NULL, as
it will normally be set at a later time. The hash chain for the node is generated, and the
node's id is calculated.

6.3.3 Private functions
void Node::computeId()

{
byte ** childY=new byte *[wChild.getxyLen()];
for(int i=0; i<wChiId.getxyLen0; i++)
childY[i] = new byte[SHA::DIGESTSIZE] /
wChild.getY(childY)/
SHA hash;
byte childTemp[SHA:rDIGESTSIZE];
byte chainTemp[SHA:rDIGESTSIZE];
byte faceTemp[SHA::DIGESTSIZE];
int j=0;
for(j=0; j<wChiId.getxyLen0; j++)
hash.Update(childY[j], SHA::DIGESTSIZE);
hash.Final(childTemp);
hash.Update(chainRoot, SHA::DIGESTSIZE);
hash.Final(chainTemp);

hash.Update((unsigned char*)&face, sizeof(float));
hash,Final(faceTemp);
hash.Update(childTemp, SHA::DIGESTSIZE);
hash.Update(chainTemp, SHA::DIGESTSIZE);
hash.Update(faceTemp, SHA::DIGESTSIZE);
hash.Final(id);

}
The identification number for the signature nodes have been modified a bit from the
original Wintemitz scheme. See Section 4.3 for details on this.
The id consists of three digests that are hashed together. The three digests are:
• A digest of all the

values in the Wintemitz signature wchi id.

• A digest of the root of the hash chain in the node.
• A digest of the face value in the node.

The SHA object
line in

chiidY

is used for all the hashing operations. In the first for-loop, each

hash

is added to hash, and the resulting digest is stored in

After the call to

hash. Final (chiidTemp),

the SHA object

hash

chiidTemp.

is reset and ready to

start receiving new arguments.
A digest of
stored in

chainRoot

is stored in the variable

chainTemp, and

a digest of

face

is

f aceTemp.

Then all three temporary digests are added to

hash, producing

the last digest

id.

void Node::generateChain()
{

^

AutoSeededRandomPool rng;
rng.GenerateBlock(chainEnd, SHA::DIGESTSIZE);
SHA hash;
hash.CalculateDigest(chainRoot, chainEnd, SHA::DIGESTSIZE);
for(int j=l; j<chainLen-l/ j++)
hash.CalculateDigest(chainRoot, chainRoot,
SHA::DIGESTSIZE);

The hash chain is generated from a random base number. This number is the private
member

chainEnd,

generated by the random function rng.GrerateBlock. The rest of

the chain is generated in the for-loop, ending with

chainRoot.

It may seem odd that the last value created is called
around. This is because

chainRoot

chainRoot,

and not the other way

is the first element to be sent to a vendor when

transaction commences [Ri, Sh'96].

void Node::getChainEnd(byte ce[])
{
for(short unsigned int i=0; i<SHA::DIGESTSIZE;
ce [i] =chainEnd ["i] ;

i++)

}
This ñinction is not strictly necessary, but implemented to keep things tidy. It is
intended for friends of
private member

class Node. The

argument

ce

is set to the same value as the

chainEnd.

Node * Node::getchild();

This function is not strictly necessary, but implemented to keep things tidy. It is
intended for friends of

class Node. The

node's pointer to its child is returned.

6.3.4 Public functions
void Node:rsetChild(Node * c);

The node's child is set to the node pointed to by c.

void Node::getld(byte

ID[]);

The nodes private member id is copied into the argument ID.

int Node::getDepth(){return

depth;}

Returns the depth of the node.

float N o d e : : g e t F a c e 0 { r e t u r n

Returns the face value,

face, of

face;}

each link in the node's hash chain.

int Node::getChainLen(){return

chainLen;}

Returns the length of the node's hash chain.

bool Node::getChildSignature(byte

**sign, byte **yTemp)

{return wChild.getSignature(sign,

yTemp);}

The two public parts of the child signature

wchild

are given, through the

g e t S i g n a t u r e - f u n c t i o n i n class Winternitz.

void Node::getChainRoot(byte

cr[]);

The node's private member

chainRoot

int Node::getLink(byte

link[]);

is copied into the argument

cr.

The current link in the hash chain is copied into the argument

link. This

value indexed by the private member

is not updated by this

index. Note

that

index

is the hash

function.
int Node::getLinkNext(byte

link[]);

The current link in the hash chain is copied into the argument
value indexed by the private member
chainEnd.

index, index

link. This

is the hash

is incremented one step towards

6.4 class Tree
class Tree is the signature chain described in Section 5.3. It consists of nodes of the
type class Node. Most of the functions in class Tree simply call the corresponding
function in class Node.

6.4.1 Private members
Node * rootPtr;

A pointer to the root node of the tree. This is the first node, and is not the child of any
other node in the tree.

Node * endPtr;

A pointer to the last node of the tree. This is the last node, and does not have any
child.

Node * currentPtr;

This pointer points to the current node in the tree. currentPtr can be moved up and
down in the structure between rootPtr and endPtr. The current node represents the
node from which the user is spending links (making payments).

6.4.2 Constructors
Tree::Tree()

Sets all three private members to NULL.

6.4.3 Public functions
Most of the public functions are inline, and quite self-explanatory.

void insertNode(float face, int n);

Creates a new node in the tree. Both currentPtr and endPtr is set to this new node.

int g e t D e p t h O {return endPtr->getDepth (); }

Returns the depth of the tree.

void getRootId(byte ID []){rootPtr->getId(ID);}

Returns the identification number id of the tree's root node.

bool up 0 ;

Moves the current pointer, currnetPtr, up one level. That is, the currentPtr will
point to the parent of the node it just pointed to. If the currentPtr is already at the
top of the tree, the function returns false. Otherwise it returns true.

bool down();

Moves the current pointer, currnetPtr, down one level. That is, the currentPtr will
point to the child of the node it just pointed to. If the currentPtr is already at the
bottom of the tree, the function returns false. Otherwise it returns true.

void start 0 ;

Sets the current pointer, currentPtr, to point to the root node of the tree (same as
rootPtr).

void end 0 ;

Sets the current pointer, currentPtr, to point to the last node in the tree (same as
endPtr).

int getSignatureSize 0 {return currentPtr->wChild.getxyLen () ; }

Returns the size of the Wintemitz signatures used in the tree.

float getCurrentFace0{return currentPtr->getFace(); }

Returns the face value, face, of the node pointed to by currentPtr.

int getCurrentDepthO{return currentPtr->getDepth() ; }

Returns the depth (in the tree structure) of the node pointed to by currentPtr.

int getCurrentChainLenO {return currentPtr->getChainLen() ; }

Returns the length of the hash chain attached to the node pointed to by currentPtr.

int getCurrentlndexO{return

currentPtr->getIndex();}

Returns the index of the current Hnk in the hash chain attached to the node pointed to
by currentPtr.

void getCurrentId(byte

ID[]){currentPtr->getld(ID);}

The identification number id in the node pointed to by currentPtr is copied into the
argument ID.

void getCurrentChainRoot(byte cr []){currentPtr->getChainRoot(cr);}

The root of the hash chain attached to the node pointed to by currentPtr is copied
into the argument cr.

int getCurrentLink(byte link[]){return currentPtr->getLink(link);}

The current link in the hash chain attached to the node pointed to by currentPtr is
copied into the argument link. Note that the index in the hash chain is not updated by
this function.

int getCurrentLinkNext(byte link[]){return currentPtr>getLinkNext(link);}

The current link in the hash chain attached to the node pointed to by currentPtr is
copied into the argument link. The hash chain index is incremented one step towards
chainEnd.

bool getCurrentSignature (byte **sign, byte **yTeinp)
{return currentPtr->getChildSignature(sign, yTemp);}

The signature-matrix and the y-matrix in the Wintemitz signature in the node
pointed to by currentPtr are copied into the arguments sign and yTemp.

bool getCurrentY(byte **yTeinp)
{return currentPtr->wChild.getY(yTemp) ;}

The y-matrix in the Wintemitz signature in the node pointed to by currentPtr is
copied into the argument yTemp.

bool currentEmptyO {return currentPtr->index==currentPtr->chainLen; }

Returns false if the hash chain attached to the node pointed to by c u r r e n t P t r is
excused. Returns true otherwise.

6.5 The test programs
A series of tests have been run to find how long some of the key operations for
signatures take. These include
Hashing
DSA signatures
RSA signatures
Random number
Wintemitz signatures
WintemitzShort signatures

The source code for these tests will not be described in detail here. The reader is
referred to the end of Appendix C for the code. The results of some of these tests are
discussed in Section 6.6.

Most of the tests for timing have been done on the author's personal computer:

ADM K7
600 MHz
128 MB RAM
Running Windows 2000

The same tests have also been run on different computers to provide more thorough
information on the performance. These times are provided in Appendix A.

It would valuable to test the implementations on other operating systems; especially
different UNIX flavours. However, this has been left out due to limited access to such
systems with the appropriate cryptographic libraries.

6.6 Time requirements and signature sizes
Two different implementations of the Wintemitz signature have been done. One is
optimised for speed, and the other for minimizing memory requirements for the
signer.
Each Wintemitz signature has three major components:
The secret matrix x.
The public matrix y.
The signature matrix signature.
In addition, a few other private members are needed to support the classes, the most
important being the sub elements that are stored in the matrix subvai.

6.6.1 Timing
as described above is optimised for quick signing, but can
produce rather large signatures. With this implementation a Wintemitz signature can
be signed about 14 times as fast as a DSA signature and 28 times as fast as an RSA
signature. This is after a more complex and time consuming set up of the signature
object has already been made, but this set up does not need to be done in real time. If
the set up is included, the Wintemitz signature is about 4 times as fast as DSA and 7
times as fast an RSA signature.
class W i n t e m i t z

The verification speeds are the same for both the standard and the short Wintemitz
signature. Verifying a signature takes about 1.5 longer than an RSA (1024) signature,
but it is about 16 faster than the DSA (1024) signature verification.
As mentioned in Section 6.2, the Wintemitz size improvement to the Merkle scheme
can be adjusted. According to [ME'87], the size can be reduced by a factor between 4
and 8. This can be done in the implementation by changing the value of elementLen
i n w i n t e m i t z .h.

elementLen = 8

correspond to a size reduction factor of 8, using one hash sum to sign 8 bits.

elementLen = 4

correspond to a size reduction factor of 4, using one hash sum to sign 4 bits.

In the following tables, figures for both of these size factors are given. It is quite clear
that a reduction factor of 8 is too much, since the computational times become too
large. Using elementLen=8 with class winternitz, the signature initiation takes
about as long as a DSA signature, and the actual signing is only about twice as fast as
the DSA signing. Signature verification is also slowed down, but is still to about twice
as fast as a DSA signature verification. The figures given where elementLen=8 are
provided to show that larger size reduction factors cannot be used.

The table below show how long it takes to produce each of the private members. Each
member takes the same amount of time in the standard and the short version of
Winternitz, but the size reduction factor makes a difference. The global constant
elementLen

elementLen
Initiate x
Produce
Produce
Produce
Produce

decides the reduction factor, and times for both 4 and 8 are provided.

Number of operations needed
4

1 random seeding
takes
44 random gen.
x takes
704 hash sums
y takes
signature takes 352 hash sums
bit shift operations
subVal

Time taken for all
operations
4
8
8

1 random seeding
22 random gen.
5632 hash sums
2816 hash sums
bit shift operations

0.71
1.06
4.81
2.41
0.01

0.71 ms
0.53 ms
39.5 ms
19.25 ms
0.01 ms

able 6.1
The number of operations needed and required time to make the private data
members in class winternitz and class WinternitzShort.

Table 6.2 shows how long each of the major operations in generating a Wintemitz
signature takes. The signature objects can be made at any point in time, and even
stored for later use if this is convenient. This is the case in the payment system
described in Chapter 5. Naturally, both the signing and the signature verifications will
be done in real time, as a payee confirms payments from a payer.

Standard Wintemitz Short Wintemitz
elementLen
4
8
4
8
Make signature object Initiate x
0.71
0.71
0.71
0.71 ms
Produce x
1.06
0.53
ms
Produce y
4.81
38.5
ms
Produce subVai
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01 ms
Total
6.59
39.75
0.72
0.72 ms
Make a signature
Produce x
1.06
0.53 ms
Produce y
4.81
38.5 ms
Produce signature
2.41
2.41
19.25
19.25 ms
Total
2.41
19.25
8.28
58.28 ms
Verify a signature
Produce subVai
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01 ms
Produce signature
2.41
19.25
2.41
19.25 ms
2.42
Total
2.42
19.26
19.26 ms

Table 6.2
Time required to do the three main operations in class wintemitz and class
wintemitzshort, broken down into each sub operation.

Table 6.3 shows how long it takes to do signing and verification with class
wintemitz, class WinternitzShort,

DSA and RSA. A 1024 bit key is used for

both DSA and RSA.

elementLen
Initialise Wintemitz object
Make Wintemitz signature
Verify Wintemitz signature
Initialise WinternitzShort object
Make WinternitzShort signature
Verify WinternitzShort signature
Make DSA signature
Verify DSA signature
Make RSA signature
Vfirifv RSA slanature

4
6.59
2.41
2.42
0.72
8.28
2.42
34.18
40.36
67.8
1.64

8
39.75 ms
19.25 ms
19.26 ms
0.72 ms
58.28 ms
19.26 ms
ms
ms
ms
ms

Table 6.3
Time required making and verifying different signatures.

Given the numbers in Table 6.2 and 6.3, we can find a relationship between the key
times for the four types of signatures. These are given in Table 6.4.

elementLen
Winternitz initiate + sign
Winternitz initiate + sign
Winternitz sign
Wintemitz sign
Wintemitz verification
Winternitz verification
WinternitzShort initiate + sign
WinternitzShort initiate + sign
WinternitzShort sign
WinternitzShort sign
WinternitzShort verification
WinternitzShort verification

8
3.8
7.53
14.18
28.13
16.68
0.68
3.8
7.53
4.13
8.19
16.68
0.68

0.58 times faster then DSA signing
1.15 times faster then RSA signing
1.78 times faster then DSA signing
3.52 times faster then RSA signing
2.1 times faster then DSA verification
0.09 times faster then RSA verification
0.58 times faster then DSA signing
1.15 times faster then RSA signing
0.59 times faster then DSA signing
1.16 times faster then RSA signing
2.1 times faster then DSA verification
0.09 times faster then RSA verification

Table 6.4
Relative numbers are given between the times required for signing and verification
with class Winternitz, class WinternitzShort, DSA and RSA.

Lines 3 through 6 in Table 6.4 are of special interest. We can see that a Wintemitz
signature can be done 14 times faster than a DSA signature and 28 times faster than
an RSA signature. Wintemitz verification is about 16 times faster than DSA
verification, and even though it is slower than the RSA verification, it only takes
about 50% longer.

6.6.2 Size
The size of the signatures depends not only on the size reduction factor represented by
elementLen,

but also on the size of the hash digests used, as each sub element is

signed with one hash digest. This implementation uses SHA-1 which has digests of
size 20 bytes.

Below is a summary of the sizes of the variables used. The data types may vary with
the platform and compiler used. The given sizes are for Windows 2000, Microsoft
Visual C++.
Data type
Size
byte*
1 bytes
short unsigned int
2 bytes
long int
4 bytes
*byte is defined as unsigned char
Table 6.5.
Size of used data types on a PC running Windows
2000, using Microsoft Visual C++.
The value of the global constants listed in Table 6.6 decide the size of the private data
members:
Data member value
elementLen

4
20
4
2
2

SHA::DIGERSTSIZE

elementLen

elementPerByte
checkLen

8
20
8
1
2

Table 6.6
The values of the global constants, deciding the
size of the private arrays and matrices
The tree major matrices (x, y and signature) all has the same size:
{(SHA::DIGESTSIZE

+checkLen)*elementPerByte)*SHA::DIGESTSIZE

= ((20+2) * 2) * 20 = 880 bytes,
= ((20+2) * 1) * 20 = 440 bytes,

for elementPerByte = 2
for elementPerByte = 1

The matrix subvai's size:
sizeof(short

unsigned)*((SHA::DIGESTSIZE+checkLen)^elementPerByte)

= 2 * ((20+2) * 2) =88 bytes,
= 2 * ((20+2) * 1) =44 bytes,

for elementPerByte = 2
for elementPerByte = 1

Given the data in Table 6.5 and 6.6 as well as the two formulas given above, we get
the following memory requirements for the class winternitz and class
w i n t e r n i t z s h o r t , for both the signer and the verifier, with either 4 or 8 as the size
reduction factor.

elementLen
byte **x
byte **y
short unsigned int xyLen
byte *subVal
short unsigned int subLen
byte *m
short unsigned int mLen
short unsigned int n
byte **signature
long seed
Total size

Bytes stored by the signer

Bytes stored by the verifier

Standard

Standard

4
880
880
2
88
2
20
2
2
880
2756

Short
8
440
440
2
44
2
20
2
2
440
1392

4

88

8

44

2

2

4

4

94

50

Short

4

8

4

8

880
2
88
2
20
2
2
880

440
2
44
2
20
2
2
440

880

440

20
2

20
2

880

440

1876

952

1782

902

Table 6.7:
The number of bytes stored in the private members in class Wintemitz and class
Winternitzshort.

class Winternitzshort

reduces the memory requirements while sacrificing

computational time. It is a modified version of class winternitz, where most of the
private data members are recomputed every time they are needed. The result is quite
beneficial for the signer, as the storage requirements are reduced by a factor of about
29. The verifier's storage requirements are reduced only marginally.

6.6.3 Using different hashing algorithms
Hashing is the operation that is done the most in the Wintemitz signature. SHA-1 has
been chosen simply because it is the standard.

Using MD5 for all hash operations offers advantages regarding both time and space.
Depending on what operation we look at, using MD5 cuts down the required time to
between 38% and 54% of what is needed while using SHA-1. The signing and

verification speeds with

class Winternitz

and

class WinternitzShort

can thus

be more then doubled.

MD5 offers smaller signatures as well, since the digests are only 16 bytes as opposed
to the 20 bytes digests of SHA-l. Signature sizes can be cut down to about 65% of the
size while using SHA-l.

6.6.4 A conclusion
The relative times given in Table 6.4 has a good potential for time saving in payment
systems with hash chains.
Since class WinternitzShort offers virtually no size gain for the verifier, it is clear that
only the signer should use this class. The signatures produces by the two classes are
fully interchangeable, so the signer can use
verifier can use

class winternitz

class WinternitzShort

to sign, and the

for verification. This allows for small storage

requirements in small devices like smart cards, while the vendors with larger memory
hardware can store more data.
Both classes are optimised to the extreme, one for speed and the other for size. It is
quite easy to make a combination, where the required storage will be less than for
class Winternitz,

and the speed will be faster than

class WinternitzShort.
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Appendix A
A series of time-data have been collected for operations relevant to the system in
Chapter 5, Wintemitz signatures and implementations. Most of the work has been
done on the authors MDA K-7, 600 MHz, but these tests have also been done on two
more computers. The three hardware platforms the tests have been done on are:
ADM K-7
600 MHz
128 MB RAM
Running Windows 2000

Pentium 3
450 MHz
128 MB RAM
Running Windows NT 4.0

ADM K-7
Time (ms)

Rounds
Make SHA-1 digest
Make SHA-1 digest
Make SHA-1 digest
Make SHA-1 digest
Make SHA-1 digest
Make SHA-1 digest
Make SHA-1 digest
Make SHA-1 digest
Make SHA-1 digest
Make SHA-1 digest
Make SHA-1 digest
Make SHA-1 digest
Average
Make MD5 digest
Make MD5 digest
Make MD5 digest
Make MD5 digest
Make MD5 digest
Make MD5 digest
Make MD5 digest
Make MD5 digest
Make MD5 digest
Make MD5 digest
Make MD5 digest
Make MD5 digest
Average
SHA-1 verification
SHA-1 verification
SHA-1 verification

Laptop Celeron
500 MHz
60 MB RAM
Running Windows 98

10000
10000
10000
100000
100000
100000
1000000
1000000
1000000
10000000
10000000
10000000
10000
10000
10000
100000
100000
100000
1000000
1000000
1000000
10000000
10000000
10000000
10000
10000
10000

Op. per sec.
142857.14
70
142857.14
70
166666.67
60
144717.8
691
144717.8
691
144717.8
691
143884.89
6950
144508.67
6920
144717.8
6910
145287.6
68829
145350.95
68799
145203.21
68869
146290.62
500000
20
333333.33
30
333333.33
30
384615.38
260
370370.37
270
384615.38
260
382701.88
2613
379794.91
2633
378357.93
2643
379838.19
26327
379118.17
26377
380705.83
26267
382232.06
100000
100
100000
100
100000
100

SHA-1 verification
SHA-1 verification
SHA-1 verification
SHA-1 verification
SHA-1 verification
SHA-1 verification
Average
SHA "manual" verification
SHA "manual" verification
SHA "manual" verification
SHA "manual" verification
SHA "manual" verification
SHA "manual" verification
SHA "manual" verification
SHA "manual" verification
SHA "manual" verification
Average
Make DSA (1024) key pair
Make DSA (1024) key pair
Make DSA (1024) key pair
Make DSA (1024) key pair
Make DSA (1024) key pair
Average
Make RSA (1024) key pair
Make RSA (1024) key pair
Make RSA (1024) key pair
Make RSA (1024) key pair
Make RSA (1024) key pair
Average
Make DSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest
Make DSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest
Make DSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest
Make DSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest
Make DSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest
Make DSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest
Make DSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest
Make DSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest
Make DSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest
Make DSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest
Make DSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest
Make DSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest
Average
Verify DSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest
Verify DSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest
Verify DSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest
Verify DSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest
Verify DSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest
Verify DSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest
Verify DSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest
Verify DSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest
Verify DSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest

100000
100000
100000
1000000
1000000
1000000

991
1011
1031
10015
9975
9965

100000
100000
100000
1000000
1000000
1000000
10000000
10000000
10000000

20
20
20
171
161
161
1592
1582
1587
9343
9343
9343
9353
9644
1011
1121
1011
1011
1001

10
10
10
100
100
100
1000
1000
1000

30
40
30
350
350
340
3475
3475
3465
34680
34630
34710

1
1
1
10
10
10
100
100
100

40
40
40
411
401
401
4026
4076
4046

100908.17
98911.97
96993.21
99850.22
100250.63
100351.23
99696.16
5000000
5000000
5000000
5847953.22
6211180.12
6211180.12
6281407.04
6321112.52
6301197.23
5797114.47
0.107
0.107
0.107
0.107
0.104
0.106
0.989
0.892
0.989
0.989
0.999
0.972
33.33
25
33.33
28.57
28.57
29.41
28.78
28.78
28.86
28.84
28.88
28.81
29.26
25
25
25
24.33
24.94
24.94
24.84
24.53
24.72

Verify DSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest
Verify DSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest
Verify DSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest
Average
Make RSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest
Make RSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest
Make RSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest
Make RSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest
Make RSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest
Make RSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest
Make RSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest
Make RSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest
Make RSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest
Make RSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest
Make RSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest
Make RSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest
Average
Verify RSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest
Verify RSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest
Verify RSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest
Verify RSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest
Verify RSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest
Verify RSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest
Average
Seed a random pool
Seed a random pool
Seed a random pool
Seed a random pool
Seed a random pool
Seed a random pool
Seed a random pool
Seed a random pool
Seed a random pool
Average
Seed a random pool and get a long seed
Seed a random pool and get a long seed
Seed a random pool and get a long seed
Seed a random pool and get a long seed
Seed a random pool and get a long seed
Seed a random pool and get a long seed
Seed a random pool and get a long seed
Seed a random pool and get a long seed
Seed a random pool and get a long seed
Average
Make random SHASIZE blocks=
Make random SHASIZE blocks=
Make random SHASIZE blocks=
Make random SHASIZE biocks=
Make random SHASIZE blocks=
Make random SHASIZE blocks=
Make random SHASIZE blocks=

1000
1000
1000

40348
40237
40848

1
1
1
10
10
10
100
100
100
1000
1000
1000

70
70
70
671
661
701
6689
6679
6669
66696
66746
66756

100
100
100
1000
1000
1000

160
160
170
1652
1643
1653

1000
1000
1000
10000
10000
10000
100000
100000
100000

310
310
290
3014
3014
3034
31154
30463
29893

1000
1000
1000
10000
10000
10000
100000
100000
100000

694
703
721
7030
7057
6986
71230
70491
73363

1000
1000
1000
10000
10000
10000
100000

30
20
30
230
240
230
2344

24.78
24.85
24.48
24.78
14.29
14.29
14.29
14.9
15.13
14.27
14.95
14.97
14.99
14.99
14.98
14.98
14.75
625
625
588.24
605.33
608.64
604.96
609.53
3225.81
3225.81
3448.28
3317.85
3317.85
3295.98
3209.86
3282.67
3345.26
3296.6
1440.92
1422.48
1386.96
1422.48
1417.03
1431.43
1403.9
1418.62
1363.08
1411.88
33333.33
50000
33333.33
43478.26
41666.67
43478.26
42662.12

Make random SHASIZE blocks=
Make random SHASIZE blocks=
Average
Make subLen and
Make subLen and
Make subLen and
Make subLen and
Make subLen and
Make subLen and
Average

checksum
checksum
checksum
checksum
checksum
checksum

Make subLen and checksum
Make subLen and checksum
Make subLen and checksum
Make subLen and checksum
Make subLen and checksum
Make subLen and checksum
Average
elementLen=4
Get (copy) the Winternitz signatures
Get (copy) the Winternitz signatures
Get (copy) the Winternitz signatures
Get (copy) the Winternitz signatures
Get (copy) the Winternitz signatures
Get (copy) the Winternitz signatures
Average
Get (copy) the y matrixes
Get (copy) the y matrixes
Get (copy) the y matrixes
Get (copy) the y matrixes
Get (copy) the y matrixes
Get (copy) the y matrixes
Average
Make empty Winternitz object
Make empty Winternitz object
Make empty Winternitz object
Make empty Winternitz object
Make empty Winternitz object
Make empty Winternitz object
Make empty Winternitz object
Make empty Winternitz object
Make empty Winternitz object
Make empty Winternitz object
Make empty Winternitz object
Make empty Winternitz object
Average
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature)
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature)
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature)
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature)

100000
100000

2344
2343

elementLen=4
110
10000
100
10000
101
10000
1131
100000
1002
100000
991
100000
elementLen=8
60
10000
40
10000
50
10000
561
100000
501
100000
511
100000

1000
1000
1000
10000
10000
10000

20
30
30
221
221
220

1000
1000
1000
10000
10000
10000

10
10
10
120
120
120

10
10
10
100
100
100
1000
1000
1000
10000
10000
10000

70
70
60
691
691
691
6869
6879
6869
68418
68418
68578

10
10
10
100

100
90
90
931

42662.12
42680.32
41477.16
90909.09
100000
99009.9
88417.33
99800.4
100908.17
96507.48
166666.67
250000
200000
178253.12
199600.8
195694.72
198369.22
50000
33333.33
33333.33
45248.87
45248.87
45454.55
42103.16
100000
100000
100000
83333.33
83333.33
83333.33
91666.67
142.86
142.86
166.67
144.72
144.72
144.72
145.58
145.37
145.58
146.16
146.16
145.82
146.77
100
111.11
111.11
107.41

Make Winternitz object (inc. signature)
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature)
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature)
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature)
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature)
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature)
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature)
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature)
Average
Make Winternitz test object
Make Winternitz test object
Make Winternitz test object
Make Winternitz test object
Make Winternitz test object
Make Winternitz test object
Average
Make/self verity Winternitz signature
Make/self verity Winternitz signature
Make/self verity Winternitz signature
Make/self verity Winternitz signature
Make/self verity Winternitz signature
Make/self verity Winternitz signature
Make/self verity Winternitz signature
Make/self verity Winternitz signature
Make/self verity Winternitz signature
Make/self verity Winternitz signature
Make/self verity Winternitz signature
Make/self verity Winternitz signature
Average
Update empty Winternitz signature
Update empty Winternitz signature
Update empty Winternitz signature
Update empty Winternitz signature
Update empty Winternitz signature
Update empty Winternitz signature
Update empty Winternitz signature
Update empty Winternitz signature
Update empty Winternitz signature
Update empty Winternitz signature
Update empty Winternitz signature
Update empty Winternitz signature
Average
Verity Winternitz signature
Verity Winternitz signature
Verity Winternitz signature
Verity Winternitz signature
Verity Winternitz signature
Verity Winternitz
Verity Winternitz
Verity Winternitz
Verity Winternitz

signature
signature
signature
signature

100
100
1000
1000
1000
10000
10000
10000

981
1001
9243
9343
9223
92192
97350
96388

1000
1000
1000
10000
10000
10000

120
110
110
1742
1742
1733

10
10
10
100
100
100
1000
1000
1000
10000
10000
10000

120
120
120
1182
1182
1232
11867
11878
11867
131139
120864
120974

10
10
10
100
100
100
1000
1000
1000
10000
10000
10000

30
20
20
250
300
300
2334
2444
2344
21351
26478
25437

10
10
10
100
100
100
1000
1000
1000

20
20
30
230
260
191
2634
2533
2644

101.94
99.9
108.19
107.03
108.42
108.47
102.72
103.75
105.84
8333.33
9090.91
9090.91
5740.53
5740.53
5770.34
7294.43
83.33
83.33
83.33
84.6
84.6
81.17
84.27
84.19
84.27
76.25
82.74
82.66
82.9
333.33
500
500
400
333.33
333.33
428.45
409.17
426.62
468.36
377.67
393.13
408.62
500
500
333.33
434.78
384.62
523.56
379.65
394.79
378.21

Verity Winternitz signature
Verity Winternitz signature
Verity Winternitz signature
Average
element Len=4
Get (produce)
Get (produce)
Get (produce)
Get (produce)
Get (produce)
Get (produce)
Get (produce)
Get (produce)
Get (produce)
Average

WinternitzShort
WinternitzShort
WinternitzShort
WinternitzShort
WinternitzShort
WinternitzShort
WinternitzShort
WinternitzShort
WinternitzShort

signature
signature
signature
signature
signature
signature
signature
signature
signature

Get (produce) y matrix
Get (produce) y matrix
Get (produce) y matrix
Get (produce) y matrix
Get (produce) y matrix
Get (produce) y matrix
Get (produce) y matrix
Get (produce) y matrix
Get (produce) y matrix
Average
Mai<e empty WinternitzShort object
IVIake empty WinternitzShort object
Make empty WinternitzShort object
IVIake empty WinternitzShort object
Make empty WinternitzShort object
Make empty WinternitzShort object
Make empty WinternitzShort object
Make empty WinternitzShort object
Make empty WinternitzShort object
Average
Make WinternitzShort signature object
Make WinternitzShort signature object
Make WinternitzShort signature object
Make WinternitzShort signature object
Make WinternitzShort signature object
Make WinternitzShort signature object
Make WinternitzShort signature object
Make WinternitzShort signature object
Make WinternitzShort signature object
Average
Update empty WinternitzShort object
Update empty WinternitzShort object
Update empty WinternitzShort object
Update empty WinternitzShort object
Update empty WinternitzShort object
Update empty WinternitzShort object

10000
10000
10000

28461
23303
24335

351.36
429.13
410.93
418.36

100
100
100
1000
1000
1000
10000
10000
10000

821
861
841
8813
8723
8603
84932
85874
86885

100
100
100
1000
1000
1000
10000
10000
10000

611
621
611
6138
6138
6148
61879
61728
61789

100
100
100
1000
1000
1000
10000
10000
10000

70
70
70
701
701
701
7020
7010
7060

100
100
100
1000
1000
1000
10000
10000
10000

70
70
80
711
711
701
7130
7161
7190

10000
10000
10000
100000
100000
100000

90
80
90
905
910
101

121.8
116.14
118.91
113.47
114.64
116.24
117.74
116.45
115.09
116.72
163.67
161.03
163.67
162.92
162.92
162.65
161.61
162
161.84
162.48
1428.57
1428.57
1428.57
1426.53
1426.53
1426.53
1424.5
1426.53
1416.43
1425.86
1428.57
1428.57
1250
1406.47
1406.47
1426.53
1402.52
1396.45
1390.82
1392.93
111111.11
125000
111111.11
110497.24
109890.11
990099.01

Average
Verity WinternitzShort
Verity WinternitzShort
Verity WinternitzShort
Verity WinternitzShort
Verity WinternitzShort
Verity WinternitzShort
Verity WinternitzShort
Verity WinternitzShort
Verity WinternitzShort
Average
elementLen=8

signature
signature
signature
signature
signature
signature
signature
signature
signature

Get (copy) the Winternitz signatures
Get (copy) the Winternitz signatures
Get (copy) the Winternitz signatures
Get (copy) the Winternitz signatures
Get (copy) the Winternitz signatures
Get (copy) the Winternitz signatures
Average
Get (copy) the y matrixes
Get (copy) the y matrixes
Get (copy) the y matrixes
Get (copy) the y matrixes
Get (copy) the y matrixes
Get (copy) the y matrixes
Average
Make empty Winternitz object
Make empty Winternitz object
Make empty Winternitz object
Make empty Winternitz object
Make empty Winternitz object
Make empty Winternitz object
Make empty Winternitz object
Make empty Winternitz object
Make empty Winternitz object
Average
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature)
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature)
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature)
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature)
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature)
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature)
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature)
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature)
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature)
Average
Make Winternitz test object
Make Winternitz test object
Make Winternitz test object
Make Winternitz test object
Make Winternitz test object

100
100
100
1000
1000
1000
10000
10000
10000

290
240
260
2273
2373
2483
25807
24765
23704

10000
10000
10000
100000
100000
100000

130
130
120
1252
1252
1252

10000
10000
10000
100000
100000
100000

70
70
70
701
701
691

10
10
10
100
100
100
1000
1000
1000

410
400
400
4065
4045
4045
40488
40468
40388

10
10
10
100
100
100
1000
1000
1000

630
591
581
6049
6409
5869
62119
60347
56752

1000
1000
1000
10000
10000

60
60
61
615
608

259618.1
344.83
416.67
384.62
439.95
421.41
402.74
387.49
403.8
421.87
402.6
76923.08
76923.08
83333.33
79872.2
79872.2
79872.2
79466.02
142857.14
142857.14
142857.14
142653.35
142653.35
144717.8
143099.32
24.39
25
25
24.6
24.72
24.72
24.7
24.71
24.76
24.73
15.87
16.92
17.21
16.53
15.6
17.04
16.1
16.57
17.62
16.61
16666.67
16666.67
16393.44
16260.16
16447.37

Make Winternitz test object
Average
Make/self verity Winternitz signature
Make/self verity Winternitz signature
Make/self verity Winternitz signature
Make/self verity Winternitz signature
Make/self verity Winternitz signature
Make/self verity Winternitz signature
Make/self verity Winternitz signature
Make/self verity Winternitz signature
Make/self verity Winternitz signature
Average
Update empty Winternitz signature
Update empty Winternitz signature
Update empty Winternitz signature
Update empty Winternitz signature
Update empty Winternitz signature
Update empty Winternitz signature
Update empty Winternitz signature
Update empty Winternitz signature
Update empty Winternitz signature
Average
Verity Winternitz signature
Verity Winternitz signature
Verity Winternitz signature
Verity Winternitz signature
Verity Winternitz signature
Verity Winternitz signature
Verity Winternitz signature
Verity Winternitz signature
Verity Winternitz signature
Average
element Len=8
Get (produce) WinternitzSiiort signature
Get (produce) WinternitzShort signature
Get (produce) WinternitzShort signature
Get (produce) WinternitzShort signature
Get (produce) WinternitzShort signature
Get (produce) WinternitzShort signature
Get (produce) WinternitzShort signature
Get (produce) WinternitzShort signature
Get (produce) WinternitzShort signature
Average
Get (produce) y matrix
Get (produce) y matrix
Get (produce) y matrix
Get (produce) y matrix
Get (produce) y matrix
Get (produce) y matrix
Get (produce) y matrix
Get (produce) y matrix

10000

610

10
10
10
100
100
100
1000
1000
1000

802
801
811
8022
7972
7961
79905
79825
79764

10
10
10
100
100
100
1000
1000
1000

211
180
180
2003
2374
1833
21591
19888
16233

10
10
10
100
100
100
1000
1000
1000

170
210
220
1953
1602
2113
17716
19548
23003

10
10
10
100
100
100
1000
1000
1000

581
591
601
5998
6179
6359
59846
56431
56251

10
10
10
100
100
100
1000
1000

400
400
400
4056
4036
4066
40468
40468

16393.44
16471.29
12.47
12.48
12.33
12.47
12.54
12.56
12.51
12.53
12.54
12.49
47.39
55.56
55.56
49.93
42.12
54.56
46.32
50.28
61.6
51.48
58.82
47.62
45.45
51.2
62.42
47.33
56.45
51.16
43.47
51.55
17.21
16.92
16.64
16.67
16.18
15.73
16.71
17.72
17.78
16.84
25
25
25
24.65
24.78
24.59
24.71
24.71

Get (produce) y matrix
Average
Make empty WinternitzShort object
Make empty WinternitzShort object
Make empty WinternitzShort object
Make empty WinternitzShort object
Make empty WinternitzShort object
Make empty WinternitzShort object
Make empty WinternitzShort object
Make empty WinternitzShort object
Make empty WinternitzShort object
Average
Make WinternitzShort signature object
Make WinternitzShort signature object
Make WinternitzShort signature object
Make WinternitzShort signature object
Make WinternitzShort signature object
Make WinternitzShort signature object
Make WinternitzShort signature object
Make WinternitzShort signature object
Make WinternitzShort signature object
Average
Update empty WinternitzShort object
Update empty WinternitzShort object
Update empty WinternitzShort object
Update empty WinternitzShort object
Update empty WinternitzShort object
Update empty WinternitzShort object
Average
Verity WinternitzShort signature
Verity WinternitzShort signature
Verity WinternitzShort signature
Verity WinternitzShort signature
Verity WinternitzShort signature
Verity WinternitzShort signature
Verity WinternitzShort signature
Verity WinternitzShort signature
Verity WinternitzShort signature
Average

100(

40488

10C
10C
10C
100C
100C
100C
1000C)
1000C
1000C1

70
70
60
701
701
691
7108
6911
7058

100
100
100
1000
1000
1000
10000
10000
10000

80
70
70
711
711
701
7014
7119
7102

10000
10000
10000
100000
100000
100000

40
40
40
421
440
401

10
10
10
100
100
100
1000
1000
1000

220
210
200
1963
1792
1602
19678
23213
23263

Rounds
Make SHA-1 digest
Make SHA-1 digest
Make SHA-1 digest
Make SHA-1 digest
Make SHA-1 digest
Make SHA-1 digest
Make SHA-1 digest

10000
10000
10000
100000
100000
100000
1000000

Pentium 3
Time (ms)
90
90
80
901
901
901
8952

24.7
24.79
1428.57
1428.57
1666.67
1426.53
1426.53
1447.18
1406.87
1446.97
1416.83
1454.97
1250
1428.57
1428.57
1406.47
1406.47
1426.53
1425.72
1404.69
1408.05
1398.34
250000
250000
250000
237529.69
227272.73
249376.56
244029.83
45.45
47.62
50
50.94
55.8
62.42
50.82
43.08
42.99
49.9

Op. per sec.
111111.11
111111.11
125000
110987.79
110987.79
110987.79
111706.88

Make SHA-1 digest
Make SHA-1 digest
Make SHA-1 digest
Make SHA-1 digest
Make SHA-1 digest
Average
Make MD5 digest
Make MD5 digest
Make MD5 digest
Make MD5 digest
Make MD5 digest
Make MD5 digest
Make MD5 digest
Make MD5 digest
Make MD5 digest
Make MD5 digest
Make MD5 digest
Make MD5 digest
Average
SHA-1 verification
SHA-1 verification
SHA-1 verification
SHA-1 verification
SHA-1 verification
SHA-1 verification
SHA-1 verification
SHA-1 verification
SHA-1 verification
Average
SHA "manual" verification
SHA "manual" verification
SHA "manual" verification
SHA "manual" verification
SHA "manual" verification
SHA "manual" verification
SHA "manual" verification
SHA "manual" verification
SHA "manual" verification
Average
Make DSA(1024) key pair
Make DSA(1024) key pair
Make DSA(1024) key pair
Make DSA(1024) key pair
Make DSA(1024) key pair
Average
Make RSA(1024) key pair
Make RSA (1024) key pair
Make RSA (1024) key pair
Make RSA (1024) key pair
Make RSA (1024) key pair
Average

1000000
1000000
10000000
10000000
10000000

8942
8942
89338
89298
89298

10000
10000
10000
100000
100000
100000
1000000
1000000
1000000
10000000
10000000
10000000

30
30
40
310
310
310
3105
3105
3105
31025
31035
31025

10000
10000
10000
100000
100000
100000
1000000
1000000
1000000

160
160
160
1633
1643
1633
16323
16323
16323

100000
100000
100000
1000000
1000000
1000000
10000000
10000000
10000000

20
20
10
130
130
140
1362
1352
1362

1
1
1
1
1

10.936
10.926
10.926
10.929
10.936

1
Jk
1
1
1
1

1211
1205
1201
1202
1211

111831.8
111831.8
111934.45
111984.59
111984.59
112621.64
333333.33
333333.33
250000
322580.65
322580.65
322580.65
322061.19
322061.19
322061.19
322320.71
322216.85
322320.71
318120.87
62500
62500
62500
61236.99
60864.27
61236.99
61263.25
61263.25
61263.25
61625.33
5000000
5000000
10000000
7692307.69
7692307.69
7142857.14
7342143.91
7396449.7
7342143.91
7178690
91.441
91.525
91.525
91.5
91.441
91.486
0.826
0.83
0.833
0.832
0.826
0.829

Make DSA
Make DSA
Make DSA
Make DSA
Make DSA
Make DSA
Make DSA
Make DSA
Make DSA
Average

siganture
siganture
siganture
siganture
siganture
siganture
siganture
siganture
siganture

on
on
on
on
on
on
on
on
on

a
a
a
a
a
a
a
a
a

SHA-1
SHA-1
SHA-1
SHA-1
SHA-1
SHA-1
SHA-1
SHA-1
SHA-1

digest
digest
digest
digest
digest
digest
digest
digest
digest

Verify DSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest
Verify DSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest
Verify DSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest
Verify DSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest
Verify DSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest
Verify DSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest
Verify DSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest
Verify DSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest
Verify DSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest
Average
Make RSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest
Make RSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest
Make RSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest
Make RSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest
Make RSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest
Make RSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest
Make RSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest
Make RSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest
Make RSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest
Average
Verify RSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest
Verify RSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest
Verify RSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest
Verify RSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest
Verify RSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest
Verify RSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest
Verify RSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest
Verify RSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest
Verify RSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest
Average
Seed a random pool
Seed a random pool
Seed a random pool
Seed a random pool
Seed a random pool
Seed a random pool
Seed a random pool
Seed a random pool
Seed a random pool
Average
Seed a random pool and get a long seed

10
10
10
100
100
100
1000
1000
1000

420
410
410
4136
4126
4146
41219
41299
41700

10
10
10
100
100
100
1000
1000
1000

471
481
481
4817
4837
4746
48500
46657
48299

10
10
10
100
100
100
1000
1000
1000

811
821
821
8181
8181
8172
81657
81668
81668

10
10
10
100
100
100
1000
1000
1000

20
20
20
201
201
211
1993
1992
1992

1000
1000
1000
10000
10000
10000
100000
100000
100000

22030
22030
21930
222310
222320
222720
2228500
2223790
2225800

1000

22730

23.81
24.39
24.39
24.18
24.24
24.12
24.26
24.21
23.98
24.18
21.23
20.79
20.79
20.76
20.67
21.07
20.62
21.43
20.7
20.9
12.33
12.18
12.18
12.22
12.22
12.24
12.25
12.24
12.24
12.23
500
500
500
497.51
497.51
473.93
501.76
502.01
502.01
497.19
45.39
45.39
45.6
44.98
44.98
44.9
44.87
44.97
44.93
45.11
43.99

Seed a random
Seed a random
Seed a random
Seed a random
Seed a random
Seed a random
Seed a random
Seed a random
Average

pool and get a long
pool and get a long
pool and get a long
pool and get a long
pool and get a long
pool and get a long
pool and get a long
pool and get a long

seed
seed
seed
seed
seed
seed
seed
seed

Make random SHASIZE biocks=
Make random SHASIZE blocks=
Make random SHASIZE blocks=
Make random SHASIZE blocks=
Make random SHASIZE blocks=
Make random SHASIZE blocks=
Average
elementLen=4
Get (copy) the Winternitz signatures
Get (copy) the Winternitz signatures
Get (copy) the Winternitz signatures
Get (copy) the Winternitz signatures
Get (copy) the Winternitz signatures
Get (copy) the Winternitz signatures
Get (copy) the Winternitz signatures
Get (copy) the Winternitz signatures
Get (copy) the Winternitz signatures
Average
Get (copy) the y matrixes
Get (copy) the y matrixes
Get (copy) the y matrixes
Get (copy) the y matrixes
Get (copy) the y matrixes
Get (copy) the y matrixes
Average
Make empty Winternitz object
Make empty Winternitz object
Make empty Winternitz object
Make empty Winternitz object
Make empty Winternitz object
Make empty Winternitz object
Make empty Winternitz object
Make empty Winternitz object
Make empty Winternitz object
Average
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature)
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature)
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature)
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature)
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature)
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature)
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature)

1000
1000
10000
10000
10000
100000
100000
100000

22730
22830
227430
227920
227820
2278380
2274270
2276170

10000
10000
10000
100000
100000
100000

300
200
300
2800
2910
2900

1000
1000
1000
10000
10000
10000
100000
100000
100000

30
30
40
260
260
270
2673
2673
2673

1000
1000
1000
10000
10000
10000

20
20
10
150
150
140

10
10
10
100
100
100
1000
1000
1000

310
300
310
3054
3054
3054
30694
30674
30714

10
10
10
100
100
100
1000

331
331
331
3355
3375
3425
33439

43.99
43.8
43.97
43.88
43.89
43.89
43.97
43.93
43.92
33333.33
50000
33333.33
35714.29
34364.26
34482.76
24580.89
33333.33
33333.33
25000
38461.54
38461.54
37037.04
37411.15
37411.15
37411.15
35317.8
50000
50000
100000
66666.67
66666.67
71428.57
67460.32
32.26
33.33
32.26
32.74
32.74
32.74
32.58
32.6
32.56
32.65
30.21
30.21
30.21
29.81
29.63
29.2
29.91

Make Winternitz object (inc. signature)
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature)
Average
Make Winternitz test object
Make Winternitz test object
Make Winternitz test object
Make Winternitz test object
Make Winternitz test object
Make Winternitz test object
Make Winternitz test object
Make Winternitz test object
Make Winternitz test object
Average
Make/self verity Winternitz signature
Make/self verity Winternitz signature
Make/self verity Winternitz signature
Make/self verity Winternitz signature
Make/self verity Winternitz signature
Make/self verity Winternitz signature
Make/self verity Winternitz signature
Make/self verity Winternitz signature
Make/self verity Winternitz signature
Average
Update empty Winternitz signature
Update empty Winternitz signature
Update empty Winternitz signature
Update empty Winternitz signature
Update empty Winternitz signature
Update empty Winternitz signature
Update empty Winternitz signature
Update empty Winternitz signature
Update empty Winternitz signature
Average
Verity Winternitz signature
Verity Winternitz signature
Verity Winternitz signature
Verity Winternitz signature
Verity Winternitz signature
Verity Winternitz signature
Verity Winternitz signature
Verity Winternitz signature
Verity Winternitz signature
Average
element Len=4
Get (produce) WinternitzShort signature
Get (produce) WinternitzShort signature
Get (produce) WinternitzShort signature
Get (produce) WinternitzShort signature
Get (produce) WinternitzShort signature
Get (produce) WinternitzShort signature
Get (produce) WinternitzShort signature

1000
1000

33969
33849

1000
1000
1000
10000
10000
10000
100000
100000
100000

140
140
140
1392
1392
1392
15032
15052
15062

10
10
10
100
100
100
1000
1000
1000

370
370
370
3726
3726
3726
37173
37183
37403

10
10
10
100
100
100
1000
1000
1000

30
30
30
300
300
340
2603
3124
2994

10
10
10
100
100
100
1000
1000
1000

40
40
40
350
340
310
3806
3275
3675

10
10
10
100
100
100
1000

111
111
111
1041
1061
1061
10405

29.44
29.54
29.8
7142.86
7142.86
7142.86
7183.91
7183.91
7183.91
6652.47
6643.64
6639.22
6990.63
27.03
27.03
27.03
26.84
26.84
26.84
26.9
26.89
26.74
26.9
333.33
333.33
333.33
333.33
333.33
294.12
384.17
320.1
334
333.23
250
250
250
285.71
294.12
322.58
262.74
305.34
272.11
276.96
90.09
90.09
90.09
96.06
94.25
94.25
96.11

Get (produce) WinternitzShort signature
Get (produce) WinternitzShort signature
Average

1000
1000

10135
10546

Get (produce)
Get (produce)
Get (produce)
Get (produce)
Get (produce)
Get (produce)
Get (produce)
Get (produce)
Get (produce)
Average

matrix
matrix
matrix
matrix
matrix
matrix
matrix
matrix
matrix

10
10
10
100
100
100
1000
1000
1000

80
80
80
771
781
781
7781
7791
7781

Make empty WinternitzShort object
Make empty WinternitzShort object
Make empty WinternitzShort object
Make empty WinternitzShort object
Make empty WinternitzShort object
Make empty WinternitzShort object
Make empty WinternitzShort object
Make empty WinternitzShort object
Make empty WinternitzShort object
Average
Make WinternitzShort signature object
Make WinternitzShort signature object
Make WinternitzShort signature object
Make WinternitzShort signature object
Make WinternitzShort signature object
Make WinternitzShort signature object
Make WinternitzShort signature object
Make WinternitzShort signature object
Make WinternitzShort signature object
Average
Update empty WinternitzShort object
Update empty WinternitzShort object
Update empty WinternitzShort object
Update empty WinternitzShort object
Update empty WinternitzShort object
Update empty WinternitzShort object
Average
Verity WinternitzShort signature
Verity WinternitzShort signature
Verity WinternitzShort signature
Verity WinternitzShort signature
Verity WinternitzShort signature
Verity WinternitzShort signature
Verity WinternitzShort signature
Verity WinternitzShort signature
Verity WinternitzShort signature
Average
elementLen=8

10
10
10
100
100
100
1000
1000
1000

220
220
220
2263
2263
2263
22782
22772
22822

10
10
10
100
100
100
1000
1000
1000

230
220
230
2253
2263
2263
22853
22863
22863

1000
1000
1000
10000
10000
10000

10
10
10
100
90
100

10
10
10
100
100
100
1000
1000
1000

30
30
30
381
341
351
3676
3946
3535

y
y
y
y
y
y
y
y
y

98.67
94.82
93.83
125
125
125
129.7
128.04
128.04
128.52
128.35
128.52
127.35
45.45
45.45
45.45
44.19
44.19
44.19
43.89
43.91
43.82
44.5
43.48
45.45
43.48
44.39
44.19
44.19
43.76
43.74
43.74
44.05
100000
100000
100000
100000
111111.11
100000
101851.85
333.33
333.33
333.33
262.47
293.26
284.9
272.03
253.42
282.89
294.33

Get (copy) the Winternitz signatures
Get (copy) the Winternitz signatures
Get (copy) the Winternitz signatures
Get (copy) the Winternitz signatures
Get (copy) the Winternitz signatures
Get (copy) the Winternitz signatures
Average
Get (copy) the y matrixes
Get (copy) the y matrixes
Get (copy) the y matrixes
Get (copy) the y matrixes
Get (copy) the y matrixes
Get (copy) the y matrixes
Average
Make empty Winternitz object
Make empty Winternitz object
Make empty Winternitz object
Make empty Winternitz object
Make empty Winternitz object
Make empty Winternitz object
Make empty Winternitz object
Make empty Winternitz object
Make empty Winternitz object
Average
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature)
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature)
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature)
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature)
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature)
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature)
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature)
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature)
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature)
Average
Make Winternitz test object
Make Winternitz test object
Make Winternitz test object
Make Winternitz test object
Make Winternitz test object
Make Winternitz test object
Make Winternitz test object
Make Winternitz test object
Make Winternitz test object
Average
Make/self verity Winternitz signature
Make/self verity Winternitz signature
Make/self verity Winternitz signature
Make/self verity Winternitz signature
Make/self verity Winternitz signature
Make/self verity Winternitz signature
Make/self verity Winternitz signature

10000
10000
10000
100000
100000
100000

130
130
140
1342
1342
1342

10000
10000
10000
100000
100000
100000

80
80
70
751
751
761

10
10
10
100
100
100
1000
1000
1000

781
741
751
7430
7420
7400
75037
73896
74598

10
10
10
100
100
100
1000
1000
1000

1022
971
1032
9734
10255
10876
97089
99332
98254

1000
1000
1000
10000
10000
10000
100000
100000
100000

70
80
70
721
721
731
7821
7791
7781

10
10
10
100
100
100
1000

1251
1242
1241
12478
12859
12458
124589

76923.08
76923.08
71428.57
74515.65
74515.65
74515.65
74803.61
125000
125000
142857.14
133155.79
133155.79
131406.04
131762.46
12.8
13.5
13.32
13.46
13.48
13.51
13.33
13.53
13.41
13.37
9.78
10.3
9.69
10.27
9.75
9.19
10.3
10.07
10.18
9.95
14285.71
12500
14285.71
13869.63
13869.63
13679.89
12786.09
12835.32
12851.82
13440.42
7.99
8.05
8.06
8.01
7.78
8.03
8.03

Make/self verity Winternitz signature
Make/self verity Winternitz signature
Average
Update empty Winternitz signature
Update empty Winternitz signature
Update empty Winternitz signature
Update empty Winternitz signature
Update empty Winternitz signature
Update empty Winternitz signature
Update empty Winternitz signature
Update empty Winternitz signature
Update empty Winternitz signature
Average

1000
1000

124459
124487

10
10
10
100
100
100
1000
1000
1000

230
230
280
2073
2774
2534
23083
25497
24587

Verity Winternitz signature
Verity Winternitz signature
Verity Winternitz signature
Verity Winternitz signature
Verity Winternitz signature
Verity Winternitz signature
Verity Winternitz signature
Verity Winternitz signature
Verity Winternitz signature
Average
element Len=8
Get (produce) WinternitzShort signature
Get (produce) WinternitzShort signature
Get (produce) WinternitzShort signature
Get (produce) WinternitzShort signature
Get (produce) WinternitzShort signature
Get (produce) WinternitzShort signature
Get (produce) WinternitzShort signature
Get (produce) WinternitzShort signature
Get (produce) WinternitzShort signature
Average
Get (produce) y matrix
Get (produce) y matrix
Get (produce) y matrix
Get (produce) y matrix
Get (produce) y matrix
Get (produce) y matrix
Get (produce) y matrix
Get (produce) y matrix
Get (produce) y matrix
Average
iVIake empty WinternitzShort object
Make empty WinternitzShort object
Make empty WinternitzShort object
Make empty WinternitzShort object
Make empty WinternitzShort object
Make empty WinternitzShort object
Make empty WinternitzShort object

10
10
10
100
100
100
1000
1000
1000

280
271
220
2955
2273
2503
27169
24926
24587

10
10
10
100
100
100
1000
1000
1000

711
781
741
7371
7821
7601
71853
78223
73686

10
10
10
100
100
100
1000
1000
1000

511
511
521
5117
5117
5117
51044
51043
51023

100
100
100
1000
1000
1000
10000

230
230
230
2283
2293
2283
22882

8.03
8.03
8
43.48
43.48
35.71
48.24
36.05
39.46
43.32
39.22
40.67
41.07
35.71
36.9
45.45
33.84
43.99
39.95
36.81
40.12
40.67
39.27
14.06
12.8
13.5
13.57
12.79
13.16
13.92
12.78
13.57
13.35
19.57
19.57
19.19
19.54
19.54
19.54
19.59
19.59
19.6
19.53
434.78
434.78
434.78
438.02
436.11
438.02
437.02

Make empty WinternitzShort object
Make empty WinternitzShort object
Average
Make WinternitzShort signature object
Make WinternitzShort signature object
Make WinternitzShort signature object
Make WinternitzShort signature object
Make WinternitzShort signature object
Make WinternitzShort signature object
Make WinternitzShort signature object
Make WinternitzShort signature object
Make WinternitzShort signature object
Average
Update empty WinternitzShort object
Update empty WinternitzShort object
Update empty WinternitzShort object
Update empty WinternitzShort object
Update empty WinternitzShort object
Update empty WinternitzShort object
Average
Verity WinternitzShort signature
Verity WinternitzShort signature
Verity WinternitzShort signature
Verity WinternitzShort signature
Verity WinternitzShort signature
Verity WinternitzShort signature
Verity WinternitzShort signature
Verity WinternitzShort signature
Verity WinternitzShort signature
Average

1000C1
100001

22872
22862

1001
100
100
1000
1000
1000
10000
10000
10000

230
230
230
2303
2293
2293
22903
22913
22913

10000
10000
10000
100000
100000
100000

40
50
40
480
520
490

10
10
10
100
100
100
1000
1000
1000

301
231
271
2704
2264
2484
29372
22612
27129

Celeron
Time (ms)

Rounds
Make SHA-1 digest
Make SHA-1 digest
Make SHA-1 digest
Make SHA-1 digest
Make SHA-1 digest
Make SHA-1 digest
Make SHA-1 digest
Make SHA-1 digest
Make SHA-1 digest
Make SHA-1 digest
Make SHA-1 digest
Make SHA-1 digest
Average
Make MD5 digest
Make MD5 digest
Make MD5 digest
Make MD5 digest

10000
10000
10000
100000
100000
100000
1000000
1000000
1000000
10000000
10000000
10000000
10000
10000
10000
100000

437.22
437.41
436.46
434.78
434.78
434.78
434.22
436.11
436.11
436.62
436.43
436.43
435.58
250000
200000
250000
208333.33
192307.69
204081.63
217453.78
33.22
43.29
36.9
36.98
44.17
40.26
34.05
44.22
36.86
38.88

Op. per sec.
62500
160
58823.53
170
90909.09
110
75757.58
1320
75757.58
1320
72992.7
1370
109051.25
9170
108459.87
9220
108342.36
9230
113934.15
87770
113921.17
87780
113934.15
87770
92031.95
166666.67
60
200000
50
166666.67
60
370370.37
270

Make MD5
Make MD5
Make MD5
Make MD5
Make MD5
Make MD5
Make MD5
Make MD5
Average

digest
digest
digest
digest
digest
digest
digest
digest

SHA-1 verification
SHA-1 verification
SHA-1 verification
SHA-1 verification
SHA-1 verification
SHA-1 verification
SHA-1 verification
SHA-1 verification
SHA-1 verification
Average
SHA "manual" verification
SHA "manual" verification
SHA "manual" verification
SHA "manual" verification
SHA "manual" verification
SHA "manual" verification
SHA "manual" verification
SHA "manual" verification
SHA "manual" verification
Average
Make DSA (1024) key pair
Make DSA (1024) key pair
Make DSA (1024) key pair
Make DSA (1024) key pair
Make DSA (1024) key pair
Average
Make RSA (1024) key pair
Make RSA (1024) key pair
Make RSA (1024) key pair
Make RSA (1024) key pair
Make RSA (1024) key pair
Average
Make DSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest
Make DSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest
Make DSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest
Make DSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest
Make DSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest
digest
Make DSA siganture on a SHA-1
digest
Make DSA siganture on a SHA-1
digest
Make DSA siganture on a SHA-1
digest
Make DSA siganture on a SHA-1
Average

100000
100000
1000000
1000000
1000000
10000000
10000000
10000000

270
330
3020
3020
3020
30100
30100
30100

100000
100000
100000
1000000
1000000
1000000
10000000
10000000
10000000

1430
1430
1370
14010
14010
13950
139900
139840
139780

100000
100000
100000
1000000
1000000
1000000
10000000
10000000
10000000

110
110
170
1370
1370
1320
13290
13230
13240
10.65
10.65
10.65
10.71
11.15
1.65
1.65
2.03
2.03
2.15

10
10
10
100
100
100
1000
1000
1000

770
770
770
4390
4450
4450
40650
40700
40700

370370.37
303030.3
331125.83
331125.83
331125.83
332225.91
332225.91
332225.91
297263.3
69930.07
69930.07
72992.7
71377.59
71377.59
71684.59
71479.63
71510.3
71540.99
71313.73
909090.91
909090.91
588235.29
729927.01
729927.01
757575.76
752445.45
755857.9
755287.01
765270.81
93.897
93.897
93.897
93.371
89.686
92.95
606.061
606.061
492.611
492.611
465.116
532.492
12.99
12.99
12.99
22.78
22.47
22.47
24.6
24.57
24.57
20.05

Verify DSA
Verify DSA
Verify DSA
Verify DSA
Verify DSA
Verify DSA
Verify DSA
Verify DSA
Verify DSA
Average

siganture
siganture
siganture
siganture
siganture
siganture
siganture
siganture
siganture

on
on
on
on
on
on
on
on
on

a
a
a
a
a
a
a
a
a

SHA-1
SHA-1
SHA-1
SHA-1
SHA-1
SHA-1
SHA-1
SHA-1
SHA-1

digest
digest
digest
digest
digest
digest
digest
digest
digest

Make RSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest
Make RSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest
Make RSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest
Make RSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest
Make RSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest
Make RSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest
Make RSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest
Make RSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest
Make RSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest
Average
Verify RSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest
Verify RSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest
Verify RSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest
Verify RSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest
Verify RSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest
Verify RSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest
Average
Seed a random pool
Seed a random pool
Seed a random pool
Seed a random pool
Seed a random pool
Seed a random pool
Seed a random pool
Seed a random pool
Seed a random pool
Average
Seed a random pool and get a long seed
Seed a random pool and get a long seed
Seed a random pool and get a long seed
Seed a random pool and get a long seed
Seed a random pool and get a long seed
Seed a random pool and get a long seed
Seed a random pool and get a long seed
Seed a random pool and get a long seed
Seed a random pool and get a long seed
Average
Make random SHASIZE blocks=
Make random SHASIZE blocks=
Make random SHASIZE bIocks=
Make random SHASIZE blocks=

10
10
10
100
100
100
1000
1000
1000

440
490
500
4620
4670
4670
46460
46520
46900

10
10
10
100
100
100
1000
1000
1000

760
820
830
7790
7800
7800
78160
78160
78220

100
100
100
1000
1000
1000

170
220
220
1920
1980
1980

10
10
10
100
100
100
1000
1000
1000

550
710
610
4230
4230
4230
40200
39490
39710

10
10
10
100
100
100
1000
1000
1000

610
500
600
3850
3900
3850
43170
42570
42460

1000
1000
1000
10000

60
50
60
610

22.73
20.41
20
21.65
21.41
21.41
21.52
21.5
21.32
21.33
13.16
12.2
12.05
12.84
12.82
12.82
12.79
12.79
12.78
12.69
588.24
454.55
454.55
520.83
505.05
505.05
504.71
18.18
14.08
16.39
23.64
23.64
23.64
24.88
25.32
25.18

21.66
16.39
20
16.67
25.97
25.64
25.97
23.16
23.49
23.55
22.32
16666.67
20000
16666.67
16393.44

Make random SHASIZE blocks=
Make random SHASIZE blocks=
Average
elementLen=4
Make empty Winternitz object
Make empty Winternitz object
Make empty Winternitz object
Make empty Winternitz object
Make empty Winternitz object
Make empty Winternitz object
Make empty Winternitz object
Make empty Winternitz object
Make empty Winternitz object
Average
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature)
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature)
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature)
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature)
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature)
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature)
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature)
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature)
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature)
Average
Make Winternitz test object
Make Winternitz test object
Make Winternitz test object
Make Winternitz test object
Make Winternitz test object
Make Winternitz test object
Average
Make/self verity Winternitz signature
Make/self verity Winternitz signature
Make/self verity Winternitz signature
Make/self verity Winternitz signature
Make/self verity Winternitz signature
Make/self verity Winternitz signature
Make/self verity Winternitz signature
Make/self verity Winternitz signature
Make/self verity Winternitz signature
Average
Update empty Winternitz signature
Update empty Winternitz signature
Update empty Winternitz signature
Update empty Winternitz signature
Update empty Winternitz signature
Update empty Winternitz signature
Update empty Winternitz signature
Update empty Winternitz signature
Update empty Winternitz signature
Average

10000
10000

589
573

16977.93
17452.01
11572.97

10
10
10
100
100
100
1000
1000
1000

820
770
820
5110
5170
5110
48770
48770
48660

10
10
10
100
100
100
1000
1000
1000

490
610
550
5000
5050
4940
55420
54810
55200

100
100
100
1000
1000
1000

50
60
50
170
110
110

10
10
10
100
100
100
1000
1000
1000

550
550
550
5380
5390
5380
60970
61020
60970

10
10
10
100
100
100
1000
1000
1000

60
50
60
270
330
280
3180
2690
2850

12.2
12.99
12.2
19.57
19.34
19.57
20.5
20.5
20.55
17.49
20.41
16.39
18.18
20
19.8
20.24
18.04
18.24
18.12
18.82
2000
1666.67
2000
5882.35
9090.91
9090.91
4955.14
18.18
18.18
18.18
18.59
18.55
18.59
16.4
16.39
16.4
17.72
166.67
200
166.67
370.37
303.03
357.14
314.47
371.75
350.88
289

Verity Winternitz
Verity Winternitz
Verity Winternitz
Verity Winternitz
Verity Winternitz
Verity Winternitz
Verity Winternitz
Verity Winternitz
Verity Winternitz
Average
element Len=4

signature
signature
signature
signature
signature
signature
signature
signature
signature

Get (produce) WinternitzShort signature
Get (produce) WinternitzShort signature
Get (produce) WinternitzShort signature
Get (produce) WinternitzShort signature
Get (produce) WinternitzShort signature
Get (produce) WinternitzShort signature
Get (produce) WinternitzShort signature
Get (produce) WinternitzShort signature
Get (produce) WinternitzShort signature
Average
Get (produce) y matrix
Get (produce) y matrix
Get (produce) y matrix
Get (produce) y matrix
Get (produce) y matrix
Get (produce) y matrix
Get (produce) y matrix
Get (produce) y matrix
Get (produce) y matrix
Average
Make empty WinternitzShort object
Make empty WinternitzShort object
Make empty WinternitzShort object
Make empty WinternitzShort object
Make empty WinternitzShort object
Make empty WinternitzShort object
Make empty WinternitzShort object
Make empty WinternitzShort object
Make empty WinternitzShort object
Average
Make WinternitzShort signature object
Make WinternitzShort signature object
Make WinternitzShort signature object
Make WinternitzShort signature object
Make WinternitzShort signature object
Make WinternitzShort signature object
Make WinternitzShort signature object
Make WinternitzShort signature object
Make WinternitzShort signature object
Average

10
10
10
100
100
100
1000
1000
1000

40
50
30
330
270
390
3080
3570
3520

250
200
333.33
303.03
370.37
256.41
324.68
280.11
284.09
289.11

10
10
10
100
100
100
1000
1000
1000

110
60
110
1040
1050
1050
11370
10380
10490

10
10
10
100
100
100
1000
1000
1000

50
110
110
770
770
770
7800
7690
7640

10
10
10
100
100
100
1000
1000
1000

660
600
610
4340
4290
4290
40750
40100
40150

10
10
10
100
100
100
1000
1000
1000

550
600
550
3850
3840
3850
43440
42790
42730

90.91
166.67
90.91
96.15
95.24
95.24
87.95
96.34
95.33
101.64
200
90.91
90.91
129.87
129.87
129.87
128.21
130.04
130.89
128.95
15.15
16.67
16.39
23.04
23.31
23.31
24.54
24.94
24.91
21.36
18.18
16.67
18.18
25.97
26.04
25.97
23.02
23.37
23.4
22.31

Verity WinternitzShort signature
Verity WinternitzShort signature
Verity WinternitzShort signature
Verity WinternitzShort signature
Verity WinternitzShort signature
Verity WinternitzShort signature
Average
elementLen=8
Make empty Winternitz object
Make empty Winternitz object
Make empty Winternitz object
Make empty Winternitz object
Make empty Winternitz object
Make empty Winternitz object
Make empty Winternitz object
Make empty Winternitz object
Make empty Winternitz object
Average
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature)
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature)
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature)
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature)
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature)
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature)
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature)
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature)
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature)
Average
Make Winternitz test object
Make Winternitz test object
Make Winternitz test object
Make Winternitz test object
Make Winternitz test object
Make Winternitz test object
Average
Make/self verity Winternitz signature
Make/self verity Winternitz signature
Make/self verity Winternitz signature
Make/self verity Winternitz signature
Make/self verity Winternitz signature
Make/self verity Winternitz signature
Make/self verity Winternitz signature
Make/self verity Winternitz signature
Make/self verity Winternitz signature
Average
Update
Update
Update
Update
Update
Update

empty
empty
empty
empty
empty
empty

Winternitz
Winternitz
Winternitz
Winternitz
Winternitz
Winternitz

signature
signature
signature
signature
signature
signature

100
100
100
1000
1000
1000

330
330
330
3080
3460
3350

303.03
303.03
303.03
324.68
289.02
298.51
303.55

10
10
10
100
100
100
1000
1000
1000

1370
1320
1370
9390
9400
9450
92940
90290
90850

7.3
7.58
7.3
10.65
10.64
10.58
10.76

10
10
10
100
100
100
1000
1000
1000

1150
1210
1150
11210
11200
11480
122260
120400
113150

1000
1000
1000
10000
10000
10000

60
50
60
637
619
532

10
10
10
100
100
100
1000
1000
1000

1370
1370
1430
13950
13950
13890
687230
147690
145440

10
10
10
100
100
100

280
280
220
2300
2310
2470

11.08

11.01
9.66
8.7
8.26

8.7
8.92
8.93
8.71
8.18
8.31
8.84
8.62
16666.67
20000
16666.67
15698.59
16155.09
18796.99
17330.67
7.3
7.3
6.99
7.17
7.17
7.2
1.46
6.77
6.88
6.47
35.71
35.71
45.45
43.48
43.29
40.49

Update empty Winternitz signature
Update empty Winternitz signature
Update empty Winternitz signature
Average
Verity Winternitz signature
Verity Winternitz signature
Verity Winternitz signature
Verity Winternitz signature
Verity Winternitz signature
Verity Winternitz signature
Verity Winternitz signature
Verity Winternitz signature
Verity Winternitz signature
Average
element Len=8
Get (produce) WinternitzShort signature
Get (produce) WinternitzShort signature
Get (produce) WinternitzShort signature
Get (produce) WinternitzShort signature
Get (produce) WinternitzShort signature
Get (produce) WinternitzShort signature
Get (produce) WinternitzShort signature
Get (produce) WinternitzShort signature
Get (produce) WinternitzShort signature
Average
Get (produce) y matrix
Get (produce) y matrix
Get (produce) y matrix
Get (produce) y matrix
Get (produce) y matrix
Get (produce) y matrix
Get (produce) y matrix
Get (produce) y matrix
Get (produce) y matrix
Average
iVIake empty WinternitzShort object
Make empty WinternitzShort object
Make empty WinternitzShort object
Make empty WinternitzShort object
Make empty WinternitzShort object
Make empty WinternitzShort object
Make empty WinternitzShort object
Make empty WinternitzShort object
Make empty WinternitzShort object
Average
Make WinternitzShort signature object
Make WintemitzShort signature object
Make WintemitzShort signature object
Make WintemitzShort signature object
Make WintemitzShort signature object
Make WintemitzShort signature object

1000
1000
1000

27020
26970
20320

10
10
10
100
100
100
1000
1000
1000

280
170
270
2690
2630
2410
22130
28780
26854

10
10
10
100
100
100
1000
1000
1000

720
720
770
7420
7640
7250
74860
74430
74970

10
10
10
100
100
100
1000
1000
1000

490
490
490
4990
5000
4990
49930
49870
49870

100
100
100
1000
1000
1000
10000
10000
10000

770
600
720
4340
4280
4400
40320
40210
40150

100
100
100
1000
1000
1000

490
600
550
3900
3900
3890

37.01
37.08
49.21
40.83
35.71
58.82
37.04
37.17
38.02
41.49
45.19
34.75
37.24
40.6
13.89
13.89
12.99
13.48
13.09
13.79
13.36
13.44
13.34
13.47
20.41
20.41
20.41
20.04
20
20.04
20.03
20.05
20.05
20.16
129.87
166.67
138.89
230.41
233.64
227.27
248.02
248.69
249.07
208.06
204.08
166.67
181.82
256.41
256.41
257.07

Make WinternitzShort
Make WinternitzShort
Make WinternitzShort
Average
Verity WinternitzShort
Verity WinternitzShort
Verity WinternitzShort
Verity WinternitzShort
Verity WinternitzShort
Verity WinternitzShort
Verity WinternitzShort
Verity WinternitzShort
Verity WinternitzShort
Average

signature object
signature object
signature object
signature
signature
signature
signature
signature
signature
signature
signature
signature

10000
10000
10000

42890
42460
42790

10
10
10
100
100
100
1000
1000
1000

270
270
220
2420
2250
2640
24280
24220
24280

233.15
235.52
233.7
224.98
37.04
37.04
45.45
41.32
44.44
37.88
41.19
41.29
41.19
40.76

Appendix B
Table 6.2 presented times for how long it takes to do some of the operations involved
with making winternitz and winternitzshort signatures. Those times, as well as
the ones on the left hand side of these tables were taken from individual smaller tests.
They are based on timing for producing hash chains (simply repeated hashing),
generate random numbers and do a few other calculations. This was done to see
where the most time was spent, and thus provide more detailed and vital data.

The values on the right hand side in these two tables are taken from tests run on the
winternitz

and winternitzShort classes. They are all fraction slower then the ones

on the left hand side, as would be expected for an object oriented implementation.

elementLen
Make signature object Initiate x
Produce x
Produce y
Produce subVal
Total
Make a signature

Verify a siganture

Produce x
Produce y
Produce signature
Total
Produce subVal
Produce signature
Total

Standard Winternitz
4
4
8
0.71
0.71
1.06
0.53
4.81
38.5
0.01
0.01
6.81
6.59
39.75

ms
ms
ms
ms
40.44 ms

2.41
2.41
0.01
2.41
2.42

ms
ms
ms
19.43 ms
ms
ms
19.4 ms

19.25
19.25
0.01
19.25
19.26

2.45

2.39

8

Table B.l
^
^ ,
Detailed time for each sub operation done m class winternitz versus the actual
times required to do the actual class winternitz operations

Ill

Short Winternitz
elementLen
Make signature object Initiate x
Produce x
Produce y
Produce subVal
Total
Make a signature
Produce x
Produce y
Produce signature
Total
Verify a siganture
Produce subVal
Produce signature
Total

4

8

0.71

0.71

0.01

0.01

0.72

0.72

1.06

0.53

4.81

38.5

2.41

19.25

8.28

58.28

0.01

0.01

2.41

19.25

2.42

19.26

4

0.72

8.57

2.48

8

ms
ms
ms
ms
0.72 ms
ms
ms
ms
59.38 ms
ms
ms
20.04 ms

Table B.l
Detailed time for each sub operation done in class winternitzshort versus the
actual times required to do the actual class winternitzshort operations

Appendix C
class Winternitz
/ * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

*winternitz.h
*Done as a part of the thesis: "Aspects of Micropayments" by Terje
*Tollisen for his Master of Science (Honours) at University of
*Wollongong.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * /

#ifndef winterntitz_h
#define winterntitz_h
#include <time.h>
#include "sha.h"
USING_NAMESPACE(CryptoPP)

/*Each element to be signed with a hash value. 4 means that each byte
will be divivde into 2*/.
const short unsigned int elementLen=4;
//Nubmer og elements per byte that must be signed with a hash value
cons't short unsigned int elementPerByte=2 ;
/•Maximum number of bytes needed for the checksum =
2^elementLen*elementPerByte*digestLen
=2^8*1*160=40960 and takes less then 16 bits
(in binary= 10100000 00000000)
=2^4*2*160=5120 and takes less then 16 bits
(in binary= 00010100 00000000)
*/
const short unsigned int checkLen=sizeof(short unsigned);
const short unsigned int digestLen=SHA::DIGESTSIZE;
class Winternitz
{
public:
//Makes a signature object with the x and y values.
Winternitz();
-Winternitz();
//Makes a signature object, and creates a signature on
the
//message messDigest
Winternitz(byte messDigest[], short unsigned int
messDigestLen);
//Produce a signature object used for tesing a signature
Winternitz(byte messDigest[], short unsigned int
messDigestLen, byte **yTest);

//Assigns a message to a defined Winternitz object
bool update(byte messDigest[], short unsigned int
messDigestLen);
//Returns the length of the x and y matrices
short unsigned getxyLen(){return xyLen;}
//Returns the object's public y matrix
bool getY(byte ** yTemp);
//Returns the public parts of the signature
bool getSignature(byte **sign, byte **yTemp);
//Test function. Verifying the objects own signature
short verifySignature();
//Tests if the given signature is valid on the object's
message
short verifySignature(byte ** testSign);
private:
//Creates the x and y matrices
void initialize 0 ;
void computeSubVal()/
//Make the checksum for the siganture
void makeCheckSum();
//Splits a byte into wo bytes, adding 0's as padding
void splitByte(const byte val, byte * splitArray)/
void produceXO ;
void produceYO ;
//Makes the signature
void produceSignature() ;
byte **x;
byte **y/
short unsigned int xyLen;
byte *subVal;
short unsigned int subLen;
byte *m;
short unsigned int mLen;
short unsigned int n;
byte **signature/

#endif

/**********************************************************
*winternitz.cpp
*Done as a part of the thesis: "Aspects of Micropayments" by Terje
*Tollisen for his Master of Science (Honours) at University of
*Wollongong.
#include
#include
#include
#include
#include

"winternitz.h"
<iostream.h>
<math,h>
<time.h>
"osrng.h"

Winternitz::Winternitz()
{
initialize ();

}

Winternitz::-Winternitz()
{
short unsigned i=0;//counter
if(x!=NULL)
{
for(i=0; i<xyLen; i++)
delete [] x[i];
delete [] x;

}

if{yl=NULL)
{
for(i=0; i<xyLen; i++)
delete [] y[i];
delete [] y;

}

if(subVal!=NULL)
delete [] subVal;
if (signature!=NULL)
{
for(i=0; i<subLen; i++)
delete [] signature[i];
delete [] signature;

}

}

//messDigest is assumed to be a SHA digest
Winternitz::Winternitz(byte messDigest[], short unsigned
messDigestLen)
{
//Initialize m
mLen=messDigestLen;
m=new byte[mLen];
for(short unsigned int i=0; i<mLen; i++)
m[i]=messDigest[i];
n = pow(2,elementLen)///A sub element has a values less then n.
//Split the bytes in m into shorter elements. Used to find
//number of hashes needed for signing
subLen=(digestLen+checkLen)*elementPerByte;
xyLen=subLen;
//Long enough to hold the digest plus checksum
subVal = new byte [subLen];
computeSubValO///Computes the sub elements in the digest.

makeCheckSum();
produceX();
produceY();
producesignature();

}
//Produce a signature object used for tesing a signature
//No X and y matrices are made.
^ . ^
Winternitz::Winternitz (byte messDigest[], short unsigned int

messDigestLen, byte **yTest)
{
//Initialize m
mLen=messDigestLen;

m=new byte[mLen];
_
for(short unsigned int i=0; i<mLen; i++)
m[i]=messDigest[i];

n = p o w ( 2 , e l e m e n t L e n ) / / / A sub element has a v a l u e s less then n
subLen=(mLen+checkLen)*elementPerByte/
xyLen=subLen;
/ / L o n g e n o u g h to h o l d the digest p l u s c h e c k s u m
s u b V a l = n e w b y t e [subLen];
c o m p u t e S u b V a l 0 / / / C o m p u t e s the sub e l e m e n t s in the d i g e s t ,
makeChecksum();
x = N U L L / / / x is not u s e d in a test o b j e c t
s i g n a t u r e = N U L L ; / / s i g n a t u r e is not u s e d in a test object
//Allocate memory for y
y = n e w b y t e *[xyLen];
f o r ( s h o r t u n s i g n e d int k = 0 ; k < s u b L e n ; k++)
{

}

}

y[k] = n e w b y t e [ S H A : i D I G E S T S I Z E ] ;
forishort u n s i g n e d int j=0; j < S H A : r D I G E S T S I Z E ; j++)
y[k] [j]=yTest [k] [j] ;

/////////////Private

functions////////////////////

void Winternitz::initialize{)
{

}

n = p o w ( 2 , e l e m e n t L e n ) ; / / A sub element has a v a l u e s less then n .
xyLen=(digestLen+checkLen)*elementPerByte;
s u b V a l = N U L L ; / / T h e m e s s a g e to sign has n o t b e e n g i v e n yet
s i g n a t u r e = N U L L ; / / T h e m e s s a g e to s i g n has n o t b e e n g i v e n yet
produceX();
produceY();

//Makes the sub elements in s u b V a l . See W i t n e r n i t z d e s c r i p t i o n s in
//chapter 4 for details
void Winternitz::computeSubVal()
{

}

s h o r t u n s i g n e d i///loop c o u n t e r
if(elementPerByte==l)
f o r ( i = 0 ; i<mLen; i++)
subVal[i]=m[i];
else
for(i=0; i<mLen; i++)
splitByte(m[i],SsubVal[i*elementPerByte]);

/ / C r e a t e s the c h e c k sum f o r the s i g a n t u r e . See C h a p t e r 4 f o r details
//This c h e c k sum w i l l be a p p e n d e d to s u b V a l
void Winternitz:rmakeCheckSum()
s h o r t u n s i g n e d c=0;//the i n t e g e r v a l u e of the c h e c k s u m
s h o r t u n s i g n e d int i=0;//loop c o u n t e r
int j = 0 ; / / l o o p c o u n t e r
short unsigned cLen=checkLen;
/ / T h e b i n a r y r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of the c h e c k sum c
b y t e * c V a l = n e w byte[checkLen]/
/ / C o m p u t e the check sum
for(i=0; i<subLen-(checkLen*elementPerByte);
c+=(n-subVal[i]);
for(i=0/ i<cLen; i++)

i++)

cVal[i]=0;
//casts the integer check sum, c, into a byte array, cVal.
cVal=(byte*)&c;
int tempVal=subLen-checkLen*elementPerByte/
short unsigned int k=cLen-l;//Last index of cVal
if(elementPerByte==l)//cVal can be copied straight into subVal
//Put cVal into the last indexes of subVal
for(j=tempVal; j<subLen; j++)
subVal[j]=cVal[k--] ;
else//byte's in check sura must split like the elements in
subVal
//Put cVal into the last indexes of subVal
for(j=tempVal; j<subLen; j+=2)
splitByte(cVal[k--], &subVal[j]);

}
//Splits a byte into an array of bytes, padding the high order bits
//with 0
void Winternitz::splitByte(const byte val, byte * splitArray)
(
//The mask starts out with one 1, and seven O's: mask=1000000
byte mask = 12 8;
//Once for each element in splitArray
for(short unsigned int i=0; i<elementPerByte; i++)
{
splitArray[i]=0;
for(short unsigned int j=0; j<elementLen; j++)
{
splitArray[i]<<=1;
if(val & mask)//Push 1, else push 0
splitArray[i]=splitArray[i] |l;
mask>>=l;

}

}

}

//Generates a matrix of ramdom numbers.
//These are the secret x values.
//Each X is set to the same length as a SHA digest,
void Winternitz::produceX0
short unsigned i;//loop counter
//Allocate memory for the x matrix
X = new byte *[xyLen];
for(i = 0; i < xyLen; i++)
x[i] = new byte[SHA::DIGESTSIZE];
//Create a secret seed
AutoSeededRandomPool rng/
long seed=rng.GetLong();
//Create the x matrix from the seed
//using a pseudorandom function
RandomPool randPool;
randPool.Put((byte*)&seed, sizeof(seed));
for(i=0;
i<xyLen; i++)
randPool.GenerateBlock(X[i],
SHA::DIGESTSIZE);

//Generates a matrix with public y values.

//Each y is a SHA (multiple) digest of the corresponding x.
void Winternitz::produceY()
{
short unsigned i, j;//loop counters
//Allocate memory for the y matrix
y = new byte *[xyLen];
for(i = 0 ; i < xyLen; i++)
y[i] = new byte[SHA::DIGESTSIZE] ;
//Each x[i] is hashed n times to produce y[i]
SHA hash;
for(i=0; i<xyLen; i++)
{
hash.CalculateDigest (y [i] , x[i], SHA: :DIGESTSIZE) ,•
for(j=l; j<n; j++)
hash.CalculateDigest(y[i], y[i], SHA::DIGESTSIZE);

}

)

//Creating the signature involves hashing each x[i]
//as many times as the value in subVal[i].
//The result is stored in signature[i]
void Winternitz::produceSignature()
{
short unsigned i, j, k;//loop conters
//Allocate memory for the signature matrix
signature = new byte *[subLen];
for(i = 0 ; i < subLen; i++)
signature [i] = new byte[SHA::DIGESTSIZE] ;
//Create the signature
SHA hash;
for(i=0; i<subLen; i++)//Once for each x (and y and subVal)
^

//The x[i] is hashed subVal[i] times and
//put into signature[i]
if(subVal[i]>0)
^

signature [i],

hash.CalculateDigest(signature[i] , x[i],
SHA::DIGESTSIZE);
//j=0 have been done on the line above
for(j=l; j<subVal[i]; j++)
hash.CalculateDigest(signature[i],
SHA: :DIGESTSIZE) ;

//subVal[i] can be 0 in the check sum. x[i] is just
//copied into signature[i]
else
for(k=0; k<SHA::DIGESTSIZE; k++)
signature [i] [k]=x[i] [k] ;

}

}

///////////tMnctions//////////////////////
//Assigns a message to sign to an object. This should only be
//done with an object made with the default constructor. It should
//also only be done once per object for security reasons,
bool Winternitz::update(byte messDigest[], short unsigned int
messDigestLen)
{
//Security check
//Comment out if several updates must be called to
// time the operations
i f(s igantuer!=NULL)
return false;
//Initialize m
mLen=messDigestLen;
m=new byte[mLen];
for(short unsigned int i=0; i<mLen; i++)
m[i]=messDigest[i] ;
//Split the bytes in m into shorter elements.
// Used to find number of hashes needed for signing
subLen=(digestLen+checkLen)*elementPerByte;
xyLen=subLen;
//Long enough to hold the digest pluss checksum
subVal = new byte [subLen];
computeSubVal0///Computes the sub values in the digest.
makeCheckSum();
producesignature();
return true;

}
//Copies the private y-matrix into the argument yTemp
bool Winternitz::getY(byte ** yTemp)
{
if(!y)
return false;
short unsigned i, j;//loop counters
for(i=0; i<xyLen; i++)
for(j=0; j<SHA::DIGESTSIZE; j++)
yTemp [i] [j] =y[i] [j] ;
return true;

}
//The public parts of the siganture (the y and signature matrices)
//are copied into the argumnts.
//Returns false if no siganture exits, and true otherwise
bool Winternitz: :getSignature (byte - s i g n , byte - y T e m p )

if(!signature)
return false;
if (!y)
return false;
short unsigned i, j;//loop counters
for(i=0; i<subLen; i++)
_
for(j =0; j<SHA::DIGESTSIZE; ]++)
^

sign[i][j]=signature[i][j];

yTemp[iJ [j]=y[i] [j 1 ;
^

}

return true;

//A test function that tests the signature of the signtureobject
//Returns -1 if no siganture exits, 0 if the test fails and 1
//otherwise
short Winternitz::verifySignature()
if(signature==NULL)
return -1/
byte tempCheck[SHA::DIGESTSIZE];
unsigned short i, j, k, t;//loop counters
SHA hash;
for(i=0; i<subLen; i++)//Once for each hash value
{
for(k=0; k<SHA:rDIGESTSIZE; k++)//Copy the siganture to
test
tempCheck[k]=signature[i] [k]/
//Hash the test siganture as many times as subVal[i]
for(j=subVal[i]; j<n; j++)
hash.CalculateDigest(tempCheck, tempCheck,
SHA::DIGESTSIZE);
//It is faster to check the digest "manually" rather
//then calling hash.VerifyDigest()
//Test is the test signature is equal to y
for(t=0; t<SHA:iDIGESTSIZE; t++)
if(y[i] [t] !=tempCheck [t])
return 0;

}
return 1;

}
//Tests if the recieved signature is a valid one for the
//signatureobject. Returns -1 if the test cannot be done,
//O if the test fails and 1 otherwise
short Winternitz::verifySignature(byte **testSign)
{
if(IsubVal)
return -1;
if (!y)
return -1;
byte tempCheck[SHA:rDIGESTSIZE] ;
unsigned short i, j, k, t;//loop counters
SHA hash;

for(i=0; i<subLen; i++)//Once for each hash value
test

^

for(k=0; k<SHA::DIGESTSIZE; k++)//Copy the siganture to
tempCheck[k]=testSign[i][k];
//Hash the test siganture as many times as subVal[i]
for(j=subVal[i]; j<n; j++)
hash.CalculateDigest(tempCheck, tempCheck,
SHA::DIGESTSIZE);
//It is fater to check the digests "manually"
//rather then calling hash.VerifyDigest()
//Test is the test siganture is equal to y
for(t=0; t<SHA::DIGESTSIZE; t++)
if(y[i] [t] !=tempCheck [t])

^
^

r e t u r n 0;

r e t u r n 1;

class WinternitzShort
*winternitzShort.h
* D o n e as a p a r t of t h e t h e s i s : " A s p e c t s of M i c r o p a y m e n t s " b y T e r j e
* T o l l i s e n f o r h i s M a s t e r of S c i e n c e (Honours) at U n i v e r s i t y of
*Wollongong.
***************************************************

#ifndef
#define

winterntitzshort_h
winterntitzshort_h

#include "winternitz.h"//Global constants needed form this class
#include

"sha.h"

USING_NAMESPACE(CryptoPP)
class WinternitzShort
{
public:
//Makes a signature object with the x and y v a l u e s .
WinternitzShort();
-WinternitzShort() ;
//Makes a signature object, and creates a signature on
//the message messDigest
W i n t e r n i t z S h o r t ( b y t e m e s s D i g e s t [ ] , s h o r t u n s i g n e d int
messDigestLen);
/ / A s s i g n s a m e s s a g e to a d e f i n e d W i n t e r n i t z S h o r t o b j e c t
b o o l u p d a t e ( b y t e m e s s D i g e s t [ ] , s h o r t u n s i g n e d int
messDigestLen);
/ / R e t u r n s the l e n g t h of the x a n d y m a t r i c e s
short unsigned getxyLen()(return xyLen;}
/ / R e t u r n s the o b j e c t ' s p u b l i c y m a t r i x
v o i d g e t Y ( b y t e ** y T e m p ) ;
/ / R e t u r n s the p u b l i c p a r t s of the s i g n a t u r e
b o o l getSignature(byte **sign, byte **yTemp);
/ / T e s t s if t h e g i v e n s i g a n t u r e is v a l i d o n
//the object's message
s h o r t v e r i f y S i g n a t u r e ( b y t e ** t e s t S i g n ) ;
/ / T e s t s if the g i v e n s i g a n t u r e is v a l i d o n
//the object's message
s h o r t v e r i f y S i g n a t u r e ( b y t e ** t e s t S i g n , b y t e ** testY)/
/ / T e s t s if the g i v e n s i g a n t u r e is v a l i d o n
//given message
s h o r t v e r i f y S i g n a t u r e ( b y t e m e s s D i g e s t [ ] , b y t e **
testSign,
b y t e ** t e s t Y ) ;
private:
void
void
void
void

computeSubVal(byte m[]);
splitByte(const byte val, byte * splitArray);
makeCheckSum();
p r o d u c e X ( b y t e ** x T e m p ) ;

void produceY(byte ** yTemp);
//To avoid making the x matrix several times
void produceY(byte ** yTemp, byte ** x)/
//Makes the signature
bool produceSignature(byte ** signTemp);
//To avoid making the x matrix several times
bool produceSignature(byte ** signTemp, byte ** x);
long seed;//Secret seed that the x-matrix is based on
short unsigned int xyLen;
byte *subVal;
#endif

/****************************************************
*winternitzShort.cpp
*Done as a part of the thesis: "Aspects of Mierepayments" by Terje
*Tollisen for his Master of Science (Honours) at University of
*Wollongong.

#include "winternitzshort.h"
#include <iostream.h>
#include <math.h>
#include <time.h>
#include "osrng.h"

Winternitzshort::WinternitzShort()
{
AutoSeededRandomPool rng;
seed=rng.GetLong0;
xyLen= (digestLen+checkLen) *elementPerByte;
subVal=NULL/

}
Winternitzshort::-WinternitzShort()
{
if(subVal!=NULL)
delete [] subVal;

}
//messDigest is assumed to be a SHA digest
Winternitzshort::Winternitzshort(byte messDigest[] , short unsigned
messDigestLen)
//Make the random seed
AutoSeededRandomPool rng;
seed=rng.GetLong();
xyLen= (digestLen+checkLen) *elementPerByte;
//Long enough to hold the digest plus checksum
subVal = new byte [xyLen];
//Computes the sub values in the digest.
computeSubVal(messDigest);
makeCheckSum();

////////////tMnctions////////////////////
//Makes the sub elements in subVal. See Witnernitz
//descriptions in Chapter 4 for details
void WinternitzShort::computeSubVal(byte m[])
{
short unsigned n = pow(2,elementLen);
short unsigned subLen=(digestLen+checkLen)*elementPerByte/
short unsigned i;//loop counter
if(elementPerByte==l)
for(i=0; i<SHA:iDIGESTSIZE; i++)
subVal[i]=m[i];
else
for(i=0; i<SHA::DIGESTSIZE; i++)
splitByte(m[i],
ScSubVal [i*elementPerByte] ) ;//2==elementPerByte
}
//Creates the check sum for the siganture. See Chapter 4 for details
//This check sum will be appended to subVal
void WinternitzShort::makeCheckSum()
{
//Find the value of the check sum that will
//be appended to subVal
short unsigned c=0;//the integer value of the checksum
short unsigned int i=0;//counter
short unsigned cLen=checkLen;
//The binary reprensentation of the check sum c
byte * cVal = new byte[checkLen];
int n=pow(2,elementLen);
//Compute the check sum
for(i=0; i<xyLen-(checkLen*elementPerByte); i++)
c+=(n-subVal[i]);
for(i=0; i<cLen/ i++)
cVal[i]=0;
//casts the integer check sum, c, into a byte array, cVal.
cVal= (byte*) 6cC;
int tempVal = xyLen-checkLen*elementPerByte;
short unsigned int k=cLen-l;//Last index of cVal
if(elementPerByte==l)//cVal can be copied straight into subVal
//Put cVal into the last indexes of subVal
for(int j= tempVal; j<xyLen; j++)
subVal[j]=cVal[k--];
else//bytes the check sum must split like the elements in
//Put cVal into the last indexes of subVal
for(int j= tempVal; j<xyLen; j+=2)
splitByte (cVal [k--] , ScSubVal [j] ) ;

}

//Splits a byte into an array of bytes, padding the high
//order bits with 0

void WinternitzShort:rsplitByte(const byte val, byte * splitArray)
//The mask starts out with one 1, and seven O's: mask=1000000
byte mask = 12 8;
//Once for each element in splitArray
for(short unsigned int i=0; i<elementPerByte; i++)
splitArray[i]=0;
for(short unsigned int j=0/ j<elementLen; j++)

}

}

}

splitArray[i]<<=1;
if(val & mask)//Push 1, else push 0
splitArray[i]=splitArray[i]|l;
mask>>=l;

//Generates a matrix of ramdom numbers. These are the
//secret x values.Each x is set to the same length as a SHA digest.
void WinternitzShort:rproduceX(byte ** xTemp)
{
//Make the x values form the private seed
RandomPool randPool;
randPool.Put((byte*)ficseed,sizeof(seed))/
for(short unsigned int j=0; j<xyLen; j++)
randPool.GenerateBlock(xTemp[j], SHA::DIGESTSIZE);

//Generates the public y matrix and puts it in the argument yTemp
//Each y is a SHA digest of the corresponding x.
void WinternitzShort:rproduceY(byte ** yTemp)
{
short unsigned int i, j///loop counters
short unsigned int n=pow(2,elementLen)/
SHA hash;
//Need to reproduce the x matrix
byte **x = new byte *[xyLen];
ford = 0; i < xyLen; i++)
x[i] = new byte[SHA::DIGESTSIZE];
produceX(x);
//make the y matrix from the x matrix
for(i=0; i<xyLen; i++)
^

hash.CalculateDigest(yTemp[i] , x[i], SHA::DIGESTSIZE) ;
for(j=l; j<n; j++)
hash.CalculateDigest(yTemp[i] , yTemp[i],
SHA::DIGESTSIZE);

//Generates the public y matrix and puts it in the argument yTemp
//Each y is a SHA digest of the corresponding x.
//The y matrix is based on the x matrix given as an argument
void WinternitzShort::produceY(byte ** yTemp, byte ** x)
{
short unsigned int i, j;//loop counters
short unsigned int n=pow(2,elementLen);
SHA hash;
for(i=0; i<xyLen; i++)
hash.CalculateDigest(yTemp[i], x[i], SHA::DIGESTSIZE);
for(j=l; j<n; j++)
hash.CalculateDigest(yTemp[i], yTemp[i],
SHA::DIGESTSIZE);

}

}

//Creating the signature involves hashing each x[i] as many
//times as the value in subVal[i].The result is stored in the
//argument signature[i]. Returns false if the signature
//can not be made, and true otherwise
bool WinternitzShort::produceSignature(byte ** signature)
if(subVal==NULL)//There is no message to produce a signature on
return false;
short unsigned int i, j, k;//loop counters
SHA hash;
//Need to reproduce the x matrix
byte **x = new byte *[xyLen];
for(i = 0 ; i < xyLen; i++)
x[i] = new byte[SHA::DIGESTSIZE];
produceX(x);
//Create the signature
for(i=0; i<xyLen; i++)//Once for each x (and y and subVal)
^

//The x[i] is hashed subVal[i] times and put
//into signature[i]
if(subVal[i]>0)
^

hash.CalculateDigest(signature[i], x[i],

SHA::DIGESTSIZE);
//j=0 have been done on the line above
for(j=l;
j<subVal[i]; j++)
hash.CalculateDigest(signature[i],
signature [i],
SHA::DIGESTSIZE);
ilse//subVal[i] can be 0 in the check sum.
for(k=0; k<SHA::DIGESTSIZE; k++)
signature [i] [k]=x[i] [k] ;

}

return 1;

}
„

HIP funtion above, except the x matrix is
the produced by the funtions. This

//saves time.
//Returns false if the siganture can not be made, and true otherwise
bool WinternitzShort::produceSignature(byte ** signature, byte **x)
if(subVal==NULL)//There is no message to produce a signature on
return false;
short unsigned int i, j, k;//loop counters
SHA hash;

//Create the signature
for(i=0; i<xyLen; i++)//Once for each x (and y and subVal)
{
//The x[i] is hashed subVal[i] times and put
//into signature[i]
if(subVal[i]>0)
{
hash.CalculateDigest(signature[i], x[i],
SHA::DIGESTSIZE);
//j=0 have been done on the line above
for(j=l; j<subVal[i]; j++)
hash.CalculateDigest(signature[i],
signature[i],
SHA::DIGESTSIZE);

}

}

else//subVal[i] can be 0 in the check sum.
for(k=0; k<SHA::DIGESTSIZE; k++)
signature [i] [k]=x[i] [k] ;

return true;

}
//////////////////Public funtions////////////////////
//Each signature object must only be used on one message.
//Update can not be called on an object that have had x produced
//already. Returns false if x has been produced before.
//Returns true otherwise.
bool WinternitzShort::update(byte messDigest[], short unsigned int

messDigestLen)
{
//Security check
//Comment out if several updates must be called to
// time the operations
if(subVal!=NULL)
return false;
//Split the bytes in m into shorter elements.
//Used to find number of hashes needed for signing
xyLen=(digestLen+checkLen)*elementPerByte;
//Long enough to hold the digest plus checksum
subVal = new byte [xyLen];
//Computes the sub elements in the digest.
computeSubVal(messDigest);
makeCheckSum();
return true;

}
//Copies the public y matrix into the argument yTemp

void WinternitzShort::getY(byte ** yTemp)
^

produceY(yTemp);

//The public parts of the siganture (the y and signature matrices)
//are copied into the arguments. Returns false if the signature can
//not be made. Returns true otherwise.
bool WinternitzShort::getSignature(byte **sign, byte **yTemp)
{
short unsigned i;
//Need to reproduce the x matrix
byte **x = new byte *[xyLen];
for(i = 0; i < xyLen; i++)
x[i] = new byte[SHA::DIGESTSIZE];
produceX(x);
if(produceSignature(sign, x)==false)
return false;
produceY(yTemp, x);
return true;

}
//Tests if the recieved signature is a valid one for the message
//(subVal) in ths signatureobject. Returns -1 if the signature
//can not be made, 0 if the tet fails and 1 otherwise
short WinternitzShort::verifySignature(byte **testSign)
^

if(!subVal)//There is no message to produce a signature on
return -1;
SHA hash;
unsigned short i, j;//loop counters
int n=pow(2,elementLen);
byte ** y = new byte *[xyLen];
//Need to make y
for(i = 0 ; i < xyLen; i++)
y[i] = new byte[SHA::DIGESTSIZE];
produceY(y);
byte tempCheck[SHA:iDIGESTSIZE] ;
for(i=0; i<xyLen; i++)//Once for each hash value
^

for(j=0;
j<SHA::DIGESTSIZE; j++)
tempCheck[j]=testSign[i]
[j] ;
//hash tempCheck until it should be the same as
//the corresponding y
for(j=subVal[i];
j<n; j++)
hash CalculateDigest(tempCheck,
tempCheck,
SHA::DIGESTSIZE);
//It is faster to check the digest "manually"
//rather then calling hash.VerifyDigest()
for(j=0; j<SHA::DIGESTSIZE; j++)
if(y[i] [j] 1=tempCheck[j ] )
return 0;

}

return 1;

}
//Tests if the recieved signature and y matrix form a valid signature

//for the message (subVal) in ths signatureobject. Returns -1 if the
//signature can not be made, 0 if the tet fails and 1 otherwise
short WinternitzShort::verifySignature(byte **testSign, byte **y)
if(!subVal)//There is no messge to produce a signature on
return -1;
unsigned short i, j;//loop counters
int n=pow(2,elementLen);
SHA hash;
byte tempCheck[SHA::DIGESTSIZE];

for(i=0; i<xyLen; i++)//Once for each hash value
{
for(j=0; j<SHA:iDIGESTSIZE; j++)
tempCheck[j]=testSign[i][j];
for(j=subVal[i]; j<n; j++)
hash.CalculateDigest(tempCheck, tempCheck,
SHA::DIGESTSIZE);
//It is faster to check the digest "manually" rather then
//calling hash.VerifyDigest()
for(j=0; j<SHA::DIGESTSIZE; j++)
if(y[i][j]!=tempCheck[j])
return 0;

}

return 1;

}
//Tests if the received signature and y matrix form a valid signature
//for the received message. Used on an empty WinternitzShort object
//made by the default constructor
short WinternitzShort::verifySignature(byte messDigest[], byte
**testSign, byte **y)
short unsigned subLen=(digestLen+checkLen)*elementPerByte;
subVal = new byte [subLen];
//Make the subVal matrix based on the messDigest
computeSubVal(messDigest);
makeCheckSum();
unsigned short i, j;//loop counters
int n=pow(2,elementLen);
SHA hash;
byte tempCheck[SHA::DIGESTSIZE] ;
for(i=0; i<xyLen; i++)//Once for each hash value
^

for(j=0; j<SHA::DIGESTSIZE; j++)
tempCheck[j]=testSign[i][j];
for(j=subVal[i]; j<n; j++)
hash CalculateDigest(tempCheck, tempCheck,
SHA::DIGESTSIZE);
//It is faster to check the digest "manually" rather
//then calling hash.VerifyDigest()
for(j=0; j<SHA::DIGESTSIZE; j++)
if(y[i] [j] !=tempCheck [ j])
return 0;

^

return 1;

class Node
*node.h
*Done as a part of the thesis: "Aspects of Micropayments" by Terje
*Tollisen for his Master of Science (Honours) at University of
*Wollongong.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * /

#ifndef node_h
#define node_h
#include "winternitz.h"
#include "cryptlib.h"
class Tree;
class Node
{
friend Tree;
public:
Node();
Node(int depth, float face, int n, Node* child=NULL);
void setChild(Node * c);
void getld(byte ID[]);
int getDepthO {return depth;}
float getFace0{return face;}
int getChainLenO{return chainLen;}
int getlndexO {return index;}
bool getChildSignature(byte **sign, byte **yTemp)
{return wChild.getSignature(sign, yTemp);}
void getChainRoot(byte cr []);
int getLink(byte link[]);
int getLinkNext(byte link[]);
private:
void
Node
void
void

getChainEnd(byte cr[]);
* getChildO;
computeld();
generateChain();

int depth;//Depth in the tree
, ^ v,
float face;//Face value of each link in the local hash
chain

byte chainRoot[SHA:rDIGESTSIZE];//The root of the local

hash chain
byte chainEnd[SHA::DIGESTSIZE];
byte id[SHA::DIGESTSIZE];

int chainLen;//Length of the local hash chain
int index///Current index of the local hash chain
Winternitz wChild;//Signature object for the child node
Node * child;//Points to the child node
#endif

/*************************************************
*node.cpp
*Done as a part of the thesis: "Aspects of Micropayments" by Terje
*Tollisen for his Master of Science (Honours) at University of
*Wollongong.
***********************************************************/

# include "node.h"
#include <iostream.h>
#include "osrng.h"
////////////Constructors//////////////////////
Node::Node(int d, float f, int n, Node* c)
{
depth=d;
face=f/
chainLen=n;
index=0;
child=c;
//Makes the local hash chain. Gives root and chainEnd values
generateChain();
computeld();

}
////////////Private functions//////////////////////
void Node::computeld()
byte ** childY=new byte * [wChild.getxyLen()];
for(int i=0; i<wChild.getxyLen(); i++)
childY[i] = new byte[SHA::DIGESTSIZE] ;
//Get the public y values of the signature on the child
wChild.getY(childY);
SHA hash;//A SHA object that will be used for hashing
//Will hold temporary hash values
byte childTempiSHA:iDIGESTSIZE];
byte chainTemp[SHA::DIGESTSIZE] ;
byte faceTemp[SHA::DIGESTSIZE] ;
int j=0;
//Put all the public y values into the childTemp array
//and make a digest (into the same array)
for(j=0; j<wChild.getxyLen(); j++)

hash.Update(childY[j], SHA::DIGESTSIZE);
hash.Final(ChiIdTemp);
//The face value must be part of the id
hash.Update(chainRoot, SHA::DIGESTSIZE);
hash.Final(chainTemp);
//The face value must be part of the id
hash.Update((unsigned char*)¿face, sizeof(float)
hash.Final(faceTemp);

//Make a new digest out of the temporary ones
//This new digest is the node id.
hash.Update(ChiIdTemp, SHA::DIGESTSIZE);
hash.Update(chainTemp, SHA::DIGESTSIZE);
hash.Update(faceTemp, SHA::DIGESTSIZE);
hash.Final(id);

}
void Node::setChild(Node * c)
{
child=c/
byte childId[SHA::DIGESTSIZE];
c->getld(childld);
wChild.update(childid, SHA::DIGESTSIZE);

}
void Node::generateChain()
{
//Make the random end of the hash chain
AutoSeededRandomPool rng;
rng.GenerateBlock(chainEnd, SHA::DIGESTSIZE) ;.
SHA hash;
//The root is at least on hash "away" form the end
hash.CalculateDigest(chainRoot, chainEnd, SHA::DIGESTSIZE);
//Produce the rest of the links in the hash chain,
//ending up with root
for(int j=l; j<chainLen-l; j++)
hash.CalculateDigest(chainRoot, chainRoot,
SHA::DIGESTSIZE);
void Node::getChainEnd(byte ce[] )

for(short unsigned int i=0; i<SHA::DIGESTSIZE; i++:
ce[i]=chainEnd[i];

Node * Node::getChild()
return child;
////functions///////////////////III

void Node::getld(byte ID[])

}

for(short unsigned int i=0; i<SHA::DIGESTSIZE; i++)
ID[i]=id[i] ;

void Node:rgetChainRoot(byte cr[])
{
for(short unsigned int i=0; i<SHA::DIGESTSIZE; i++)
cr[i]=chainRoot[i];

}

int Node::getLink(byte link[])
{
if(index==chainLen)//end of chain
return -1;
for(short unsigned int k=0; k<SHA::DIGESTSIZE/ k++)
link[k]=chainEnd[k];
for(int j=l; j<chainLen-index; j++)
SHAO .CalculateDigest(link, link, SHA::DIGESTSIZE);
return index;

}
int Node::getLinkNext(byte link[])
{
if(index==chainLen)//end of chain
return -1;
for(short unsigned int k=0; k<SHA::DIGESTSIZE; k++)
link[k]=chainEnd[k] ;
for(int j=l; j<chainLen-index; j++)
SHAO .CalculateDigest(link, link, SHA::DIGESTSIZE);
return index++;//Return the current index of this link, then
advance the index
}

class Tree
» D o n ^ L a part of the thesis: "Aspects of Micropayn^ents" by Terje
.Tollisen for his Master of Science (Honours) at University of

#ifndef tree_h
#define tree_h
#include "node.h"

class Tree
{
public:
Tree();
void insertNode(float face, int n);//, Node* c=NULL);
int getDepth0{return endPtr->getDepth();}
void getRootId(byte ID[]){rootPtr->getId(ID);}
bool up();
bool down();
void start 0 ;
void end();
int getSignatureSize0
{return currentPtr->wChild.getxyLen();}
float getCurrentFace0{return currentPtr->getFace();}
int getCurrentDepthO{return currentPtr->getDepth();}
int getCurrentChainLenO{return currentPtr>getChainLen()/}
int getCurrentlndexO{return currentPtr->getlndex();}
void getCurrentId(byte ID[]){currentPtr->getId(ID);}
void getCurrentChainRoot(byte cr[])
{currentPtr->getChainRoot(cr);}
int getCurrentLink(byte link[])
{return currentPtr->getLink(link);}
int getCurrentLinkNext(byte link[])
{return currentPtr->getLinkNext(link);}
bool getCurrentSignature(byte **sign, byte **yTemp)
{return currentPtr->getChildSignature(sign, yTemp);}
bool getCurrentY(byte **yTemp)
{return currentPtr->wChild.getY(yTemp);}
bool currentEmpty()
{return currentPtr->index==currentPtr->chainLen;}
private :
Node * rootPtr;
Node * currentPtr;
Node * endPtr;

};
#endif
/**********************************************************
*tree.cpp
*Done as a part of the thesis: "Aspects of Micropayments" by Terje
*Tollisen for his Master of Science (Honours) at University of
*Wollongong.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * /

#include "tree.h"
//#include <iostream.h>
Tree ::Tree()
{
rootPtr=NULL;
current Pt r=NULL;
endPtr=NULL/

}
void Tree::insertNode(float face, int n)

if(rootPtr==NULL)
{
r o o t P t r = n e w N o d e ( 0 , f a c e , n) ;
currentPtr=rootPtr ;
endPtr=rootPtr;

}

else
{
Node * temp=new Node(endPtr->getDepth()+1,
endPtr->setChild(temp);
currentPtr=temp ;
endPtr=temp/

f a c e , n)/

}
}

bool Tree : : up()
{
if(currentPtr==rootPtr)
return false;
else
{
Node * temp=rootPtr;
while(temp->getChild()!=currentPtr;
temp=temp->getChild() ;
currentPtr=temp;
return true;

}
bool Tree : : down()
{
if(currentPtr==endPtr)
return false;
else
{
currentPtr=currentPtr->getChild();
return true;

}
void Tree::start 0
currentPtr=rootPtr;

v o i d Tree : : end()
currentPtr=endPtr;

Test program
/ * * * * * * * * * * * * * * • * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

* D o n ^ 2 ^ a p a r t of the t h e s i s : "Aspects of M i c r o p a y m e n t s " b y T e r j e
* T o l l i s e n f o r h i s M a s t e r of S c i e n c e (Honours) at U n i v e r s i t y of

#include
#include
#include
#include
#include
#include
#include
#include
#include
#include
#include
#include
#include
#include
#include
#include
#include
#include

"config.h"
"cryptlib.h"
"osrng.h"
<iostream.h>
<iomanip.h>
"winternitz.h"
"winternitzshort.h"
"node.h"
"tree.h"
<math.h>
<time.h>
"pch.h"
"sha.h"
"mdS.h"
"dsa.h"
"rsa.h"
"hex.h"
"files.h"

USING_NAMESPACE(CryptoPP)
short unsigned int iy[AX_PHRASE_LENGTH=2 50 ;
void help();
void treeTestO;
void manualTreeTest();
void nodeTiming(int max, int inc, int len);
void printTree(Tree t);
bool verifyLink(byte root[] , byte link[], int i);
bool verifyChild(byte **sign, byte **y, byte*childID);
bool verifyChild(byte **sign, byte **y, byte**childY,
byte*childChainRoot, float face, int signLen);
void hashChainTiming(int max, int inc);
void randomTiming(int max, int inc) ;
void winternitzTest();
void winternitzTiming(int max, int inc);
void winternitzShortTest0;
void winternitzShortTiming(int max, int inc)/
void makeKeys();
void signingTest(int max, int inc);
int main(int argc, char* argv[])
int max=0, inc=0, len=0;
char command[10];
if(argc==l)
^

cout<<endl<<"Enter a command option (h for help):";
cin>>command;
if(strcmp(command, "h")==0)
{
helpO ;
cout<<endl;
return 0;

)

)

else
{
strcpy((char*)command,argv[1]);
if(argc>2)

max = atoi(argv[2]);
if(argc>3)
inc = atoi(argv[3]);
if(argc>4)
len = atoi(argv[4]);
if(inc<=0)
inc=max;

}

if(strcmp(command,

{

}

help() ;
cout<<endl;
r e t u r n 0;

if(strcmp(command,
{

}

"wt")==0)

winternitzTest();
cout<<endl/
r e t u r n 0;

if(strcmp(command,
{

)

"mtt")==0)

manualTreeTest();
cout<<endl;
r e t u r n 0;

if(strcmp(command,
{

}

"tt")==0)

treeTest();
cout<<endl;
r e t u r n 0;

if(strcmp(command,
{

)

"h")==0)

"wst")==0)

winternitzShortTest();
cout<<endl;
r e t u r n 0;

if(strcmp(command,
{

"mk")==0)

makeKeys();
cout<<endl;
r e t u r n 0;

}

if(argc==l)

}

c o u t < < " M a x n u b m e r of iterations:
cin>>max;
cout<<"Size of increments:
cin>>inc;

if(strcmp(command,
^

"nt")==0)

if(len==0)
^

}

c o u t < < " L e n g t h of h a s h
cin>>len;

chain:

nodeTiming(max, inc, len);
cout<<endl;
return 0;
f(strcmp(command, "hct")==0)
hashChainTiming(max, inc);
cout<<endl;
return 0;
f(strcmp(command, "rt")==0)
randomTiming(max, inc);
cout<<endl;
return 0;
f(strcmp(command, "wti")==0)
winternitzTiming(max, inc);
cout<<endl;
return 0;
if(strcmp(command, "wsti")==0)
winternitzShortTiming(max, inc);
cout<<endl;
return 0;
if(strcmp(command, "st")==0)
signingTest(max, inc);
cout<<endl;
return 0;

}
cout<<endl; return 0;

void helpO
{
takes 1. 2 or 3 arguments."
argument is a letter code for which
<<operation \n\tto perform:"
_
<<endl<<"-tt:\tPerform a test on a signature chain as
<<"described \n\tin Chapter 5."
< < e n d l < < " - m t t : \ t P e r f o r m a manual test on a signature
<<"chain as \n\tdescribed in Chapter 5."
« e n d l « " + n t : \ t T e s t the time it takes to make a node
«"with a given \n\tnumber size hash chain."
< < e n d l « " + h c t : \ t T e s t the time it takes to make and verify

cout«endl«"Program
«endl«"First

aiven \n\tnumber of hashes."
. ..
<<end?<<"+rt:\tTest the time it takes to initialise a "
«"random \n\tnumber and do pseudo ramdom operations •
< < e n S < < " - w t : \ t P e r f o r m tests on the implementation of the
it takes to do operations
on "

<<"\n\tthe Winternitz
the "

class."

< < e n d l < < " - w s t : \ t P e r f o r m t e s t s o n t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of
<< << "e \n nd \l t< W< i" n+ tw es rt ni i: t\ zt ST he os rt t the
c l a ts ism.e" it t a k e s to d o o p e r a t i o n s
<<"on \n\tthe WinternitzShort class."
< < e n d l < < " + m k : \ t T e s t t h e t i m e it t a k e s to m a k e a n

RSA(1024) "
<<"and \n\ta DSA(1024) key pair."
< < e n d l < < " + s t : \ t T e s t t h e t i m e it t a k e s to d o a g i v e n
number "
<<"of \n\tRSA and DSA operations.";
c o u t < < e n d l < < e n d l < < " T h e c o m m a n d s m a r k e d w i t h a - t a k e s o n l y one
<<"\nargument

(the c o m m a n d o p t i o n ) "

< < e n d l < < " T h e c o m m a n d s m a r k e d w i t h a + c a n t a k e one o r t w o
<<"more options:"
< < e n d l < < " l ) m a x n u b m e r of i t e r a t i o n s "
< < e n d l < < " 2 ) s i z e of i n c r e m e n t " ;
c o u t < < e n d l < < e n d l < < " T h e a r g u m e n t s \ " h t c 1 0 0 0 0 \ " w i l l c a s u e the "
< < " p r o g r a m t o \ n d o t e s t s o n 10000 h a s h c h a i n o p e r a t i o s "
< < e n d l < < " T h e a r g u m e n t s \"htc 10000 5 0 0 0 \ " w i l l c a s u e the
< < " p r o g r a m to \ n d o t e s t s o n 5000 a n d t h e n 10000 h a s h
c h a i n II
<<"operatios"
<<endl<<"And so on.";

void
{

treeTestO
Tree tree;
tree.insertNode((float)1.1,
tree.insertNode((float)2.2,
tree.insertNode((float)3.3,
tree.insertNode((float)4.4,
bool test=true;

2)
4)
6)
8)

int s i g n S i z e = t r e e . g e t S i g n a t u r e S i z e ( ) ;
int i;
byte testId[SHA::DIGESTSIZE];
b y t e ** t e s t Y = n e w b y t e * [ s i g n S i z e ] ;
b y t e ** t e s t S i g n = n e w b y t e * [ s i g n S i z e ] ;
b y t e ** t e s t C h i l d y = n e w b y t e * [ s i g n S i z e ] ;
byte * testChildRoot=new byte[signSize] ;
float testChildFace;

for(i=0; i<signSize;
^

i++)

testY[i]=new byte[SHA::DIGESTSIZE] ;
testSign[i]=new byte[SHA::DIGESTSIZE];
testChildY[i]=new byte[SHA::DIGESTSIZE] ;

}
tree.start();
printTree(tree);

for(i=i; i<=tree.getDepth(); i++)
tree.getCurrentSignature(testSign, testY);
if(¡tree.down 0 )
{
cout<<endl<<"Unexpexcted end of tree";
return;

}
tree.getCurrentChainRoot{testChildRoot);
tree.getCurrentY(testChildY);
testChildFace=tree.getCurrentFace();
tree.getCurrentId(testid);
if(IverifyChild(testSign, testY, testChildY,
testChildRoot, testChildPace, signSize))

{

test=false;
cout<<endl<<"Signature on child "<<i<<" failed";

}
else
cout<<endl<<"Signature on child "<<i<<" ok";
if(IverifyChild(testSign, testY, testid))
{
test=false;
cout<<endl<<"Signature on child's id "<<i<<"
failed";

}
else
cout<<endl<<"Signature on child's id "<<i<<" ok";

}
//Make payments
cout<<endl<<endl<<"Payment tests";
byte tempLink[SHA:cDIGESTSIZE] ;
byte * chainRoot=new byte[signSize];
int index;
tree.start 0 ;
while(true)
printTree(tree) ;
while(true)
^

tree.getCurrentChainRoot(chainRoot);
index=tree.getCurrentLinkNext(tempLink);

if(index==-l)//end of chain
^

cout<<endl<<"End of chain";
break;

if(!verifyLink(ChainRoot, tempLink, index))
^

test=false;
cout<<endl<<"Link verification failed";

}

else
cout<<endl<<"Link verification ok";
if(! tree.down 0 )
{

cout<<endl<<"End of tree";
break;

)

'

printTree(tree);
if (test)
cout<<endl<<endl<<"All tests ran as expected";
else
cout<<endl<<endl<<"One or more tests did not go as
expected";
cout<<endl;

}
void manualTreeTest()
{
clock_t tl, t2;
tl =clock();
Tree tree;
int length;//Length of chain to insert
float face;//Face value for the chain to insert
t2 =clock();
//Build the tree
while(true)
{
tl=clock();
cout<<endl<<"Inserting new node (0 or less to exit):";
cout<<endl<<"Lenght of hash chain: ";
cin>>length;
if(length<=0)
break;
cout<<"Face value per link: ";
cin>>face;
t2=clock();
if(length>0)
{
tl=clock();
tree.insertNode(face, length);
t2=clock();
cout<<"Insert node with a hash chain of
length\t"<<length<<"= "<<
(float)(t2-tl)/CLOCKS_PER_SEC
<<"\tseconds"<<endl;

}

}

printTree(tree);
tree.start 0 ;
//Variables needed to test the tree signatures
int signSize=tree.getSignatureSize() ;
int i;
byte testId[SHA::DIGESTSIZE];
** testY=new byte* [signSize] ;
j^y^g ** testSign=new byte* [signSize] ;
byte ** testChildY=new byte*[signSize];
j^y^g * testChildRoot=new byte [signSize] ;
float testChildPace;

//Allocate memory

for(i=0; i<signSize/ i++)
testY[i]=new byte[SHA::DIGESTSIZE];
testSign[i]=new byte[SHA::DIGESTSIZE] ;
testChildY[i]=new byte[SHA::DIGESTSIZE];

}
//Test the signatures on the nodes
cout<<endl<<endl<<"Test the signatures on the nodes:";
tree.start();
while(true)
{
//Get the siganture of the parent node
tree.getCurrentSignature(testSign, testY);
//Move the current point one down; to the child
if(!tree.down())
break;
//Get the three public parts of the child node
tree.getCurrentChainRoot(testChildRoot);
tree.getCurrentY(testChildY);
testChildFace=tree.getCurrentFace();

//Test the Winternitz signature on the public
//parts of the child node
if(IverifyChild(testSign, testY, testChildY,
testChildRoot, testChildPace, signSize))
cout<<endl<<"Signature on node "
<<tree.getCurrentDepth()
<<" public components failed";
else
cout<<endl<<"Signature on node "
<<tree.getCurrentDepth()
<<" public components ok";
//Test the Winternitz signature on the id number
//of the child node
tree.getCurrentId(testid);
if(¡verifyChild(testSign, testY, testid))
cout<<endl<<"Signature on node "
<<tree.getCurrentDepth0<<" id failed";
else
cout<<endl<<"Signature on node "
<<tree.getCurrentDepth0<<" id ok";

//Make payments
cout<<endl<<endl<<"Payment tests";
byte tempLink[SHA::DIGESTSIZE];_
byte * chainRoot=new byte[signSize];
int index;
while(true)
^

printTree(tree) ;
cout<<endl<<"Value of next payment: ";

cin>>face;
if(face==0)
break;
tree.start();
while(true)
{
if(face == tree.getCurrentFace
ScSc ! tree. currentEmpty () )

{

index=tree.getCurrentlndex();
tree.getCurrentChainRoot(chainRoot);
tree.getCurrentLinkNext(tempLink);
if(verifyLink(chainRoot, tempLink, index))
cout<<endl<<"Link verification ok";
else
cout<<endl<<"Link verification failed";
break;

}

else
if(!tree.down())
{
cout<<endl<<"No such value found";
cout<<endl<<"To insert a new node with
face
value "<<face<<",";
cout<<endl<<"type length of the new
hash chain,
(0 to drop insert): ";
cin>>length;
if(length<=0)
break;
if (length>0)
{
tl=clock();
tree.insertNode(face, length);
t2=clock();
cout<<"Insert node with a hash
chain of

length\t"<<length<<"= "
<<(float)(t2-tl)/CLOCKS_PER_SEC
<<"\tseconds"<<endl;
}
break;

}
void printTree(Tree t)

{

cout<<endl<<"The tree structure:";
t.start();
while(true)

{

cout < < endl< <"Depth: "«t.getCurrentDepth()«
"
Face= "<<t.getCurrentFace0<<
"
Length= "<<t.getCurrentChainLen()<<
"
Index= "<<t.getCurrentlndex0 ;
if ( ! t .downO )
break;

}
//Use public information to verify a link in a hash chain, compared
to the root of the chain
bool verifyLink(byte root[], byte link[], int i)
byte temp[SHA::DIGESTSIZE];
for(int k=0; k<SHA::DIGESTSIZE; k++)
temp[k]=link[k];
if(i>0)//link is root
for(int j=0; j<i; j++)
SHAO .CalculateDigest(temp, temp, SHA:iDIGESTSIZE);
for(int j=0; j<SHA:rDIGESTSIZE; j++)
if(root[j]!=temp[j])
return false;
return true;

}
//Tests if the arguments sign and y makes a valid
//Wintetnitz signature on childID
bool verifyChild(byte **sign, byte **y, byte*childID)
{
Winternitz testSign(childID, SHA::DIGESTSIZE, y);
if(!testSign.verifySignature(sign))
return false;
return true;

}
//Computes the id of the child node form the arguments
//childY, childChainRoot and face. Tests if the arguments sign
//and y makes a valid Wintetnitz signature on that id
bool verifyChild(byte **sign, byte **y, byte**childY,
byte*childChainRoot, float face, int signLen)
{
SHA hash;//A SHA object that will be used for hashing
//Will hold temporary hash values
byte chainTemp[SHA::DIGESTSIZE] ;
byte childTemp[SHA::DIGESTSIZE];
byte faceTemp[SHA::DIGESTSIZE];
byte id[SHA::DIGESTSIZE] ;
int j=0;
//Put all the public y values into the
//childTemp array and make a digest (intot he same array)
for(j=0; j<signLen; j++)
hash.Update(childY[j], SHA::DIGESTSIZE);
hash.Final(childTemp);
//The denomination of each link must be part of the id
hash.Update(childChainRoot, SHA::DIGESTSIZE);
hash.Final(chainTemp);
//The denomination of each link must be part of the id
hash.Update((unsigned char*)&face, sizeof(float));
hash.Final(faceTemp);

//Make a new digest out of the temporary ones. This new digest
is the node id.
hash.Update(childTemp, SHA::DIGESTSIZE);
hash.Update(chainTemp, SHA::DIGESTSIZE);
hash.Update(faceTemp, SHA::DIGESTSIZE);
hash.Final(id);
Winternitz W(id, SHA::DIGESTSIZE, y);
if(!W.verifySignature(sign))
return false;
return true;

//Times how long it takes to make a new signature node
//with a given length of the hash chain
void nodeTiming(int max, int inc, int len)
{
cout<<endl<<"Node timing"<<endl;
clock_t tl, t2;
int i, j;//loop counters
tl=clock();
t2 =clock();
tl=ClOCk();
Tree tree;
t2 =clock();

for( i=inc; i<=max; i+=inc)
{
tl=clock();
for(j=0; j<i; j++)
tree.insertNode((float) 1.1, len) ;
t2=clock 0 ;
cout<<"Insert "<<j<<" nodes with lenght\t"
<<len<<"\tchain=\t"
<<(float)(t2-tl)/CLOCKS_PER_SEC<<"\tseconds"<<endl;

}
//Times how long it takes to produce a hash chain with a
//given number of links
void hashChainTiming(int max, int inc)
^

cout<<endl<<"Hash chain timing"<<endl;
clock_t tl, t2;
SHA hash;
tl=clock();
byte ml[SHA: :DIGESTSIZE] ;
byte m2 [SHA::DIGESTSIZE];
AutoSeededRandomPool rng;
rng.GenerateBlock(ml, SHA::DIGESTSIZE);//Make the message
int i, j;//loop counters
t2 =clock();
for( i=inc; i<=max; i+=inc)
^

tl=clock();

for{j=0; j<i/ j++)
hash.CalculateDigest(ml, ml, SHA::DIGESTSIZE);
t2=clock()/
cout<<"Make a SHA-1 hash chain of length\t"
<<j<<"\t=\t"
^

<<(float)(t2-tl)/CLOCKS_PER_SEC<<"\tseconds"<<endl;

MD5 md5;
for( i=inc; i<=max; i+=inc)
tl=clock();
for(j=0; j<i/ j++)
md5 .CalculateDigest (ml, ml, SHA: .-DIGESTSIZE)/
t2=clock()/
cout<<"Make a MD5 hash chain of length\t"
<<j<<"\t=\t"
^

<<(float)(t2-tl)/CLOCKS_PER_SEC<<"\tseconds"<<endl;

cout<<endl<<"Hash chain verification timing";
hash.CalculateDigest(m2, ml, SHA::DIGESTSIZE) ;
//m2 is now a digest of ml

//Test if m2 a digest of ml?
if (ihash.VerifyDigest(m2, ml, SHA::DIGESTSIZE))
{
cout<<endl<<"Hash verification failed"<<endl;
return;

}

else
cout<<endl<<"Hash verification ok"<<endl;
for(i=inc; i<=max; i+=inc)
{
tl=clock();
for(j=0; j<i; j++)
//Test if m2 a digest of ml?
if (!hash.VerifyDigest(m2, ml, SHA::DIGESTSIZE))
{
cout<<endl<<"Hash verification failed while
calling
hash.VerifyDigest(m2, ml, SHA::DIGESTSIZE)";
return;

}
t2=clock();
cout<<"Verify\t"<<j<<"\thash values with testing=\t"
<<(float)(t2-tl)/CLOCKS_PER_SEC<<"\tseconds"<<endl;

}
hash.CalculateDigest(ml, ml, SHA::DIGESTSIZE);
//ml and m2 should now be equal
cout<<endl;
int k=0;
for(i=inc*10; i<=max*10; i+=inc*10)
^

tl=clock();

for(j=0; j<i; j++)
{
for(k=0; k<SHA::DIGESTSIZE; k++)
if(ml [k] !=m2[k])
{
cout < < endl< <"error";
return;

}

}

t2=clock();
cout<<"Verify\t"<<j<<"\thash values manually=\t"
<<(float)(t2-tl)/CLOCKS_PER_SEC<<"\tseconds"<<endl;

}
//Times how long it takes to initsialize a random number generator
//and to make a given number of pseudo random numbers
void randomTiming(int max, int inc)
{
cout<<endl<<"Random number generation";
clock_t tl, t2;
tl=clock();
t2 =clock();
cout<<endl<<"Test zero time=\t"
<<(float)(t2-tl)/CLOCKS_PER_SEC<<"\tseconds"<<endl;
int i,j;
const short unsigned int messLen=SHA::DIGESTSIZE;
long seed;
byte mess[messLen];
AutoSeededRandomPool rng;
for(i=inc; i<=max; i+=inc)
{
tl=clock 0 ;
for(j=0; j<i; j++)
AutoSeededRandomPool rng;
t2=clock 0 ;
cout<<"Initsialize\t"<<j
<<"\trandom number generators=\t"
<<(float)(t2-tl)/CLOCKS_PER_SEC<<"\tseconds"<<endl;

}

for(i=inc; i<=max; i+=inc)
{
tl=clock();
for(j=0; j<i; j++)

AutoSeededRandomPool rng;
seed=rng.GetLong();

}

t2=clock();
cout<<"Initsialize\t"<<j
<<"\trandom number generator and get a long=\t"
« ( f l o a t ) (t2-tl)/CL0CKS_PER_SEC«"\tseconds"«endl;

for(i=inc; i<=max; i+=inc;
^

tl=clock();
for(j=0; j<i; j++)

rng.GenerateBlock(mess, SHA::DIGESTSIZE);
t2=clock();

cout < <"Generate\t"< < j < <
"\trandom numbers of size SHASIZE=\t"
<<(float) (t2-tl)/CLOCKS_PER_SEC<<"\tseconds"<<endl;

void winternitzTest()
{
int i=0/
bool test=true;
//A sub element has a values less then n.
const short unsigned int n = pow(2,elementLen);
const short unsigned int messLen=SHA: .-DIGESTSIZE;
byte mess[messLen];//The message who's digest will be signed
//Generating a random message
AutoSeededRandomPool rng;
rng.GenerateBlock(mess, SHA::DIGESTSIZE);
//Creating the digest of the message
byte m [SHA::DIGESTSIZE];//Will hold the digest of the message
SHA () .CalculateDigest(m, mess, messLen);
Winternitz Wl(m, SHA::DIGESTSIZE)/
cout<<endl<<"Wl is a Winternitz sigantue
object:Winternitz Wl(m, SHA::DIGESTSIZE)";
cout<<endl<<"Self verification on W1 should be ok"/
if(!W1.verifySignature())
{
test=false;
cout<<endl<<"Signature on W1 failed";

}
else
cout<<endl<<"Signature on W1 ok";

Winternitz W2;
cout<<endl<<"W2 is an empty Winternitz sigantue object."
<<endl<<"Calling W2.update(m, SHA::DIGESTSIZE)";
W2.update(m, SHA::DIGESTSIZE);
cout<<endl<<"Self verification on W2 should be ok";
if(!W2.verifySignature 0 )
{
test=false;
cout<<endl<<"Signature on W2 failed";

}
else
cout<<endl<<"Signature on W2 ok";

//Generate varables need for siganture testing
short unsigned int signLen=W2.getxyLen();
byte ** sign=new byte * [signLen];
byte *subVal=new byte [signLen];
short unsigned int subLen=W2.getxyLen();
byte **y=new byte *[signLen];;;
short testValue;
//Allocate memory
for(i=0; i<signLen; i++)
{

y[i]=newbyte [SHA::DIGESTSIZE];
sign[i]=new byte [SHA:iDIGESTSIZE];

cout<<endl<<"Get the public y and sign
fromW2: W2.getSignature(sign, y)";
W2.getSignature(sign, y);
cout<<endl<<"W3 is a Winternitz testing
sigantue: Winternitz W3(m, SHA:rDIGESTSIZE, y)";
Winternitz W3(m, SHA::DIGESTSIZE, y);
cout<<endl<<"Use W3 to test the sign from W2.
Signaute test should be ok";
if(IW3.verifySignature(sign))
{
test=false;
cout<<endl<<"Signature on W3 failed";

}
else
cout<<endl<<"Signature on W3 ok";
sign [0] [0]++;
cout<<endl<<"Change a nubmer in sign, to make a miss match"
<<endl<<"Siganture on W3 should now fail";
if(!W3.verifySignature(sign))
cout<<endl<<"Signature on W3 failed";
else
{
test=false;
cout<<endl<<"Signature on W3 ok";

}
cout<<endl<<"W4 is an empty Winternitz
sigantue object: Winternitz W4";
Winternitz W4;
cout<<endl<<"Calling W4.verifySignature()"
<<endl<<"This siganture does not exist,
the operation and should not be completed.";
testValue=W4.verifySignature();
if(testValue==-l)
cout<<endl<<"Signature W4 could not be completed";
else
if(testValue==0)
{
test=false;
cout<<endl<<"Signature on W4 failed";

}
else
if(testValue==l)
{
test=false;
cout<<endl<<"Signature on W4 ok";

}
if (test)
cout<<endl<<endl<<"All tests ran as expected";
else
cout<<endl<<endl<<"One or more tests did not
go as expected";

tl=clock();
for(j=0; j<i; j++)
tempW.getY(tempY);
t2=clock();
cout<<"Get (copy)\t"<<j
<<"\ty matrixes=\t"
<<(float)(t2-tl)/CLOCKS_PER_SEC<<"\tseconds"<<endl;

}
Winternitz testW(m, SHA:iDIGESTSIZE, tempY);
if(!testW,verifySignature(tempSign) )
{
cout<<endl<<"Test signature failed. Abnormal Abort";
return;

}
//Verif the Winternitz siganture on a signature object
for(i=inc; i<=max; i+=inc)
{
tl=clock();
for(j=0; j<i; j++)
testW.verifySignature(tempSign);
t2=clock();
cout<<"Verity\t"<<j
<<"\twintertnitz signatures=\t"
<<(float)(t2-tl)/CLOCKS_PER_SEC<<"\tseconds"<<endl;

}

void winternitzShortTest()
//A sub element has a values less then n.
const short unsigned int n = pow(2,elementLen);
const short unsigned int messLen=SHA::DIGESTSIZE;
byte mess[messLen];//The message whos digest will be signed
bool test=true;
//Generating a random message
AutoSeededRandomPool rng;
rng.GenerateBlock(mess, SHA:iDIGESTSIZE);
//Creating the digest of the message
byte m [SHA::DIGESTSIZE];//Will hold the digest of the message
S H A O .CalculateDigest (m, mess, messLen) ;
WinternitzShort Wl(m, SHA::DIGESTSIZE) ;
cout<<endl<<"Wl is a WinternitzShort
object:WinternitzShort Wl(m, SHA::DIGESTSIZE) . " ;
//Generate varables need for siganture testing
short unsigned int signLen=Wl.getxyLen();
byte ** sign=new byte * [signLen];
byte *subVal=new byte [signLen];
byte **y=new byte *[signLen];
short testValue;

//Tiems how long it takes to do different actions on a
//Winternitz signature

void winternitzTiming(int max, int inc)
cout<<endl<<"Winternitz timing. lementLen=\t"<<elementLen;
clock_t tl, t2;
tl=clock();
t2 =clock()/

tl=clock();
//A sub element has a values less then n.
const short unsigned int n = pow(2,elementLen);
const short unsigned int messLen=SHA::DIGESTSIZE;
byte mess[messLen];//The message who's digest will be signed
//Generating a random message
AutoSeededRandomPool rng;
rng.GenerateBlock(mess, SHA: :DIGESTSIZE);
//Creating the digest of the message
byte m [SHA::DIGESTSIZE];
SHA().CalculateDigest(m, mess, messLen);
t2 =clock();
cout<<"Initsialize time=\t"
<<(float)(t2-tl)/CLOCKS_PER_SEC<<"\tseconds"<<endl;
int i,j;
//Makes an empty Winternitz siganture
for(i=inc; i<=max; i+=inc)
{
tl=clock();
for(j=0; j<i; j++)
Winternitz W;
t2=clock 0 ;
cout<<"Make\t"<<j<<"\tempty wintertnitz signatures=\t"
<<(float)(t2-tl)/CLOCKS_PER_SEC<<"\tseconds"<<endl;

}

//Updates an empty Winternitz siganture
for(i=inc; i<=max; i+=inc)
{
Winternitz W;
tl=clock 0 ;
for(j=0; j<i; j++)
W.update(m, SHA: :DIGESTSIZE) ;
t2=clock();
cout<<"Update\t"<<j<<"\terapty wintertnitz signatures=\t'
<<(float)(t2-tl)/CLOCKS_PER_SEC<<"\tseconds"<<endl;

//Makes a Winternitz siganture
for(i=inc/ i<=max; i+=inc)
tl=clock();
for(j=0; j<i; j++)
Winternitz W(m, SHA::DIGESTSIZE);
t2=clock();
cout<<"Make\t"<<j
<<"\twintertnitz signatures=\t"
<< ( f l o a t )

}

(t2-tl)/CL0CKS_PER_SEC«"\tseconds"<<endl;

//Makes a Winternitz siganture and does the self
//verification test
for(i=inc; i<=max; i+=inc)

tl=clock();
for(j=0; j<i; j++)
{
Winternitz W(m, SHA: :DIGESTSIZE) ;
if(!W.verifySignature())
{
cout<<endl<<"Signature failed";
return;

}

}

}

t2=clock();
cout<<"Make/self verity\t"<<j
<<"\twintertnitz signatures=\t"
<<(float)(t2-tl)/CLOCKS_PER_SEC<<"\tseconds"<<endl;

//Create the temporary variables need to verify a
//signature
Winternitz tempW(m, SHA::DIGESTSIZE);
short unsigned int len=tempW.getxyLen();
byte ** tempSign=new byte * [len]/
byte *tempSubVal=new byte [len];
byte **tempY=new byte * [len];
for(i=0; i<len; i++)
{
terapY[i]=new byte [SHA::DIGESTSIZE];
tempSign[i]=new byte [SHA::DIGESTSIZE];

)
//Gets the public parts of a Winternitz signature
tempW.getSignature(tempSign, tempY);
//Make Winternitz test-objects, used to veruty signatures.
for(i=inc; i<=max; i+=inc)
{
tl=clock();
for(j=0; j<i; j++)
Winternitz testW(m, SHA::DIGESTSIZE, tempY);
t2=clock();
cout<<"Make\t"<<j<<"\twintertnitz test objects=\t"
<<(float)(t2-tl)/CLOCKS_PER_SEC<<"\tseconds"<<endl;

}
//Gets the public parts of a WinternitzShort signature
for(i=inc; i<=max; i+=inc)
{
tl=clock();
for(j=0; j<i; j++)
tempW.getSignature(tempSign, tempY);
t2=clock 0 ;
cout<<"Get (copy)\t"<<j
<<"\twintertnitz signatures=\t"
<<(float)(t2-tl)/CLOCKS_PER_SEC<<"\tseconds"<<endl;

)
//Gets the public parts of a WinternitzShort signature
for(i=inc; i<=max; i+=inc)

for(int i=0; i<signLen; i++)
y[i]=new byte [SHA::DIGESTSIZE];
sign[i]=new byte [SHA::DIGESTSIZE];

^

cout<<endl<<"Calling W1.getSignature(sign, y). Should be ok";
if(!W1.getSignature(sign, y))
test=false;
cout<<endl<<"Could not get the siganture on Wl";

}
else
cout<<endl<<"getSignature(sign, y) ok";
cout<<endl<<"Calling Wl.verifySignature(sign)."
<<endl<<"Signature on Wl should be ok";
testValue=Wl.verifySignature(sign);
if(testValue==-l)
{
test=false;
cout<<endl<<"Signature verification on Wl
could not be completed";

}

else
if(testValue==0)
{
test=false;
cout<<endl<<"Signature on Wl failed";

}
else
if(testValue==l)
cout<<endl<<"Signature on Wl
cout<<endl;

ok";

cout<<endl<<"Calling Wl.verifySignature(sign, y)."
<<endl<<"Signature on Wl should be ok";
testValue=Wl.verifySignature(sign,

y);

if(testValue==-l)
{
test=false;
cout<<endl<<"Signature verification on Wl
could not be completed";

}

else
if(testValue==0)
{
test=false;
cout<<endl<<"Signature on Wl failed";

}
else
if(testValue==l)
cout<<endl<<"Signature on Wl

ok";

cout<<endl;
WinternitzShort W2;
v. • ^
c o u t « e n d l « " W 2 is an empty test object.
« e n d l « " C a l l i n g W2. verifySignature (m, sign, y) .
<<endl<<"Signature on W2 should be ok";
testValue=W2.verifySignature(m, sign, y);

if(testValue==-l)

{
test=false;
cout<<endl<<"Signature verification on W2
^ could not be completed";
else
if(testValue==0)
{
test=false;
cout<<endl<<"Signature on W2 failed";

}
else
if(testValue==l)
cout<<endl<<"Signature on W2
cout<<endl;

ok";

cout<<endl<<"Changing a number in y to
produce a failed signature";
if (y[0] [0] >0)
y[0] [0] --;
else
y[0] [0]++;
cout<<endl;
cout<<endl<<"Calling W2.verifySignature(m, sign, y)."
<<endl<<"Signature on W2 should fail";
testValue=W2.verifySignature(m,sign, y);
if(testValue==-l)
{
test=false;
cout<<endl<<"Signature verification on
W2 could not be completed";

}

else
if(testValue==0)
cout<<endl<<"Signature on W2 failed";
else
if(testValue==l)
{
test=false;
cout<<endl<<"Signature on W2

ok";

}
cout<<endl;

WinternitzShort W3;
cout<<endl<<"W3 is an empty test object.";
cout<<endl<<"Calling W3.getSignature(sign, y).
Should not be able to get it";
if(!W3.getSignature(sign, y))
cout<<endl<<"Could not get the siganture on W3";
else
{
test = false;
n n. ^ • „
cout«endl<<"Got the siganture on W3. Abnormal behavior";

}
if(test)

^
tests ran as expected ;
^
,
cout<<endl<<endl<<"One or more tests did
cout<<endl<<endl<<"All

else

^

not go as expected";
cout<<endl;
return;

//Times how long it takes to do different actions
//on a WinternitzShort signature
void winternitzShortTiming(int max, int inc)
cout<<endl<<"WinternitzShort timing."<<endl;
clock_t tl, t2;
tl=clock();
//A sub element has a values less then n.
const short unsigned int n = pow(2,elementLen);
const short unsigned int messLen=SHA::DIGESTSIZE;
byte mess[messLen];//The message whos digest will be signed
//Generating a random message
AutoSeededRandomPool rng;
rng.GenerateBlock(mess, SHA::DIGESTSIZE);
//Creating the digest of the message
byte m [SHA::DIGESTSIZE];
SHA().CalculateDigest(m, mess, messLen);
t2 =clock();
int i,j;//loop counters
//Makes an empty WinternitzShort siganture
for(i=inc; i<=max; i+=inc)
{
tl=clock();
for(j=0; j<i; j++)
WinternitzShort W;
t2=clock 0 ;
cout<<"Make\t"<<j<<"\tempty wintertnitz signatures=\t"
<<(float)(t2-tl)/CLOCKS_PER_SEC<<"\tseconds"<<endl;

}
//Updates an empty WinternitzShort siganture
//Can normally only be done once on an empty object
for(i=inc; i<=max; i+=inc)
{
WinternitzShort W;
tl=clock();
for(j=0; j<i; j++)
W.update(m, SHA::DIGESTSIZE);
t2=clock 0 ;
cout<<"Update\t"<<j
<<"\tempty wintertnitz signatures=\t"
<<(float)(t2-tl)/CLOCKS_PER_SEC<<"\tseconds"<<endl;

}
//Makes a WinternitzShort siganture
for(i=inc; i<=max; i+=inc)
{
tl=clock 0 ;
for(j=0; j<i; j++)
WinternitzShort W(m, SHA::DIGESTSIZE);
t2=clock();

^

cout<<"iyiake\t"<<j <<"\twintertnitz signature objects=\t"
<<(float)(t2-tl)/CLOCKS_PER_SEC<<"\tseconds"<<endl;

//Create the temporary variables needed to verify a siganture
WinternitzShort tempW(m, SHA:iDIGESTSIZE);
short unsigned int len=tempW.getxyLen();
byte ** tempSign=new byte * [len];
byte *tempSubVal=new byte [len];
byte **tempY=new byte * [len];
//Allocate memory
for(i=0; i<len; i++)
{
tempY[i]=new byte [SUA: iDIGESTSIZE] /
tempSign[i]=new byte [SHA::DIGESTSIZE];

}
//Gets the public parts of a WinternitzShort signature
tempW.getSignature(tempSign, tempY);
//A signature testing object
WinternitzShort testW;
short testValue=testW.verifySignature(m, tempSign, tempY);
if(testValue==-l)
{
cout<<endl<<"Test signature could not be completed.
Abnormal abort";
return;

}
else if(testValue==0)
{
cout<<endl<<"Test signature failed. Abnormal abort";
return;

}
//Verify the WinternitzShort siganture (tempSign, tempY)
//on the message m
for(i=inc; i<=max; i+=inc)
{
tl = cloc]c 0 ;
for(j=0; j<i; j++)
testW.verifySignature(m, tempSign, tempY);
t2=clock();
cout < <"Verity\t"< < j
<<"\twintertnitz signatures=\t"
<<(float)(t2-tl)/CLOCKS_PER_SEC<<"\tseconds"<<endl;

}
//Gets the public parts of a WinternitzShort signature.
//This involves producing the signature
for(i=inc; i<=max; i+=inc)
{
tl=cloc]c 0 ;
for(j=0; j<i; j++)
tempW.getSignature(tempSign, tempY);
t2 = cloc]c() ;
cout<<"Get (produce)\t"<<j

}

<<"\twintertnitz signatures=\t"
<<(float)(t2-tl)/CLOCKS PER SEC<<"\tseconds"<<endl;
"
"

//Gets the public y of a WinternitzShort signature.
//This involves producing the y martrix
for{i=inc; i<=max; i+=inc)
{
tl=clock();
for(j=0; j<i; j++)
tempW.getY(tempY);
t2=clock();
cout<<"Get (produce)\t"<<j
<<"\ty matrices=\t"
<<(float)(t2-tl)/CLOCKS_PER_SEC<<"\tseconds"<<endl;

}
void makeKeys()
{
clock_t tl, t2;
tl=clock();
unsigned int keyLength=1024;
const char *privRSAFilename="hexrsapriv.txt"/
const char *pubRSAFilename="hexrsapub.txt";
const char *privDSAFilename="hexdsapriv.txt"/
const char *pubDSAFilename="hexdsapub.txt";
const char *seed="456erty68ur";
t2=clock();
cout<<endl<<"Make keys timing"<<endl;
//Make RSA keys
tl=clock();
RandomPool randPool;
randPool.Put((byte *)seed, strlen(seed));
RSAES_OAEP_SHA_Decryptor priv(randPool, keyLength);
HexEncoder privFile(new FileSink(privRSAFilename));
priv.DEREncode(privFile);
privFile.MessageEnd();
RSAES_OAEP_SHA_Encryptor pub(priv);
HexEncoder pubFile(new FileSink(pubRSAFilename))/
pub.DEREncode(pubFile);
pubFile.MessageEndO ;
t2=clock();
cout<<"Make RSA (1024) key pair=\t"<<(float)(t2tl)/CLOCKS_PER_SEC<<"\tseconds"<<endl;
//Make DSA keys
tl=clock();
randPool.Put((byte *)seed, strlen(seed) ) ;
DSAPrivateKey dsaPrivate(randPool,keyLength);
HexEncoder dsaPrivFile(new FileSink(privDSAFilenamej
dsaPrivate.DEREncode(dsaPrivFile)/
dsaPrivFile.MessageEnd();
GDSAVerifier<SHA> dsaPublic(dsaPrivate);
HexEncoder dsaPubFile(new FileSink(pubDSAFilename));

dsaPublic.DEREncode(dsaPubFile);
t2=clock();
cout<<"Make DSA (1024) key pair=\t"<<(float)(t2tl)/CLOCKS_PER_SEC<<"\tseconds"<<endl;
}
void signingTest(int max, int ine)

clock_t tl =clock();
const char *privRSAFilename="hexrsapriv. txt" ;
const char *pubRSAFilename="hexrsapub.txt";
const char *privDSAFilename="hexdsapriv.txt"/
const char *pubDSAFilename="hexdsapub.txt";
int i=0;
const char *seed="375rth5tdy";
long longseed;
const int messLen=12;
byte mess[messLen]="Hello world";
byte digest[SHA::DIGESTSIZE];
AutoSeededRandomPool rng;
longseed=rng.GetLong();
RandomPool randPool;
//(byte*)&c;
//randPool.Put ( (byte *)seed, strlen(seed))/
randPool.Put((byte*)¿longseed, strlen(seed));
byte * randomMssg=new byte[SHA:rDIGESTSIZE];
randPool.GenerateBlock(randomMssg, SHA::DIGESTSIZE);

S H A O .CalculateDigest(digest, mess, messLen);
GDSASigner<SHA>

dsaSigner(FileSource(privDSAFilename,
true, new HexDecoder));
GDSADigestSigner dsaDigestSigner(FileSource(privDSAFilename,
true, new HexDecoder));
GDSADigestVerifier dsaDigestVerifier(FileSource(pubDSAFileñame,
true, new HexDecoder));
RSASSA_PKCSlvl5_SHA_Signer rsaDigestSigner(FileSource
(privRSAFilename, true, new HexDecoder));
RSASSA_PKCSlvl5_SHA_Verifier rsaDigestVerifier(FileSource
(pubRSAFileñame, true, new HexDecoder));

int signDsaDigestLen=dsaSigner.SignatureLength() ;
byte * signatureDsaDigest=new byte [signDsaDigestLen];
int signRsaDigestLen=rsaDigestSigner.SignatureLength();
byte * signatureRsaDigest=new byte [signRsaDigestLen] ;

int
rounds=max;
clock t t2 =clock();

tl=clock();
for(i=0; i<rounds; i++)
^
dsaDigestSigner.SignDigest(rng, digest

SHA::DIGESTSIZE, signatureDsaDigest);
t2=clock();
cout<<"dsaDigestSigner time=\t"
<<(float)(t2-tl)/CLOCKS_PER_SEC<<"\t"<<rounds<<endl;
tl=clock();
for(i=0; i<rounds; i++)
dsaDigestVerifier.VerifyDigest(digest,
SHA::DIGESTSIZE, signatureDsaDigest);
t2=clock();
cout<<"dsaDigestVerifier time=\t"
<<(float)(t2-tl)/CLOCKS_PER_SEC<<"\t"<<rounds<<endl;
tl=clock();
for(i=0; i<rounds; i++)
rsaDigestSigner.SignDigest(rng, digest,
SHA::DIGESTSIZE, signatureRsaDigest);
t2=clock();
cout<<"rsaDigestSigner time=\t"
<<(float)(t2-tl)/CLOCKS_PER_SEC<<"\t"<<rounds<<endl;
tl=clock();
for(i=0; i<rounds; i++)
rsaDigestVerifier.VerifyDigest(digest,
SHA::DIGESTSIZE, signatureRsaDigest);
t2=clock();
cout<<"rsaDigestVerifier time=\t"
<<(float)(t2-tl)/CLOCKS PER SEC<<"\t"<<rounds<<endl;
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